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A strategic conflict analysis

A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region



Content

Executive summary 5

Section I Introduction and Regional analysis 6
Section II. Scenario Analysis and recommendations 6
Section III. The country analysis 10

1 Introduction 16

1.1 Objectives and methodology 16
1.2 Points of departure 19

2. Overview of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region 23

2.1 Multi-ethnic societies, failed nation-state projects and structural violence 24
2.2 Large-scale direct violence and impunity 25
2.3 The refugees, the diaspora and the conflicts in Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi and Uganda 25
2.4 The regional conflict situation – a brief overview 26

3. Conflict resolution mechanisms 33

3.1 External actors and mechanism 34
3.2 Regional Actors 36
3.3 Examples of NGO and CBOs working with regional dimensions of the conflict 42
3.4 Trade and Private Sector development 43
3.5 Challenges 43

4. Crosscutting themes in the regional conflict complex 45

4.1 Structural violence – root source one 45
4.2 Knowledge production, construction of identities and legitimacy in GLR – root source two 46
4.3 Elite competition 48
4.4 Deficient democracy, governance, legitimacy and citizenship 49
4.5 Culture of violence, genocide and impunity 51
4.6 Militarisation of the societies 52
4.7 Regional demographic fluidity 54
4.8 Security sector reform 56
4.9 Justice, reconciliation, rehabilitation and trauma 58
4.10 Demographic stress and physical isolation 59

4.11 Natural resources – conflict source and development option 60
4.12 HIV/AIDS 62
4.13 Interconnection between conflicts – not necessarily direct linked, but still reinforcing the dynamics in the region 63
4.14 Conclusion 64

5. Scenario Analysis 68
5.1 Worst case scenario 68
5.2 A best-case scenario 72
5.3 Most likely scenario 75

6. Approaching a regional cooperation strategy. Policy recommendations 81
6.1 Structural violence allevation 83
6.2 "Cognitive reintegration" 86
6.3 Regional conflict resolution mechanisms 88
6.4 Policy level and donor coordination 89
6.5 Demobilisation 90
6.6 Regional programme/capacity on research and facilitation of conflict management and peace building . 91
6.7 Sweden's role 91
6.6 Concluding suggestions 92

7. Conflict analysis Rwanda 102
7.1 Introduction 102
7.2 Historic overview of the emergence of major structures in the Rwandan conflict complex – the root causes 102
7.3 Five proxy factors behind the genocide of 1994 108
7.4 Triggers; the peace process, democratisation, Burundi 109
7.5 The Genocide and its consequence for today's Rwanda 111
7.6 The conflict configuration – from a Rwandan perspective .. 114
7.7 Internal effects of genocide: Destroyed society and state machinery, mass murder, traumatised survivors and perpetrators 117
7.9 Brief analysis of the main actors 124
7.10 Today's situation 129
7.11 Challenges – Risk for future conflicts 132
7.12 Conclusions and the role of the international society 134

8. Conflict Analysis of Burundi 137
8.1 History as pretext 137
8.2 Themes in Burundi's conflict configuration 141
8.3 Direct violence in Burundi 142
8.4 Main actors in Burundi's conflict configuration 143
8.5 Structural violence in Burundi 146
8.6 The construction of knowledge and identities 149
8.7 Deficient democracy, governance, and rule of law 150
8.8 Strategic considerations for working in and on the Burundi conflict 155

9. Conflict Analysis Democratic Republic of Congo 158
9.1 The conflict environment 159
9.2 Post independence 160

9.3 Revival of old tensions and the two wars 163
9.4 The international donors and the quest for peace 170
9.5 Challenges for peace building 171
9.6 Current political risk issues 176
9.7 Risk evaluation 183
9.8 Mechanisms for conflict management and resolution 185
9.10 The Congolese civil society 189
9.11 Summing up on conflict management mechanisms 191

10. Conflict analysis Uganda 193
10.1 Basic characteristics. 193
10.2 Uganda since independence 193
10.3 Internal Conflict Pattern. 194
10.4 The External Conflict Pattern 197
10.5 The Uganda State and Civil Society 199
10.6 A thematic analysis 200
10.7 What to do? 202

11. Conflict analysis Kenya 204
11.1 Basic characteristics 204
11.2 Kenya since independence. 204
11.3 Present Conflict Pattern. 205

12. Tanzania 207
12.1 Internal conflicts 207
12.2 Tanzania's role in the Great Lakes 208

Selected list of references 211

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Executive summary

The purpose of this study is to give some input to the preparation process of a new regional strategy for Swedish international development co-operation in the Great Lakes region. The report draws on a number of field visits carried out from May to November 2003. Extensive reviews of secondary material were also conducted.

The report is organised in a three sections: the first section with an introduction and theoretical point of departure and an overview of the major sources of conflicts on the regional level, a chapter on regional conflict resolutions mechanisms and lastly a chapter outlining crosscutting issues from the country analyses; the second section consists of a chapter on scenarios and a chapter on policy recommendations; the third section consists of country analyses of Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Uganda and Kenya. In the country analyses, we show the major structural, proxy and triggering factors behind the current conflict configuration. The country analyses constitute the stepping-stone for the crosscutting issues and regional analysis in section two.

The overall conclusion of our work is that the peace process has taken some very important steps forward during 2003. Both the governments of the region, and the international donors display a commitment to peace and development. Despite certain local outbreaks of violence in more than one of the countries, the generalised violence has come to a halt.

However, this situation cannot be taken for granted, and there are still risks for reversals. It is this perspective the future role of the international community must be seen. Among the concepts included in our theoretical points of departure are the well-known distinction between direct violence and structural violence. The present military situation, with fading expressions of violence, means that direct violence in the region is fading, while there are still no signs of any coherent strategy for what we have chosen to call structural violence reduction.

Thus, first and foremost, the international donors should at all costs promote a development strategy which is based the immediate need to direct all efforts to reduce the structural violence in the region. Basically, this is about dealing with people's basic needs satisfaction. Without this, huge amounts of people, not least young people, in the region will continue to be vulnerable and receptive for any kind of mobilisation to renewed direct violence.

A second conclusion regards what we call cognitive reintegration. This has to do with all the long-term images and perceptions of group relations in the region. The elites and the leaderships in the different countries are obviously not free from existing stereotypes in perception of the others. But also at much deeper levels of these societies identity questions have interplayed with material and immaterial basic conditions for a sustainable livelihood. Thus, the question of structural violence reduction and cognitive reintegration should be dealt with simultaneously. Here, we want to highlight the necessity to integrate also local and regional elite groups in the future economic set-up of the region.

Section I Introduction and Regional analysis

Section one start out with outlining the methodology and theoretical points of departure for the study. An overview of the main features of the regional conflicts is made as well as an inventory of existing regional mechanisms for conflict management. In chapter 3 we suggest that the main features and driving force of the conflicts are: Structural Violence: Knowledge production; construction of identities and legitimacy; Elite competition; Deficient democracy, governance and rule of law; Culture of violence, genocide and impunity; Militarization of the societies; Regional demographic fluidity; Lack of justice, reconciliation and trauma counselling; Demographic stress and physical isolation; conflicts over natural resources; HIV/AIDS; Interconnection between the conflicts.

In section II a three scenarios are developed as well as policy recommendations. Among the conclusions and the policy recommendations are:

1) The Great Lakes' region is a comparatively confined geographical area, with high population density and a history of interdependence. There are several very strong regional dynamics, as well as direct and indirect interactions between the conflicts in the region. It is thus necessary to have a clear regional analysis as a basis for actions in the different countries in the region. This does not necessarily mean that implementation must be on a regional level. However, it is necessary to analyse how the situation or intervention in one country affects the neighbours.
2) One third of all ended civil wars in Africa restarts. We think that two stepping-stones for the maintenance of peace are on the one hand, "to reduce structural violence", and, on the other, "to contribute to cognitive reintegration". The building of institutions and the reconstitution of the social contract between state and citizens, and the social trust among citizens are steps in order to achieve a successful post-conflict transformation.
3) Helping the people of a war-torn country to rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a politically delicate process, which requires financial commitment and programmatic coherence from the international community. It requires a multifaceted, coordinated effort to rebuild not only economic but also and perhaps more importantly, social and political institutions, as well as legitimacy and trust, now devastated by war and violence.

4) The peace process could paradoxically generate widening frustration gaps. Expectations and hope increase. At the same time, it will take a long time to reconstruct economic, political and social structures that are in shambles, which Rwanda clearly illustrates. It will take even longer before an improvement from the prerequisites-conflict situation could be achieved. Withheld international support could, in a delicate transition phase, widen the frustration gap, as for example by undermining the peace process both through increased frustration, and by not rewarding the political leadership endeavouring to broker peace (as in Burundi). In this way, an overcautious approach might risk delegitimise both the peace process, and the donors.

5) This is an argument for the international community to give substantial support already during the transition period, though it may be very difficult, and carries high transaction costs, and risk doing harm.

6) The question is how to do this: with what means, which channels to use, where to enter and with what sequencing, with the minimum requirement i.e. not to do any harm. The needs are enormous, the challenges gigantic, the complexity immense and the interplay of forces makes any prediction of likely future development uncertain. Nevertheless, it is our conclusion that the conflicts determine *how, but not how much*, to work in the region, that is to say that the conflicts call on specific strategic considerations on how to work in and on the conflicts.

7) The type of support that should be given should of course be developed in dialogue with all the various actors in the region, with the overall objective of the largest degree possible of ownership and sustainability. The ideas given here are points of departure in that process. Nevertheless, we would like to suggest some general guidelines that might be used when selecting where and how to intervene:

8) Conflicts as such are *not* a hindrance for, or an excuse for not intervening in, development cooperation. The conflict situation, however, frames *how* the cooperation should be designed. It is an expression of political interest or other priorities, that decides whether aid should be given or not. Thus, according to our point of departure, a rapid transfer from a humanitarian approach to a development approach is called for.

9) We thus argue for increased development cooperation in these vastly devastated areas, where a number of positive developments could now be discerned, both in Rwanda, DRC and as well as in Burundi. Moreover, developments in the region will have large repercussions in Uganda, Tanzania, and to a certain extent via Uganda and Sudan, in Kenya. All are countries with a long history of development cooperation with Sweden, and where vast sums of Swedish aid have been invested; investments that might be partly lost if the conflict escalates again. It is important to assist these countries in the fragile post-conflict transformation phase to enable the rapid rebuilding of economic, social and physical institutions, in such a way that a clear and beneficial peace dividend will be palpable for the whole populations, as well as for the elites. The opportunity cost for war and violence must be increased, and a possible peace dividend more quickly felt both by the population – and maybe more importantly – by elites at different levels.

10) Rwanda has gone through an impressive post-conflict rehabilitation and has now built up a comparatively efficient institutional setup, and is endeavouring to establish a new Rwandan identity. Rwanda is in a delicate transition period; the most important root cause of the conflict is still there: poverty.

11) We also think that it is important to work and to continue to work with an intense policy dialogue. There is an obvious dilemma as regards the criticism against weaknesses in Rwanda's human rights record. On the one hand, it cannot be taken for granted that these weaknesses have passed their peak, while on the other hand, exit is not a viable option if 'we' want to support an improved development. A reinforced policy dialogue is a relevant answer to this dilemma. Such a dialogue should focus on the need to strengthen sustainable rural livelihood reinforcement, far beyond what is conceived in the PRS. Fulfilling the PRS, as regards poverty alleviation, is clearly not enough in order to constitute a trade-off against a poor human rights record, and it is certainly not enough in order to reach the level of structural violence reduction, that we deem necessary in such a traumatic post-conflict perspective.

12) Assistance to Burundi should also be considered augmenting, and a bilateral programme should be developed during the current strategy period so that Burundi could be a program country in the next strategy period.

13) Increased interventions in eastern DRC and Burundi could preferably be administered from a post in the region, in order to facilitate a better flow of information and ease up administration, rather then being administered from Nairobi. The UK and the Netherlands administer their aid in the region via their embassies in Kigali. Legitimacy needs would still require an extended presence in Kinshasa.

14) However, increased support for the region must be based on careful elaborated strategy and needs to be guided by intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground in the different countries:

   a. Generally strive to balance central power structures in order to support a balance of power inside and outside the state apparatus as well as to contribute to an inclusive, reconciliatory and democratic culture, local level development and a pluralistic society.
   b. Maintain a close and open dialogue on human rights issues.
   c. Support to DRC and Burundi should be based on sectors and districts/provinces, rather then countries. This means that in a situation that characterises Burundi and DRC today, there are always local areas with no violence in the middle of deep conflicts.
   d. A high degree of flexibility should characterise the interventions, so that activities could easily be moved or stopped.
   e. Close cooperation with other donors, and linking up with multilateral regional programmes are essential.
   f. Depending on the country, it might be considered beneficial to work with many small projects, rather than with huge projects with high initial investment costs and therefore less flexible.

15) The channels and contacts already in use should continue to be used. However, an effort to widen the kind of Swedish NGOs to be used should be considered. Sida should also consider using established governmental and indigenous NGOs to a larger extent, especially now when we are approaching a post-conflict situation. This would both strengthen local capacity and avoid creation/maintaining parallel structures.

The role of Sweden

16) We think that Sweden has an important role to play in the Great Lakes' area. Sweden does not have a colonial heritage or geopolitical aspirations in the region. Sweden is also regarded as an interesting role model for the post-conflict societies in the making, with our long history of peace, balance between state and market and welfare society. In terms of casualties, the wars in the region have produced the largest numbers since the Second World War. Extremely fragile peace processes are now underway in DRC and Burundi. The needs in the region are enormous, and at the same time overshadowed, not least by the developments in Middle East. At the same time, it is a very dynamic period in the region's history, where Sweden could be a partner in the formation of the new states and societies in GLR.

17) On the international level, Sweden shall support all international efforts to achieve and sustain peace in the region. We suggest that Sweden takes a more active role in UN and its departments as well as in EU, in order to support activities with the aim of building peace and development in the Great Lakes' regions. Not least important is to keep the Great Lakes on the agenda. Sweden should not only take a passive role and support the initiative of others, but also play a more active role, initiate proposals and campaign for them. One such important issue is that of the different international actors coordinating their policies in order to pull in the same direction and not undermine each other's activities. It is also important to promote solutions that are based on the needs and interests of the Great Lakes' region, and not based on Western geopolitical or narrow economic or nationalistic interests. A second issue is to advocate in all international negotiations and rule-setting arenas, like WTO, for an international order that favours poor countries like the Great Lakes' countries rather then the industrialised countries. A third issue is to establish a responsible rules and corporate governance, when DRC and the region, in a post-conflict phase will open up for international investments.

18) This would require that a person, at high level in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assume a special responsibility to follow the events and act on the international arena. At present, one person has such a role in Southern Africa and another has been appointed the EU coordinator for the area Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry.

19) This might also need a stronger Swedish presence in the region, as well as an expanded Swedish knowledge base.

Section III. The country analysis

Rwanda

No direct violence occurs in Rwanda. The 10-year transition period from the peace agreement in 1993 formally ended with the referendum on the new constitution in May 2003 and the Presidential and Legislative elections in the autumn 2003. The first multiparty elections since independence have been concluded nine years after an extreme situation, and in a regional context with ongoing violent conflicts. It must be judged out from those preconditions. However, human rights organisations and the EU election monitors have pointed at a number of human rights abuses, taking place both before and under the elections. On the other hand, no violence occurred, in contrast to almost all neighbouring countries recent elections. The election must be regarded as the first step towards reconciliation and democratisation in a highly divided and fragile country with extremely weak national identity, rather than an end point of a transition to democracy. Focus should be on the broader political developments and long-term development prospect rather then only be judged on the electoral procedure as such. The number of *Hutus* both in the government and in the parliament has increased, paving the way for a new Rwandan identity where cultural identity exists parallel to a strong feeling of being a Rwandan citizen. Despite all its flaws, we consider it a hopeful point of departure for the process of reconciliation that will take decades, if not generations to conclude. For the first time in Rwanda's independent history a popularly elected government rules the country. The elections should be judged out from what the new leadership delivers in terms of a democratic culture and institutions the coming five-seven years.

A number of institutions has been rehabilitated and/or new been developed. And a comparably efficient administration has been established and it has launched and implemented a number of reforms. Security sector reform has created a new National Defence Force and integrated different forces as well as demobilised almost 50 000 soldiers. A new constitution have been acknowledge in a referendum. Local government reforms underway as well as a reform of the judiciary. A number of innovative institutions for conflict management, reconciliation and post-conflict rehabilitation have been established. The national commissions for Unity and Reconciliation and the Gacaca courts for instance. The macro economic development is reasonable well.

The situation is, however, fragile. Several of the root sources of the conflict(s) are still present. Hardliners on both sides are still active. The poverty is deep and even more widespread than before the genocide. The population is deeply traumatised. The victims' situation is very difficult. The justice system in crisis and more then 80 000 people still in prison without adequate trials. The Human Rights situation has improved, but still leaves a lot more to desire. Freedom of speech and media is circumscribed. Even if a private media recently have been allowed. In order to avoid new cycles of direct violence, either emanating from the region or with regional implications, the following challenges must be managed;

1) The structural violence that generated the genocide in 1994 has even increased. If economic development fails to reach the majority the

frustrated and marginalised people might be mobilised again. In addition, economic opportunities must be developed for elites outside the state apparatuses.

2) To handle the multiplicity of tensions between diverging interests, not the least over scarce resources. Land pressure and demographic development still provide a hotbed for frustration, in particular when different generations of refugees and Ex-FAR/Interahamwe combatants are coming back, soldiers are demobilised and 10 000s of prisoners are released.
3) Cognitive reintegration: To handle the unhealed wounds of Genocide, i.e. the lack of trust between people and between people and the state, the need to "mending" society and establish a new social contract between the state and the citizens. The eradication of the ideology and identities underpinning the genocide. The victim's situation must be improved and the traumas at least somehow healed; otherwise another future source of conflict will be generated.
4) Democratic deficit: If the new government fail to develop inclusive political processes, from local to national level, people's resentment will increase. Of particular importance is to find a way for competing elites to get access to political space, without resorting to violence. It also means to integrate all political components, including political parties in exile that are firmly engaged in political struggle and recognising genocide without ambiguity. The high level of illiteracy on the one hand makes people an easy prey for manipulation by political elites. The low level of education creates a dramatic lack of capacity, in a situation with great administrative as well as economic challenges.
5) Regional challenges: Rwanda, as a small country with weak economic base, perceives that it security situation is precarious. If the peace process in DRC fails or if the militias are not disarmed, demobilised and integrated, the situation will have a dramatic effect on Rwanda. The situation in Uganda has implications for the development in Rwanda as well. If the Ugandan government continues to be challenged from inside, and maybe in addition from the Sudan, its policies against DRC and Rwanda might change again to a more expansionistic strategy in order to strengthen its power base. However, currently (early 2004) the relation between the two countries is better then ever. The development of the peace process in Burundi have influence, albeit less than a few years back when the state in Rwanda was less well established.

The role of the international society

The develop cooperation must take its departure in the context of Rwanda's violent history and deeply divided society. All interventions must be made with peace and conflict management as an overarching principle. The development in Rwanda must be seen as a long-term state-, nation-building and reconciliation process. One of the most important prerequisites for this to take place is *structural violence reduction*, that is creating structure enabling increased productivity and income opportunities for the whole population, not the least in the rural areas.

Another is to keep as large part of the Rwandan society *connected* to a wider international community, to assist in building networks and most important of all, keep a constant dialogue with both the government as well as with other sections of the society on issues of human rights, democracy and reconciliation.

Few countries more desperately need international support in order to rebuild its society in order to avoid a new genocide or war based on continued frustration over increasing structural violence, Support should on the one hand be devoted to the government's efforts to build the institutions that are needed for an efficient and well-governed state and the PRS. But at the same time contribute to create as much balance of power in terms of effective independent judiciary, ombudsman, strong parliament, strong local councils, strong civil society, democratic culture and strong and free media and, if possible, strong oppositions parties. Reconciliation without democratic spaces will be impossible in the long run. Reconciliation also means healing the traumatised individuals, not the least the woman and children victims from the genocide. *Cognitive reintegration,* i.e. promotion of dialogue, changing the attitudes, ideology and identities that enabled the genocide is of major importance. A regional approach is necessary as the communities are so closely linked at regional level. Here, the free, critical and high quality massmedia, education, cultural and sports events and history writing play a pivotal role.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Although there is now a transitional government in place in Kinshasa, and many steps are taken, which should be considered as very positive, they cannot be a justification for triumphalist claims that the DRC is now a country in peace. Our judgement is that there are good possibilities for the future, though there are a number of challenges ahead.

There is a general risk linked to peace agreements, which mainly deals with a reshaping of balance of power and influence in the military and political realm of the conflict-ridden society. Although it sometimes manages to establish a 'working order' among the included parties, not all relevant parties are included, and mostly no attention is given to what is sometimes called root causes of the conflict. Root causes are normally left to any new government to consider. Lack of political maturity, in combination with persistent patterns of regional, ethnic or other identity group discrimination, may easily leave root causes behind, contributing to a seething discontent.

According to our analysis of the DRC conflict dynamics there are three complexes, in which the most important issues are to be found.

The first is a continuing poverty and isolation of the rural areas. The total breakdown of societal legitimacy and social trust at local level, which emerged, mainly, out the post-1998 war situation has clear roots in the way DRC has been governed since a long time. In many senses the post-independence period did not differ substantially from the colonial era. The structural violence built into the proper societal situation was due to create rupture and move into large scale direct violence at any time. These deep roots of conflict sources must be a main priority for the foreseeable future.

The second issue is the internal east-west relations of DRC. The regional cleavages in both economic and identity terms must be dealt

with. Built into this issue is also the external relations to Uganda and Rwanda. The eastern provinces have deep historical relations eastwards, while Kinshasa for all practical purposes is very far away. This dilemma should be taken into account in all efforts to heal the region.

The third important issue is the proper nature of a development strategy for DRC. Its main assets are obviously the minerals, and mineral export must, also obviously, play a very important part of any strategy. But the challenge for the international community in general, and the transnational economic mineral actors specifically, is to allow a pattern of distribution of the concessions and future profits, which avoids rather than promotes future conflicts.

Burundi

Sustainable development in Burundi is impeded by a series of conflicts fed by structural and political factors around ethnic and geographic stratification and control with different social groups trying to obtain some degree of livelihood under increasing structural constraints. The direct violence since the failed democratization in 1993 should be seen in light of the social, economic, and political history including pre-colonial patterns of marginalisation and control. Adding to the conflict configuration is the regional dimension manifested primarily in military support to government and non-government forces, regional refugees, militarization of societies throughout the region, a regional conflict psychology, and the structural constraints constituted by the regional conflict on Burundi's economic development.

Since its inauguration on Nov 1st 2001, and the successful turnover of power on May 1st 2003, the National Transitional Government has made some progress towards peace and reintegration in Burundi. Sweden should develop its efforts in Burundi to support ongoing initiatives for peace and development in much need of concrete dividends. The existing level of conflict in Burundi is thus not an insurmountable obstacle to expand on engagements in Burundi. The conflict configuration should determine *how, not how much*, to engage in Burundi. Working in and on the conflict in Burundi thus calls for strategic considerations in terms of Sida's engagement in Burundi.

Sida's engagement in Burundi should be developed in cooperation with international and domestic actors to support direct and structural violence alleviation, cognitive reintegration, and democratic governance and rule of law. Specific attention should be given to support to civil society, economic entrepreneurs, parliamentarians, media, and local government. Among the most pressing needs are support to the security sector reform, reintegration of former combatants and refugees, and support to foster a viable, liberalized economic sector. Sida could specifically target the need for cognitive reintegration by supporting national and regional initiatives and dialogues. Further, support to democratic rule is pivotal for sustainable development of Burundi.

Uganda/Kenya/Sudan

Internally, Uganda has been plagued by severe violence in the northern and western parts of the country. At the moment the West Nile is relatively calm, even if the danger of new eruptions in a post conflict area is

always present. The Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA) has been raiding large parts of northern Uganda for 16 years, being behind cruel atrocities. It is difficult to grasp the rationale behind the LRA activities. In the neighbouring areas to the LRA districts we find Karamoja that has been at the apex for cattle rustling since pre colonial times. The situation has been aggravated due to the access to modern arms in the region. One dilemma in areas that have been the victims of atrocities from LRA or Karamoja warriors is the number of people that are internally displaced (IDPs). Another one has been the escalating trafficking in small arms across a number of countries in the region. Cattle raiding is also a problem on the other side of the border to Kenya with Turkana, Samburu and Pokot. With the Kibaki rule we have also seen an intensification of tribal diversities, not least in an increasing marginalisation of the Luo ethnic group next to Lake Victoria.

It is also possible to see how the pattern of insecurity in both Kenya and Uganda is influenced by external forces. The volatile situation in Ethiopia and Somalia has a great impact on the state of affairs in Kenya. For northern Uganda the issue of southern Sudan is of crucial importance. A peace accord on southern Sudan will be a substantial threat to the continued existence of the LRA forces. At the same time even an agreement on Sudan does not guarantee a peaceful future for that country. New wars, like in Darfur, have cropped up and even in the southern parts the basic problems are far from being solved. To a certain extent it is also possible to see how Uganda is getting closer to the Great Lakes region, with its involvement with both DRC and Rwanda. Relations to Congo have for long been related to exploitation of resources in a country without any substantial state governance. In this Uganda has been one actor, together with powerful international finance capital.

The situation of conflict in Uganda in particular is closely related to poverty and a lack of development in the northern part of the country. To do something on this issue must be a prime objective, in addition to an alleviation of the acute poverty in IDP camps. Most probably the indigenous NGO/CBO sector can play a part in this activity. It would be essential to support the on-going peace work done at the AU, IGAD and through organisations such as Africa Peace Forum.

A future scenario for any one region, or country for that matter, is closely linked to what is going on in other parts of not only the Great Lakes, but also the Horn of Africa. One conclusion from this is that we have to give a greater emphasis to the regional dimension for peace and development in the area.

Section I.
Introduction and regional analysis

1 Introduction

During 2003, Sida has been developing a regional strategy for the Great Lakes' region, including country strategies for Burundi, DRC and Rwanda for the period 2004–2007. Because of the complex conflict situation in the region, Sida consulted experts to carry out a series of comprehensive conflict analyses including recommendations on how donors could promote peace building in the regions. Jonas Ewald was consulted to write a regional conflict analysis and a country analysis on Rwanda, Patrik Stålgren on Burundi, Anders Nilsson on DRC and Anders Närman on Uganda/Kenya. The analyses will serve as input in the strategy processes. Jonas Ewald functioned as team leader during the field phase and as editor for the writing up of the report.

The consultants are based at Department for Peace and Development Studies; the Department of Political Science; and the Centre for Africa Studies at Göteborg University and the School of Social Sciences at Växjö University, respectively.[1] The team in turn cooperated with Alice Karekezi Urasaro and Eugene Ntaganda from the Centre for Conflict Management, National University of Rwanda (CCM) and Anícia Lalá from Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI), Mozambique/ Cranfield University/UK. Alice Karekezi Urasaro has also provided substantial written input in the section on regional conflict resolution mechanisms.[2]

1.1 Objectives and methodology

According to the terms of reference, the overall objective of the Strategic Conflict Analysis of the Great Lakes' regions is to "deepen Sida's under-

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2 During our work, we have benefited greatly from the assistance of a large number of people both within Sida as well as outside the organisation. Charlotte Eriksson and Inger Buxton have been generous with their time and inputs in the study. In particular Charlotte Eriksson has created a conducive and constructive dialogue during the whole process. We are also grateful to the staffs at the embassies in the region for the time they have taken to discuss with us as well as read and comment on earlier drafts: Bo Göransson, David Viking, Per Karlsson in Nairobi, Erik Åberg in Kampala, Sten Rylander in Dar es Salaam and Ingrid Lövström Berg and Johanna Altin in Kigali. We have also been given the opportunity for discussing with a large number of functionaries, officials as well as researchers and NGOs in the region. We are deeply indebted to them for the time and the insights they have shared with us, some of which might conceivably appear in the report. We have decided not to put the names of those interviewed in the report for confidentiality reasons. Lennart Wohlgemut and Tomas Riddeaus at the Nordic Africa Institute has been an invaluable discussion partner as well. We have also had the opportunity to present the report at Sida for a number of staffs that contributed valuable comments. In the end, however, it is the authors who are responsible for the text and views in this report.

standing of potential and ongoing conflicts, with the aim of strengthening Sida's capability of contributing to conflict management responses in the regions". The analysis will include an overview of the regional conflict context in order to identify current trends within the regions and map out conflict-related risks and opportunities for promoting peace, with a view to outlining a number of options for Sida's work in the future.

The framework of the analysis will include the following parts:

1. Conflict analysis – with the aim of mapping out existing and potential conflicts, to seek to understand the causes and dynamics of the conflicts, as well as the forces pushing for violent conflict respectively for peace.

2. Scenario analysis – with a point of departure in the conflict analysis above, to assess the likelihood of ongoing conflicts, as well as potential conflicts, increasing, decreasing or remaining stable, and to provide likely future conflict scenarios and assess their probability.

3. Developing strategies and options – with a point of departure in the Conflict analysis and Scenario analysis as well as a dialogue with Sida, to identify opportunities and risks for Sida's and other donors' work in the regions and in the individual countries. The strategies and options should emanate from an understanding of local and regional processes, the needs of local ownership and Sida's previous engagements within the regions".[3]

Methodology material and timeframe

The work commenced in April/May 2003 with consultations with desk officers at Sida/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the embassies/delegations in Kigali, Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es Salaam. Sida provided background material and the team collected and analysed relevant literature and research materials. Interviews were conducted with stakeholders and key informants in Sweden.

The main fieldwork was done in June, August and September 2003.[4] Interviews/consultations were conducted with embassy staff and field staff, government and elected representatives at different levels, political/military actors, NGOs, representatives from religious organisations, researchers, other countries embassies/aid agency staff and journalists. The interviews were conducted with the help of semi-structured question guides or as guided conversations. In selecting interviewees, the team sought to obtain on the one hand, the view of Swedish representatives and the informants usually used by the Swedish aid and embassy staff, and on the other, to go beyond those channels of information in order to gather information from diverse sources and various actors, not least from the networks the various team members have built up through several years' work in the region. As some of the information gathered could be of a sensitive kind, most interviews were conducted under the

3 Terms of Reference for strategic conflict analyses of Lake Victoria and Great Lake Regions. Sida/Stockholm May 2003.

4 The fieldwork was carried out in three phases: The team travelled together to Nairobi, and Kampala and from Kampala, Patrik Stålgren went on to Burundi while the other three continued to Kigali. In Kigali, Paulino Macaringue and Eugene Ntaganda joined the team.. From Kigali Anders Närman returned to Sweden, while Anders Nilsson, Jonas Ewald and Paulino Macaringue travelled to DRC (Bukavo and Goma). Jonas Ewald returned to Kigali while Nilsson continued to Kinshasa. Eugene Ntanganda worked first with Stålgren in Burundi and later returned to work with Ewald in Rwanda. Jonas Ewald made a second field visit in August/September to Rwanda and Anders Nilsson to DRC.

promise of anonymity. Thus nowhere in the report will we link any individual or organisation to any type of statement, and vice versa, none of the information in this report can be attributed or linked to one individual. We have systematically triangulated and/or validated all information from as diverse sources as possible. If we received controversial statements or information we have always used at least two different sources before inclusion in our analysis. However, it should be noted that at the end of the day we rely on our own interpretations of plausibility and likelihood. In all, about 120 interviews have been conducted.

Material

The material used has been the customary mix of governmental reports and steering documents, research reports, national and international NGOs reports, books, papers and news media. It is obvious that the short time at our disposal for this work constitutes a major obstacle for any 'primary research'. Thus, we rely entirely on written sources and the interviews and informal conversations that we had conducted on our tour in the regions.

However, it is from a methodological point of view important to say that our considerations are based on a first step in a triangulation process, in which we construct our first interpretation of the situation and its dynamics based on three pillars. The first one is our pre-understanding of the situation, including our (somewhat individually different) theory assumptions. The second pillar is our reading of books and reports, and the third being our direct impressions from interviews and conversations, as well as our observation of concrete expressions of societal phenomena. Triangulation as a methodological approach to reliability means that we have to allow our interpretation to be scrutinised by the actors themselves, and other observers we rely on.

Thus, it is with a huge portion of humbleness and respect for the complex situation that we submit this text to the reader.

There are numerous descriptions of the course of the conflicts, both in its national and regional dimensions, documented in consultancy reports, conference papers and books. We assume that the interested reader of this report is reasonably well informed about the empirical expressions of the conflicts. We will then concentrate our efforts on the analytical side. A simple rule of thumb for our selection of information has been that what we have come to understand to a better degree during the course of this study, and our tour in the Great Lakes' region, is the maximum of what we can offer to our readers.

We have chosen this analytical approach because of our conviction, that measures to be taken in any context of international development cooperation must be based on a thorough understanding of the dynamics of, say, an armed conflict. Thus, where possible, the analytical side of the investigation rather than the descriptive should be given priority.

We also actively seek to minimise descriptions of the theoretical approaches, which underpin our analysis. However, in each part of the report, where it has been deemed necessary, we do give brief accounts of our underlying basic assumptions, as well as of our understanding of the main concepts that appear.

Structure of the report

We have chosen to outline some of the long-term processes that have generated today's conflict situation in the country studies. We think this is necessary in order to provide some substance for today's situation.

This report is organised in a three sections: the first section with an introduction and theoretical point of departure and an overview of the major sources of conflicts on the regional level, a chapter on regional conflict resolutions mechanisms and lastly a chapter outlining crosscutting issues from the country analyses; the second section consists of a chapter on scenarios and a chapter on policy recommendations; the third section consists of country analyses of Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Uganda, Kenya. In the country analyses, we show the major structural, proxy and triggering factors behind the current conflict configuration. The country analyses constitute the stepping-stone for the crosscutting issues and regional analysis in section two. The reason for placing the country studies in a separate, final section is to make it easier for the reader to follow the regional conflict analyses. It should be noted that the conclusions, the scenarios and the recommendations emerging from the country studies appears in chapter 2–5.

The report encompasses analyses of six different countries and complex regional processes. We envisaged that most readers of this report have detailed information about the context to the respective programme areas, but perhaps not on all six countries and all of the regional processes. We have consequently endeavoured to strike a balance between including enough empirical information to make the essence of the analytical section more concrete, but without overburdening the reader with too many details. The advantage of the approach is that the text could serve many different readers.

Few texts available actually seek to analyse the contemporary situation in all the countries in the same framework. Hopefully, some crosscutting themes, interconnections and new perspectives will emerge from this exercise. The drawback of course is that the text becomes a bit lengthy. On the other hand, it is easy for the reader to skip sections with which they are familiar.

1.2 Points of departure

The war in the Great Lakes' region has often been described as a war revolving around ten countries. We profoundly believe that this country, or state, focus is misleading. A more rewarding approach, especially when it comes to conflict resolution, and future development in a prevention perspective, would be to look at the actors as social forces in search of the satisfaction of their respective most urgent needs. As researchers or development cooperation civil servants, we may disagree with these needs, or deem the expressed needs as more noble pretexts, aimed at disguising other 'needs'. Whatever is the case, any external intervention in any conflict needs to better understand the motivational processes guiding the actors. This is what conflict analysis is about.

Methodological framework

We do in principle, try to follow the reporting structure proposed in the ToR, based on the DFID'S conflict analysis approach – 'Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes. Although this structure sometimes

contradicts our holistic ideal, we have tried to overcome these potential obstacles as smoothly as possible. We have done so to some extent, but supplemented with some more theoretical assumptions, guiding our understanding of the conflict dynamics.

Conflict analysis – structural violence reduction

It has become fashionable in conflict analysis to take a position in the dichotomised debate on greed or grievances as the main explanations for contemporary violent conflicts. Both being elusive concepts, they seem to escape operative possibility. Beyond this, greed as a personality trait has a primordial and pejorative position in Western and Christian culture since the 'Ten Commandments'. Thus, its strength as an analytical tool does not seem too relevant. The choice of wording decides. By defining the illness in such morally and ethically entrenched concepts, a thorough deconstruction of the social phenomenon is seldom called for.

Instead we search for an understanding of contemporary conflicts within the framework of three overlapping layers of sources of conflict, formulated by John Burton (Burton, 1990), where possible sources of conflict may be divided into three categories: interests, values and basic human needs. Thus, we prefer talk about sources of conflict rather than causes of conflict, in an effort to increase understanding of the conflict environment, rather than engage in a search of causal explanations.

Interests are here understood as material or monetary claims, which are clearly above what is required for physical survival, but still within the framework of what can be socially justifiable in any given societal context. The proper nature of these kinds of claims make them objects for negotiations, thus interests as a source of conflict are less prone to end up in violence. However, as will be noted below, claims of interests may also be accompanied by strong perceptions of their social justifiability, especially if revindicated by marginalised elite groups. Struggle for political influence/power in order to secure access to resources – or to sustain/augment security could also be seen as part of interests.

Values, as a category of sources of conflict, is here understood as including issues linked to culture, ideology, religion, participation, freedom of expression, citizenship, etc. The idea is that obstacles to people's free choices of the value content of their lives may create tensions, which, if not removed, may contribute to conflict escalation, including armed conflict. Although values in this sense may be altered individually (people may, for example, convert to other religions, or substitute one ideology for another) collective changes or collectively felt obstacles are harder to negotiate than claims of interests.

Basic Human Needs are understood not only in its material dimension, as food, shelter, water, and long-term survival. It also includes other, and immaterial, social human needs, as identity, belonging, dignity, long-term group survival, language, reproductive rights, etc. In this sense, the satisfaction of basic human needs is not negotiable. Any durable situation of non-fulfilment of these needs will inevitably imply increased risks for future violent conflicts.

Thus, what we are dealing with is an approach to conflict analysis, in which we see these three clusters of sources of conflict as layers of more or less conflict-prone societal conditions, of which the interaction is

essential to understand. One party of a conflict may be driven by deeply felt sentiments at the 'values' layer, combined with other salient layers, while another part may be understood, as having its basic sources of conflict at the basic human needs level. In reality, most conflict actors display various degrees of dissatisfaction from all three levels.

A second part of the analysis is the institutional/structural context/order in which different actors/conflict dynamics operate. Available frameworks for negotiations/political interaction, its degree of legitimacy and inclusion as well as capacity, are of crucial importance for the way conflict dynamic unfolds. Lack of, or insufficient, legitimate and inclusive political structures, rule of law and good governance, democratic or inclusive political culture etc., amplify existing conflicts. (Development, or at least slowly improving conditions also for the majority, is as well an important part of the structural context for conflicts.)

Before going into the more palpable parts of the analysis, two assumptions that are more theoretical underlie our analytical approach.

The first assumption is derived from the idea that there are three different areas of sources of conflict. This means that the possible sources of conflict for all actors can be analysed within the same framework. Hence, we have to seek to examine the motivational processes of both groups of the population and the rank-and-file recruits to different movements and rebellions, and to the elite and leadership layers of the same organisations. Both of them possess their own specific combination of sources from the three areas, which can be analysed and, maybe, better understood.

Finally, it should be noted that elite and rank-and-file dynamics in our approach should be analysed simultaneously. Elite contradictions, how acute they may seem, cannot develop any broader violent activities if there is no meeting point between elite efforts to instrumentalise their political activities, and a growing discontent among the population of a 'suitable' identity group. We may talk about vulnerability for violent mobilisation, or politicisation of identity if there is a degree of confidence between elite and broader layers of that group of identity. The point is that this meeting point between mobilised rank-and-file and mobilising elites has to be reached if societal violence is to develop beyond inter-elite coups or individual assassinations. An analysis of each actors specific combination of sources of conflicts, and their respective negotiability, is therefore paramount if we want to identify possible interventions within the available battery of humanitarian assistance, and development cooperation measures, in order to work in, and especially if we want to work on, the conflict.

Attached to this idea of three different realms of sources of conflicts is the perception that 'gaps of frustration' are a main dynamic force in conflict escalation. A 'gap of frustration' is understood as the gap between an identity group's socially justifiable aspirations, and the same groups own perception of its possibility to satisfy these aspirations. This, as hinted above, implies that a frustration gap can emerge within any identity group, among its elite as well among peasants and/or ordinary grass-root people, on the margins of material survival. Gaps of frustration, defined in this way, implies that also conflicting elites in a society can be analysed with a reference to what they themselves consider their

justifiable rights. Thus, also sources of conflict within the sphere of interests, though more negotiable than other sources, may heavily contribute to conflicts, if the gap of frustration widens among the elites.

In this context, we find it useful to include Amartya Sen and his theoretical framework for analysing poverty. The deprivation of entitlements, and thus the capabilities of development, is an important explanation for poverty, as well as grounds for political mobilisation.

In the text and in our analysis we use a broad definition of conflict. It thus refers both to open armed struggle over political power and to conflicting interest that must not necessarily take a violent form.

While the discussion about sources of conflicts and gaps of frustration have played a mainly inspiring role in our work, we have used Galtung's distinction between direct and structural violence in a more concrete way. Thus, we have used the concept of structural violence in the tradition from Galtung and informed by Sen's theories, as the most important underlying condition for conflicts. Consequently, 'structural violence reduction' is a necessary strategy in order to create conditions for peaceful development. In using the expression 'structural violence reduction', we want to emphasise that efforts to address potential conflicts should go beyond the common expression of poverty alleviation. Thus, we see poverty alleviation as a humanitarian imperative in all contexts. However, when we are dealing with conflicts and conflict analysis, more attention should be directed at identifying root causes among the multifold expressions of structural violence, which surround most armed conflicts in Africa. Hence, poverty alleviation is an important part of structural violence reduction, though the concept of structural violence also tries to include the structures and dynamics of political and economic power, which contribute to the poverty in the first hand.

2. Overview of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region

The conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes region are complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international actors. The violent conflicts have tended to expand geographically and the epicentre of the conflicts is shifting from one country to another. The conflicts in the region have a dual character: even if most of the conflicts have a distinct local and/or national anchorage, they are at the same time fuelled by or fuelling regional conflicts. A regional approach is necessary, for both analysis and management of the conflicts.

Hence, the Great Lakes region is an illustrative example of the need to abandon the artificial dichotomy between intra- and inter-state conflicts. It is, as well, an example of an armed conflict, in which a possible containment of violence has to take into account the interface between structural and direct violence. .

For the first time for many years, a fragile, but positive development is taking place in all Great Lake Region (GLR) countries. Rwanda formally left the transition process behind with the elections in autumn 2003. The DRC reached a power-sharing agreement and a transitional government was installed in July 2003. In Burundi, a peace agreement was reached on November 15th 2003.

At the same time, enormous challenges lie ahead, not least in the DRC, where conflicts still occur on a lower scale. The situation in Burundi is still a crucial one. The fighting in Bujumbura in July and August 2003 highlights the fragility of the peace accord. South African-led peacekeepers are implementing a peace accord, which does not enjoy the consent of all parties in the conflict. The conflicts in Uganda continue and challenge the security in large parts of the country. Common to all the countries is that the major challenge is the high level of structural violence, the large frustration gap and that a paradoxical situation prevails where peace prevails at the national level while insecurity could even be on the increase at the local level as a result of the militias and rebel groups breaking down, and the militias turning into loose bands of brigands. There is thus a need for a rapid and effective DDRRR process for the peace dividend to trickle down to the local level.

In this chapter we will first outline some the main themes in the regional conflict dynamics and thereafter point at the major regional conflicts between the various countries in the region.

2.1 Multi-ethnic societies, failed nation-state projects and structural violence

Social-ethnic cleavages have featured in most of the Great Lakes region conflicts masking their very personalised and exploitative nature. The inability to respond to the challenges of managing multi-ethnic societies was compounded by the failure of political society to evolve adequate rules for governing itself and exacting accountability from its members. The conflict surrounding the Banyarwanda in the DRC today is a classic example of the denial of citizenship contributing to the violent conflict in the Great Lakes. The degree of dominance or suppression of the Rwandese diaspora in the Great Lakes links the conflict of this group to the domestic conflicts of the states in which they reside. Conflict in this region is linked to who has the right to full citizenship, in this case, ethnically defined. The consequences of this situation are the intensification of social divisions and tensions as well as a halt in the nation-building process, via the failure as a guarantor for social peace.

It is unfortunate that far from guaranteeing personal security, the nation-state elements have fostered insecurity, of life and property. Today, the nation-state is a target of communal and disaffected groups; they generate a bulk of the conflicts that lead to insecurity. Reinventing the nation-state in its institutional dimension as the centre of security rather than a source of insecurity is an increasingly larger puzzle of conflict reduction and mitigation.

In contrast to the causes, the consequences of the fragility of nation-states in the Great Lakes became more glaring in the 1990s. Previously concealed by cold war politics, these manifestations of strife grew primarily from the unravelling of the authoritarian political regimes, the economic decay of the 1980s, and the renewed communal contests for power and resources. Unlike previous periods, these conflicts became regionalised, transforming the Great Lakes into a trans-African belt of conflict and discord. The collapse of the predatory Idi Amin regime in Uganda in 1979 set the pace for the convulsions that were to engulf the region, subsequently embroiling the equally weak, but authoritarian governments in Rwanda and Zaire (the DRC). Ugandan changes were instructive because stability was restored only after the emergence of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) but also because of the existence in Uganda of a large population of Rwanda's *Tutsi* refugees, products of the *Hutu* Revolution of 1959. The rise of Museveni, as new state-builder in 1986, produced two outcomes of regional consequence: the rejuvenation of national institutions in Uganda; the resurgence of the national question in Rwanda, in particular, the *Hutu-Tutsi* conflict; but also the continuation of the old traditional militarised political process that was soon exported within and outside Uganda's borders, only with more disastrous consequences.

The increasing poverty and crippling social services from the mid eighties and onwards increased the structural violence lead to widening gaps of frustration that could provide a hotbed for political mobilisation, and violence.

2.2 Large-scale direct violence and impunity

Genocide and localized ethnic violence were not new to the region, demonstrated by the mass killings of *Tutsi* politicians and other civilians by the Rwandan Army between December 1963-January 1964 and sporadic violence in which the 1994 genocide was the climax – the massacre of *Hutu*s in Burundi in 1972. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda had broader implications for redefining regional relationships and the direction of conflicts. Thus, the events in Rwanda had a contiguous effect on political change in Burundi, and underwent a tenuous democratic transition after the election of the first *Hutu* president in June 1993. This transition was sabotaged by a *Tutsi*-instigated military coup against the government in November 1993, concerned that a *Hutu* majority government would not guarantee its security. More importantly, the Burundi coup crystallized regional ethnic consciousness along the *Tutsi-Hutu* divide, exacerbating the cycle of violence and massacres that have come to define the Great Lakes region.

In addition, a culture of impunity for political violence developed in all countries, lowering the threshold for participation as well as creating a culture of fear.

2.3 The refugees, the diaspora and the conflicts in Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi and Uganda

Refugees have been a dominant feature of the regional landscape since the 1960s, stemming from the dual crises of citizenship and constitutionalism. However, over the years, the refugee problem did not acquire the political virulence that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) mustered when it intervened in Rwanda in 1990. With the RPF invasion, the politically monolithic regime of Juvenal Habyarimana could no longer procrastinate on the question of citizenship for its minority *Tutsi*s. Claims about resource scarcities that had been compounded by the precipitous collapse of coffee prices, Rwanda's single most important foreign exchange earner, could not hold once the determined RPF forced the issues of return, representation, and participation. Regional mediation efforts to find a compromise, captured in the Arusha Agreement of August 1993, failed when *Hutu* extremists launched the genocide in 1994.

The Great Lakes region presents an interesting forced migration picture. It is both one of the largest refugee-producing regions as well as one of the largest refugee-hosting regions. The impact of refugees' presence can be enormous on the host country as they put enormous pressure on the already limited resources. They cause extensive environmental destruction, and severe deterioration of the economic and social infrastructure, and the overburdening of services including health and education. They are also a political issue. They are alternately labelled as scapegoats or hired and manipulated by political brokers. Mobutu was a master of this exercise, earning the loyalty of the Banyamulenge by threatening to deport them, but in other periods offering full participation in the countries' political and economic life. In Uganda, the Banyarwanda refugees were deprived of social independence and faced great internal prejudice even after they had allied with NRA elements against Obote II, whose government mistreated them atrociously. This

has been a source of insecurity within settlements and the surrounding areas as well as between the countries of origin and the host country. Refugees have triggered wars between the countries of asylum and those of origin; for example, the war that deposed Uganda's Idi Amin in 1979 and the invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990.

Armed refugee camps in Goma became the new symbol of citizenship crises exported to the regional level. Furthermore, Rwandan *Hutu* refugees upset the precarious balance of power in south Kivu populated by *Tutsi*-speaking groups, the Banyamulenge.

The impact of Rwanda's trauma on the DRC deepened the contagion of conflicts, a trend that established the Great Lakes region as a zone of instability in the heart of Africa. The contagion of conflicts is an outcome of interlocking strife about power and resources, but it is more accurately described as consequences of weak states exporting their problems to a region that has yet to find a sound, institutional and organisational basis. In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda sponsored Laurent Kabila's AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the liberation of the Congo) to overthrow the Mobutu government, in an organised effort that succeeded in linking ethnic contests in Rwanda with the mounting pressures for political change in the Congo. In removing the security threat posed by Rwandan refugees in eastern Congo, the intervention escalated into an anti-authoritarian crusade seeking a new order in the Congo, and increasingly raised questions about the political survival of the DRC's multi-ethnic character crafted and sustained by colonial and postcolonial authoritarianism. Mobutu's defeat led to several outcomes.

2.4 The regional conflict situation – a brief overview

The conflict in the DRC

The conflict in the DRC is a conflict on a continental scale in one of Africa's largest states that has involved seven foreign armies and a myriad of militias and mercenaries. As the conflict in the DRC evolved into a regional war it mirrors the domestic fissures within the region, the conflict is prosecuted by actors that have dominated the regional landscape: refugees, rebels, mercenaries, and warlords. Adding to the combustive mix are new actors such as the large numbers of child soldiers, the new sources of contestation such as natural resources, and the new means of executing wars using small arms. Ideologically, too, the blending of the *Tutsi-Hutu* conflict onto the DRC conflict has lent a new complexity to the conflict, defying easy solutions. With the blurring of the lines between civil and regional war, and conventional and unconventional war, civilians became the primary victims of the conflict. Caught in between rebel and conventional armies, and in the context of the severe militarisation of society and the marked collapse of basic infrastructure, civilians suffer most of the ravages associated with the war. Left to the depredations of a host of competing armed groups, the population has endured the most of the conflict, as attested by recent reports: 16 million hungry Congolese; almost 4.5 million IDPs; two out of five children dying in infancy; 40% of children with no access to schooling; and more than 10,000 child soldiers involved in the conflict[5].

[5] Consolidate Inter-Agency Appeal, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003

The withdrawal of most foreign armies from the Congo by 2002 offered an opportunity for the UN peacekeeping force in the country (MONUC) to implement the Lusaka peace agreement of 1999.

The DRC and Rwanda

In Rwanda and the DRC, a number of structural issues have contributed to specific tensions in each country. In the DRC the specificities of the Belgian colonial rule and the consequences of the mineral dependence of the country after independence are among the most prominent. There is a historical differentiation between the west and the east of the DRC. In the case of Rwanda, as in Burundi, the tensions are directly related to a combination of structural violence and politicisation of identity by elites in the struggle over state power and material resources. (See the Rwanda chapter).

However, the way these tensions are linked to each other and the intra-state consequences of this are not always taken into account.

On the Rwandan side, security threats are present and made – they have to be evaluated seriously. Rwandan claims about the persistence of a military security threat from DRC territory have often been dismissed with two different arguments:

1) Over the years, the so-called Ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* military capacity has been reduced. Although it is true that it once existed, it has been increasingly difficult to keep that military structure intact. Many people have individually trickled back into Rwanda, and many have been integrated in the Kivu and Maniema provinces. Thus, the military potential of these forces has decreased.

2) The Rwandan government is claiming the existence of a security threat only as a justification of a continuous presence in the area, mostly disguised as its proxy (the RCD-Goma). According to this position, the Rwandan government has two objectives. One is to continue its exploitation of mineral resources in eastern DRC, and, in a long-term perspective, include eastern DRC in the Rwandan economy, potentially transforming the region to a de facto Rwandan territory. Also according to this view, the *Banyamulenge*, and other 'Congolese' *Tutsi* are nothing but a Rwandan 'fifth columnist' in Congolese politics and economy. This argumentation ends in the conclusion that since Rwanda has had its army present in eastern DRC for many years it would have been easy for them to destroy whatever hostile military forces may have existed.

Our consideration of the first argument is that it is obvious that many refugees have returned to Rwanda over the years, and it is also obvious that many have found a place to stay in the eastern provinces. However, it should be remembered that through Operation Turquoise and the subsequent flow of refugees, well above one million, came to live in the eastern parts of the DRC. It seems to us as if it would be extremely difficult to determine how many, and who, among the returnees to Rwanda, belonged to the organised forces of the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*. The repatriation schemes in place today have treated the return of around 2,000 people, including dependants. Furthermore, it seems to be uncontroversial to argue that these *'Hutu'* forces could acquire (and indeed have acquired) many new recruits in the refugee camps during the period 1994–96. According to different sources there were right up to

August 2003, at least 10, 000 organised and armed forces within the EX-FAR/*Interahamwe* forces, some sources extend it up to 30, 000. Even the lower figure is a strong enough force to legitimise Rwanda's security concern. It should also be noted that in the peace accords since 1999, the DRC has promised to disarm and repatriate these "negative" forces. This has not been done, despite the fact that Rwanda withdrew its troops in 2002 in accordance with the peace agreement. In fact, according to sources both on the ground and within, MONUC claims that the DRC/ Kabila supported the ExFar/*Interahamwe* with materials, weapons and logistics up to August 2003. This seems to us to validate the Rwandan claim of a real security threat.

The second argument in this context is more problematic. On the one hand, it seems obvious that both Rwandan, and Ugandan military forces and personalities are heavily involved in mineral extraction in the DRC. However, it is not possible to evaluate to what extent the profit from this extraction is used for individual enrichment, and to what extent it constitutes a source of financing the war itself. In the UN panel report, a distinction is made between Uganda and Rwanda. The more loosely controlled Ugandan government and military allow a much more scope to manoeuvre for individual enrichment, while the more controlled and disciplined Rwandan state apparatus and military largely controlled the extraction of resources. It should be evident that the totality of military activities (internal as well as external) carried out by Rwandan and Ugandan troops could not be financed within the framework of the military expenditure of respective state budgets. Since the budgets have passed the scrutiny of the international donor community with distinction, the way of financing the war efforts is considered to have the tacit approval of the international community.

On the other hand, regarding the real strength of *'Hutu'* forces in Congolese territory, there are two very distinct positions among the donors, especially, but not only, in Kinshasa. One is a position of avoidance and denial of the issue. Diplomatically, this may be seen as a way of giving room to manoeuvre for the new government in the DRC to dispose of the problem. The other distinct position is that there is, de facto, a well-organised military force in eastern DRC, with a similarly well-organised political backup in exile. Two intelligence observations are behind this. Some units of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* origin are said to have been much more integrated into the Congolese army than what has normally been admitted in the donors' discourse. Strictly military considerations on the numbers of forces that would be necessary to wipe out these forces today, estimate that a considerable operation would be needed, based upon technically advanced airborne troops with very good logistical support. In short, it would not be an easy task, not even for a well-equipped European military unit.

The extraordinary aggressive anti-Rwandan, or anti-*Tutsi, emotions* constitute one basic feature of Congolese politics today, cutting through both political parties and the civil society, including the religious organisations. We understand these strong emotions as expressions of long-term problems in the Congolese elite formation.

One historical problem was that the *Banyamulenge* population in the Kivu had never had its position in the Congolese society recognised.

They lacked the customary rights to land, and they were not recognised as Congolese citizens in its full meaning. The same limitations applied also the *Banyarwanda* population in general, including the *Tutsi* groups, who settled in eastern Congo during colonial time. Nevertheless, they constituted an alternative elite with aspirations for an improved position after independence.

Furthermore, the question of elite contradictions is also linked to external interventions in the conflict.

Broad sectors of the political opposition, and the civil society, are still unhappy that Mobuto's external backers, mainly the United States, did not recognise that the National Sovereign Conference in 1992 offered a peaceful road to a change of power in the then Zaire. Even worse, the same external forces did not rely on the Congolese social forces to resolve the issue, but supported the Rwandans in doing the job. In line with arguments referred to above, the most active anti-Rwanda forces mostly within civil society and including the churches are also very suspicious of the intentions of the entire external intervention in the DRC.

This line of thought has a bearing on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Over the years, Lumumba has become a national symbol, also among people who did not share his political ideas. Thus, the perception that the UN did not do what it could to protect Lumumba, and that the assassination was a US-Belgian plot, still shapes the Congolese perception of the present UN intervention. Hence, the continuous US support for Rwanda is seen with suspicion among many people in Kinshasa, especially among those with the highest disregard for the *Banyarwanda* issue.

Thus, the broad image of a future peace, on this governmental/elite level, is linked to crucial issues, which must be properly treated by the international community. One is the security concerns for Rwanda, which have to be resolved. The second is the *Banyamulenge* issue in the DRC. As long as the message from the international community is unclear on these two issues, the perception of threat will persist on both sides.

The DRC and Uganda

Uganda has been active militarily in the DRC, as well as in the support of various rebel groups – some of which are pure Ugandan creations. After the withdrawal of Uganda troops from Bunia, the border regions have experienced a serious influx of refugees from the DRC, i.e. Hema and Lendu, both of which are close to various Ugandan groups.

The relationship between Uganda and the eastern part of the DRC (Zaire) has been very close since long before independence. In many cases, the people in the border areas have lived in a situation as if this was part of the same country, migration and trade being constant features. In fact, the only outlet from eastern Congo for export and commodity import has been through Uganda (and Kenya).

In the early years of Obote I, the main interest in the Congo was gold and ivory. The selection of Amin as head of the army, replacing General Opolot, could be seen partly as a greater plot to invade the then Zaire from the Ugandan side. Ironically, it was the smuggling from Zaire that place Amin in a position that eventually forced him to take over the government in a coup.

With a continuous fragmentation of the Zaire state under Mobuto, dividing the country according to his own personal financial interests, there was a growing stake for Ugandan businessmen (at the same time acting as administrators and politicians). The accusations against leading Ugandan military and politicians can lately be seen as part of an age-old trade across a non-existent border. On the other hand, the escalating interest of foreign capital, of which the Barrick, and Lundin groups, and Heritage Oil are but a few meant that the extra finances brought in by these companies have been partly instrumental in the building up of various rebel groups, partly also allied to Uganda (and Rwandan authorities). We have to see the development taking place under the late Mobotu, early Kabila era, as a continuation of a situation that has been continuing for decades with varied intensity.

The Congo territory has been used as an area for various rebel groups for attacks on Uganda. The West Bank Nile Front was using Bunia as its headquarters. During the protracted war led by Museveni against Obote II and Okello, numerous smaller groups were raiding from regions to the west of Ruwensori. During the early years of the 21st century, intensified attacks have been made by the Allied Democratic Forces (the ADF) and on the Ugandan side by the DRC. The conflicts in Ituri have led to a stream of refugees entering Uganda, Hema and Lendu, who have close relationships with the ethnic groups on the other side of the border.

The interest in the DRC was illustrated when the army recruited volunteers as Local Defence Units (LDU) in the Katakwi District in 2003 as protection against the Karimojong raids, but they were simply sent on to fight in the DRC. This, however, is said to have been initiated by the UPDF without any approval from the civil authorities. This also relates to what has been said that the Ugandan army and even fractions of the army has largely acted on its own accord.

Rwanda and Uganda. A special relationship.

During the latter half of 2003, the chilly relations between Uganda and Rwanda since the Kisangani incident in 1998 have improved considerably.

The war in the DRC, as well as the takeover in Rwanda by groups originally from Uganda has created a special relationship between the two neighbours. On the one hand, the links are very close between the two regimes as well as between the people, on the other, the present situation is marred by accusations and counter-accusations, based on serious mutual suspicion. It is important to note that the people of the two countries appear not to support the conflict between the presidents. The conflict is about a) the personal rivalry (Kagame does not accept Museveni as a father or elder brother but as a presidential colleague), b) regional hegemony and c) territory in the DRC.

The conflict between Rwanda and Uganda has its roots in Rwandan immigration and refugee flows to Uganda. A sizeable Rwandese population lived for decades in Uganda. In Museveni's first attack, with 35 men on the barracks, two were Rwandan – the current President Kagame being one of them. He had spent time in training camps with Museveni since the seventies, sharing the same Trotsky-inspired movement ideology, learning how a small but determined force could win over larger

forces. When Museveni captured Kampala in 1986 more then one-fourth of the army was composed of *Tutsi*s originating from Rwanda. Kagame was a high-ranking officer in the Ugandan security force. President Museveni is from an ethnic group that is very close to the Rwandan ones.

When Rwanda engaged in the DRC, at first hand to dissolve the camps, which were used as a basis of the former *genocidare* government to launch attacks on Rwanda, this incidentally coincided with a weakened Zairian state that became an easy target for the rebel forces, with support from Rwanda and Uganda. Gradually a rivalry developed between the two presidents, from early nineties, that culminated in the clashes over Kisangani in 1998.

According to government representatives in Uganda, Uganda played a low- key, and mainly defensive role in the DRC, while Rwanda was said to pursue a more offensive and expansionist policy. Moreover, Ugandan authorities did not exclude Rwandan military invasion in Uganda. It was claimed that Rwanda supported rebel groups that plotted or planned coups against the Ugandan government. Rwandan government representatives, on the other hand, declared that Uganda was supporting the Alir/FDLR in order to undermine Rwanda.

To draw any absolute objective conclusions is not easy. The bilateral negotiations and the football championship appear now to have resulted in an improvement in the relations between the Uganda and Rwanda. Museveni's participation in the inauguration of Kagame in September 2003 was an important symbol of the improved relations.

Rwanda and Burundi

Today the tension between the two countries has been reduced. The development in one of the countries, nevertheless highly affects the other. The two countries have chosen two different models for conflict management. While in Rwanda the main efforts are to create one Rwandan identity and the suppression of ethnic identity, the Burundian model has recognised the ethnic identity. In this way, a success for one of the models will undermine the legitimacy of the model in the other country. From a Rwandan point of view, the sensitivity of the development of the Burundian model has most likely been reduced during the past few years, in pace with the increased stability in Rwanda. On the other hand, would increased political instability in Burundi risk destabilising Rwanda? Thus, Rwanda is highly interested in supporting the peace process in Burundi as well as stabilising the government. Of particular importance for Rwanda is that the Burundian government could control its territory so the ExFar/Interahamwe forces could not use Burundi as a platform for a dual-frontal attack on Rwanda. In the same way, will stability in Rwanda contribute to stability on Burundi? The current president, Ndadaye recognises that a sustainable peace in Burundi demands a regional solution, where Rwanda, the DRC and Tanzania will be key players. Increased legitimacy for the state and government in Rwanda will spill over as increased legitimacy for the state and government in Burundi.

According to reports, Rwanda has inactive troops in the northern parts of Burundi in order to prevent ExFAR-*Intrahamwe* attacks against Rwanda. There are reports that the Intrahamwe are included in the FNL but the numbers are uncertain. The exFAR-Interahamwe forces could

move on Burundian territory, but more because of the lack of control in the territory rather than as support from the government. There are also information/rumours about a silent agreement between Rwanda and the Burundian army that Rwanda would intervene in case of a rebel attack against the Bujumbura government. The Burundian president participated in the inauguration of Kagame signalling the normalisation of relations between the countries.

Burundi and the DRC

The direct violence in Burundi is tied into the regional conflict dynamics via two main links: the FNL is linked up to and receives support from *Hutu*-oriented groups based in the DRC, i.e. the Interahamwe, the Ex-Far, and the Mayi-Mayi. The low level of institutionalisation of the FNL and the DRC-based groups calls into question any coordination between the groups. Nevertheless, the FNL is said to consist of 3,000 to 4,000 men under arms and the support from the DRC is to consist mainly of supplies of food, arms, and temporary shelter from the fighting in Burundi. A political/ideological link between the FNL and *Hutu*-based groups in the DRC seemingly prompts the idea of increased *Hutu* power in the region. Unconfirmed sources reveal that these groups nurture a dream of a "*Hutu* land" located somewhere in the borderland of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

Burundi and Tanzania

The FDD receives military, logistics, political and moral support from Tanzania. The most evident support base in Tanzania is found in the refugee camps along the Burundian border. However, the connection also points to high-level political actors in the Tanzanian government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It should also be noted that the FDD use the DRC to regroup and launch attacks on Burundi from the west.

3. The driving force behind the Tanzanian support to FDD is not clear.

Conflict resolution mechanisms in the Great Lakes Region

Below is a review of a set of initiatives of conflict management designed to address the various aspects of the conflict dynamics in the region. It highlights the roles of the various players, their strengths and weaknesses; other initiatives by some other players included sub-regional and regional organisations towards peace building and economic development from a regional perspective.

A number of actors, initiatives and fora exist. Multilateral institutions, regional organisations, heads of state initiatives, individual donors, formal and informal contacts between governments and rebel groups as well as civil society organisations and religious organisations are involved in conflict resolution work, at different levels. It appears, however, that efforts are not always well coordinated, that information about different activities is not fully known by other actors and that at times, it appears to be unclear under which mandate different initiatives are taken. This might result in different initiatives, how important they ever might be in a local setting, undermining or infringing negatively on other initiatives. It appears that a more efficient distribution of information about what is taking place at different levels would improve the efficiency on all work with conflict management. This also includes information on what NGOs and other are doing at the local level and upwards in the system. It should also not be ruled out that this multitude of organisations in need of financing might start competing with each other, displaying others as less efficient than themselves.

Of particular importance is that activities at the macro-level by different actors and foras are clearly displayed so actors at the micro-level gain a good understanding of the general direction of peace process. If not, the myriad of initiatives that are now implemented by religious organisations and NGOs in, for instance, the DRC might risk weakening the peace process at the macro-level. However, it is also important that national and international institutions and organisations are open for, and able to, include experiences from local peace activities in their own considerations.

UN disinterest/low capacity and lack of effective sub- regional institutions

Two of the major challenges of conflict management in the Great Lakes region are on the one hand the difficulties the UN have had to get a

mandate and resources enabling its operations to play a substantial role, and on the other, the lack of effective security institutions in this sub-region. Since the UN withdrew from Rwanda in 1994, it has consistently declined to send peacekeepers to Burundi and has sent an insufficient force (with an initial authorised strength of only 5,537) to the DRC. This situation most likely is an outcome of on the one hand the ambiguous international interests in the region, and on the other the complexity and challenges to manage peace-keeping operations in the context of "Africa's first world war". The Great Lakes region itself does not have an established institutionalized framework for managing conflicts. The Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL) comprising Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (now the DRC), has long been moribund. The potential of the DRC to play a lead role in the Great Lakes, as Nigeria has attempted to do in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa, has been diminished by the fact that Congo has itself been a major theatre of conflict.

However, interesting developments have taken place on the regional level. ith support from Efforts to end the conflicts in the Great Lakes region have prominently involved regional and external actors. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU/AU) negotiated the Lusaka peace accord of 1999, while South Africa has been instrumental in the DRC and Burundi peace processes. The UN has deployed a peacekeeping force to the Congo and is planning to organise an international conference in 2004. The US, France and Belgium have historically supported key allies in the region.

3.1 External actors and mechanism

The US and France, Belgium and the EU

It is important to highlight the role of two important external actors in the Great Lakes region: the US and France. Since the 1960s, Washington has had geo-political interests in the Great Lakes region, and helped to instal in power and strongly supported, the autocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko between 1965 and the early 1990s. France and Belgium, the former colonial powers of the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, also strongly supported Mobutu's regime, sending troops to protect the autocrat from invasions from Shaba province in 1977 and 1978. During the Cold War, the Great Lakes region became a centre of competing rivalry between the two superpowers, and their allies. This competition greatly shaped the politics of this region. The removal of Mobutu from power in 1997, after four decades of misrule, sparked a rebellion that has engulfed the entire Great Lakes region.

The region's natural and human resources as well as its strategic location make it either a catalyst or a stumbling block to African unity"[6]. The US has increased its economic and military assistance to many countries in the region including Uganda and Rwanda. Washington has trained soldiers from Rwanda and Uganda as part of its 1996 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to strengthen the military capabilities of African states for regional peacekeeping. American military support

[6] Lemarchand, "Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region," p. 87.

for Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea was also part of its anti-Sudan policy in the region. The US has played an important role behind both the Pretoria agreement and its implementation; for example US pressure played an important part both in Kigali's and Kampala's decision to withdraw its troops from the DRC in 2002.

The increasing US role and influence in the Great Lakes region has generated tensions with France. France has not concealed its distaste for what it considers a growing Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence (Britain has also mediated between Uganda and Rwanda and is a major donor to both countries) in a region that was traditionally part of France's chasse gardée (private hunting grounds). The fall of the *Hutu* government in Rwanda in 1994, and the subsequent demise of Mobutu in the Congo in 1997 significantly reduced the Gallic influence in Central Africa. The US is a close ally of Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries with significant influence in this region, whose leaders greatly mistrust France's role. The current Rwandan government has never forgiven France for its assistance to the genocidal *Hutu* regime in 1994.[7] The rivalry between Paris and Washington has implications for a durable peace in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda is no doubt the contemporary Fashoda incident.

The EU as well has recently taken a more active role in the peace-making efforts in the region. In 2003, France deployed the first soldiers of a 1,400-strong largely European force mandated to protect civilians in Bunia until the expected arrival of 3,000 Bangladeshi peacekeepers by September 2003.

Belgium, with its long and complicated relation to the region, as well plays an active role.

The UN in the Great Lakes Region

UN set up a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 as part of the Arusha Peace agreement. The force was underfinanced, too small and not given a mandate to intervene in the building up of the militias. Daillare, the head of the peacekeeping force faxed all information about the building up of the genocide to the UN headquarters and desperately attempted to secure a broader mandate to intervene with a larger force. The OAU commission on genocide concludes that if the UNAMIR had been given a somewhat larger force and a mandate to intervene, the genocide could have been stopped. Instead UNAMIR was withdrawn from Rwanda after the start of the Rwandan genocide in April 1994, a situation that has created a deep distrust for the UN in Rwanda, and in the region. (see the Rwanda chapter below)

Since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the UN has been reluctant to intervene in conflicts in the Great Lakes region. In February 2000, the Security Council established the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). After deploying 90 military liaison officers to the DRC by the end of 1999 (Stage I), MONUC's military observers were eventually increased to 4,386 by February 2003 (Stage II). If the implementation of the accord is judged to be proceeding well, MONUC's numbers could rise to 15,000 or more (Stage III).

[7] Ibid. p. 93

In July 2002, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appointed Ibrahima Fall, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as his Special Representative to the Great Lakes region. Fall was mandated to organise an international conference on the Great Lakes involving regional governments, civil society actors and foreign donors. The work of the Special Representative is expected to culminate in a conference in 2004 that aims at constructing a regional settlement to the conflicts in the Great Lakes and mustering donor support for the economic reconstruction of the region.

In May 2003, Kofi Annan called for the increase of MONUC's forces to 10,800 (which in principle is the case as of 31 October 2003), and urged the strengthening of the UN's mandate to enable the mission to contribute more effectively to conflict management efforts and to provide greater political support to the transitional government in Kinshasa. Despite progress on the diplomatic front, instability has continued in the Kivu region, while the situation in Bunia deteriorated sharply following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in May 2003. The departure of Ugandan soldiers left a security vacuum that ethnic-based militias rushed to fill, slaughtering hundreds of civilians and threatening the beleaguered UN compound. A 720-strong MONUC contingent of Uruguayan peacekeepers was unable to stop the fighting in Bunia, due to its lack of a strong mandate and military equipment and with the increasing fears about large-scale massacres in Bunia, in early June 2003. (See below)

The UN operation in the DRC, is obviously the most visible mechanism for peace in the DRC today. The present mandate is stronger than the earlier ones, which have been criticised for having been too weak in order to cope with the difficult situation.

However, its activities in demobilising foreign troops in the DRC (in practice ex-FAR/*interahamwe*) until recently, have been of limited scope. However, MONUC has been lately been very instrumental in the negotiation process, which has led to a new wave of demobilisation and the repatriation of *Hutu* forces from eastern DRC.

Besides the monitoring of the cease-fire, the DDR process as regards foreign forces will be the main responsibility for MONUC in the near future. It will also handle 'spontaneous' demobilisation of the *Mayi-Mayi* forces or other Congolese groups, who present themselves to MONUC observers or troops.

MONUC is also responsible for the co-ordination between the government and the donors as regards the planned elections

3.2 Regional actors

It can be noted that the work with the peace processes in the region have largely been Africa driven. A number of formal and informal initiatives, both on regional, national and local level, as well as from NGOs and the private sector, have paved the way for the current fragile peace processes. This is an important shift in the continent's history, towards larger ownership; indicating that both internal capacity, institutions and existing experience could now manage African affairs.

The OAU's/AU's Peacemaking Efforts

The OAU sent unarmed military observers to Rwanda (1991–1992) and Burundi (1994). The organisation also negotiated the Arusha agreement for Rwanda in 1993. The OAU has also been active in peacemaking efforts in the Congo. At a meeting it hosted in Lusaka in July 1999, Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed a peace accord. The Lusaka accord called for a cease-fire and the redeployment of troops to specified positions; the release of prisoners of war; the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC; a national dialogue between the government in Kinshasa, armed opposition groups, and the unarmed civilian opposition; the disarming of all militias and "armed groups"; and the creation of a new national army. The UN was asked to deploy a peacekeeping force to the Congo, in collaboration with the OAU. The Lusaka accord also called on the OAU to nominate a chair for a Joint Military Commission (JMC) and to designate a neutral facilitator for the Inter-Congolese dialogue. The JMC was mandated to verify the disengagement of forces and the quartering and disarmament of armed groups, as well as to monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo. Sir Ketumile Masire, the former president of Botswana, was nominated as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese dialogue.

The African Union has played an important role, not least by establishing a framework for the peace processes, e.g., in the DRC and Burundi, even if its financial and institutional capacity is limited and larger states with resources, like South Africa, often have to take the lead. If the conflict prevention unit had more resources, and political mandate, it might be possible for them to play a more proactive role.

The way the peace process has been managed in Burundi is an interesting example of an Africa-driven process, where South Africa has contributed with funds, logistics, expertise and key military personnel, and in cooperation with Mozambique and Ethiopia, has set up a peacemaking force. The decision to deploy AMIB was taken by the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, in early April 2003. AMIB currently has a total strength of 2,655 troops contributed by Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, out of a mandated strength of 3,248.

Institutional set up of AU in relation to conflict management

The objective of AU is: to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

A number of important decisions have been made to institute mechanism for fulfilling the objectives above. The capacity as well as political room to manoeuvre of OAU has, however, been weak. In 1997, for example, the OAU Chiefs of Staff meeting recommended that each African sub region develop peacekeeping forces of brigade size for deployment on peace missions. These plans will need to be revisited during the African Union's consultations with the Regional Economic Communities on the establishment of five regional brigades to serve the planned African Standby Force. It appears that a larger political commit-

ment to AU both from African states and the international community have increased both the legitimacy and capacity of AU, but still strong political tensions exists within the organisation.

The importance that the AU place on conflict management might be indicated by the fact that the Commission of the AU (the key organ in the day-to-day management of the AU), have a portfolio on Peace and Security (Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and Combating Terrorism). The Commissioners responsible for Peace and Security, is Amb. Said Djinnit, from Algeria.[8]

Among the mechanism that could be noted in this context is the African Commission for Human rights that have played a role in following up the African Charter. In the pipeline is a Peace and Security Council (PSC) within the African Union.[9] The Protocol establishing the PSC is in the process of ratification. The Republic of Burundi became the 25th member state to ratification of the Protocol in December 2003, out of the 27 necessary. An institution that are anticipated to more efficiently deal with security issues on the continent.

The Economic Community of Central African States

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was created in 1983. It was conceived as a tool to pursue economic development, promote regional cooperation, and to establish a Central African Common Market. ECCAS brought together eleven countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe. In an attempt to address the perennial conflicts in Central Africa, ECCAS leaders decided to create an early warning mechanism in 1996. At a meeting in Libreville, Gabon, in 1997, regional leaders proposed the creation of a security mechanism for the prevention and management of conflicts. The aim of the mechanism was to establish a legal and institutional framework to promote and strengthen peace and security in Central Africa. The Conseil de Paix et de Securité de l'Afrique Centrale (COPAX) was established under the auspices of the UN Standing Committee for Security Questions in Central Africa. COPAX was given a mandate to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Central Africa.[10]

However, technical difficulties associated with ECCAS's structures, as well as the pursuit of parochial national interests, have frustrated the effective operation of this security mechanism. ECCAS's members have yet to agree on the relationship between ECCAS, COPAX, and its early warning mechanism. Some states have argued that since ECCAS is a weak organisation, its security mechanism should be an independent body, while others have called for the mechanism to work within existing institutions. Central African states have responded to the failure to create an institutional framework for managing conflicts by seeking membership in alternative sub-regional organizations. For example, the DRC joined

[8] It could be noted that Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka, former minister of state in Rwanda was elected the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission in 2003. It was highly appreciated in Rwanda as a recognition of its unity and reconciliation process as well as role in the peace process in DRC.

[9] By decision AHG/Dec 160 (xxxvii) of the Summit of Lusaka, July 2001.

[10] See Musifiky Mwanasali, "Politics and Security in Central Africa," *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol.4 No.2, 1999.

SADC in 1997, while Burundi and Rwanda have applied to join the EAC. The UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights in Yaoundé, Cameroon, could potentially play an important role in supporting ECCAS' future peacemaking efforts, and as one of the partner organisations in organizing the Tanzania seminar of December 2003.

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)[11]

In contrast to ECCAS, SADC and its members have been active in recent peacemaking efforts in the Great Lakes region. One of SADC three objectives is "to promote regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony".

SADC's ability to address the conflict in the DRC, one of its member states, had previously been constrained by differences between South Africa, on the one hand, and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, on the other. Presidents of Zimbabwe, Angola and Nambia perceived that they had a SADC mandate to intervene to support the Kabila government. While other members of SADC, with South Africa in the front, firmly resisted such an interpretation.

SADC have a number of institutions dealing with peace making and support to democratisation processes. The Organ on defence, politics and security cooperation is the overarching structure with a directorat of peace and security. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) includes DRC since 1997. The ISDSC established a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe, responsible for UN Command and Staff Training in SADC. Following the contested elections in Zimbabwe, however, donors withdrew support for the Centre. Through the ISDSC, SADC has decided in favour of the creation of a 'sustainable brigade size peacekeeping force' over a five-year period, following the example (although not the practice) established in West Africa. The first phase would consist of the establishment of a skeleton staff for a permanent, multinational mobile brigade headquarters. In subsequent years the rest of the brigade will take form. As a standalone force such a capacity is beyond the political will and financial resources of the region — but not if it is designated and structured as a stand-by capacity within the various national armed forces. SADC is therefore more cautious than West Africa in seeking to promote regional security — reflecting a divided region, limited experience in building security on a regional as opposed to a national basis and the lack of a 'lead nation'.

A Mutual Defence Pact was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Dar es Salaam Summit in 2003. It places an obligation all Member States to defend any territory within the SADC region from external threat through provision of support to the affected country.[12]

Another institution is the SADC Parliamentary Forum, a regional organisation that brings together 12 parliaments of the southern Africa region, but not yet DRC, represents 1800 Members of Parliament.

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[11] Members: DRC, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique Zimbabwe Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles* , Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi (Seychelles withdrew 2003)

[12] However, the form of support required is not clearly defined as the commitment of troops. The draft document is not yet publicly available. http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/sadc.html 211203

Among the Forum's objectives is the support of the growing democracy in the region. Elections are observed with a peer review mechanism, training program are launched etc.

The Role of South Africa

South Africa has emerged as one of the key peacemakers in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC and Burundi. It has capacity and a political will to play the role as regional hegemone. And reluctantly it also have been given the legitimacy to play that role from most of the states in the region. Between February and April 2002, the Inter-Congolese dialogue was held in Sun City, South Africa. In July 2002, Thabo Mbeki brokered the Pretoria accord between Kinshasa and Kigali, in which Rwanda agreed to withdraw from the Congo in exchange for Joseph Kabila's tracking down and disarming of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias.[13] Rwandan troops withdrew from the Congo by late 2002 and Uganda first in May 2003. In December 2002, all the parties that had participated in the Inter-Congolese dialogue signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in Pretoria and in July 2003, the transition government was installed. South Africa provided a sizeable peacekeeping contingent for the UN force in the DRC, as it has done in Burundi.

Before the changes in South Africa in 1994, Tanzania played a much more influential role as regional peace broker and had the ambition of being a regional player of importance. The post-Apartheid South Africa with its much larger capacity and resource base has outcompeted Tanzania. It might as well be a part of a Western strategy to facilitate and legitimise South Africa to be established as a regional hegemony that could "keep the African problem in Africa" after the US debacle in Somalia in 1993. This rivalry between Tanzania is displayed in the initial peace processes in Rwanda and Burundi, where Tanzania and Nyerere hosted the peace process. When Mandela took over as chief mediator after Nyerere in the Burundian peace process important changes were immediately made to establish South Africa as a more neutral hegemony than Tanzania. While Nyerere excluded some of the minor rebel groups from the talks, Mandela sought to include all. Tanzania has been regarded as having a more positive appreciation of the "*Hutu*" position.

The Burundian peace process was largely Africa-driven. The AU gave the mandate to SA to be the broker, and the AMIB, (African Mission in Burundi) was the AU's first peacekeeping military intervention; South Africa doing the logistics and providing coordination and key troops together with Mozambique and Ethiopia. In this way, the intervention could combine a much cheaper peacekeeping intervention then the UN is able to do. In addition, the African troops have a more intimate knowledge of the conditions prevailing on the ground than the usual UN peacekeeping forces have.

[13] A month after South Africa's diplomatic triumph, Angola brokered the Luanda accord between Kinshasa and Kampala in which Uganda agreed to withdraw its troops from the Congo

Heads of State initiative

One of the more important institutions for conflict management in the region is the Heads of States forum. The Heads of State initiative, earlier in Rwanda, and now more recently in the DRC and in Burundi, has mediated in several of the conflicts. The chairmanship of the Heads of State network circulates between the presidents, currently Museveni is the chair. Tanzania has played a crucial role as host and facilitator of the peace negotiations in Rwanda and Burundi.[14]

Networks between security sector staffs

Another important asset for peace building in the region is the frequent informal and formal contact at high-level between countries and actors in the region. Particularly the staffs at senior level in the security structures appear to have close and efficient informal networks, often based on joint study experiences at military academics in Europe or the US. These networks are mobilised when crises appear, or work as "Shepherd's" before important formal meetings. The African elites are quite shallow and often family- or friendship-linked senior officials in different sectors.

East African Community

If and when Burundi and Rwanda become members of the EAC, it will play a role in facilitating peacemaking in the region. Both the Rwandan and the Burundian peace accord have been negotiated largely in Arusha. It is, however, unlikely that the DRC will become a member of the EAC. The EAC has low capacity so far, to intervene in active peace mediation. The membership in the EAC could however be an important carrot for Rwanda and Burundi to speed up the normalisation in their countries. The EAC has the ambition of establishing an East African peacekeeping force, as well as the mechanism for conflict management. Already the East African Parliamentarians have conducted a number of mediation activities, related to the cattle rustling and conflicts over fishing rights between the member states. If Rwanda and later Burundi become members of the EAC, it is most likely that they will contribute to stability in the region, not least by reducing structural violence through better working infrastructure, faster economic development as well the exchange of ideas, experience and people.

Cooperation between the Parliamentarians

The parliamentarians in the region have a joint organisation, Amani, that arranges seminars, monitors peace and elections processes. Amani appear to play a progressive role, both as forum for parliamentarians from the different countries anx as a "peer review" mechanism.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD, with Etiopia, Eritrea, Djibuti, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda as members have played a important role in the peace processes on the Horn and in the Sudan. It thus do not directly work with the conflict, in the narrow definition, of the Great Lakes region, but as Uganda is a member and the situation in the Sudan as well as on the Horn via a "domino" effect have influence of the situation in Uganda it

[14] However, Tanzania has been supporting one part financially in the conflict in Burundi, the FDD.

is also an important forum in the region. A Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002.

Coordination between different regional bodies

A challenge is that a number of regional bodies are overlapping, or that neighbouring countries are members of different regional organisations. One example is that DRC and Tanzania are members of SADC, but not Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya are members of EAC, and most likely soon Rwanda and eventual Burundi will be members as well. But not DRC. Tanzania has left COMESA, where still Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and DRC are members. All three great lake countries are also members of ECCAS.

This is partly managed at regional level trough mutual high-level participation at summit meetings. For instance at the last SADC summit in Dar es Salaam in August 2003, the Secretary-General of the COMESA, the Secretary-General of the EAC and representatives of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the NEPAD Secretariat of the African Union Commission and the African Development Bank participated.

Other conflict management efforts: the NGOs and networks

Civil society organizations, the NGOs, the CBOs, and the faith-based organisations are conducting a range of regional peacemaking activities. Regional umbrella organisations exist within the fields of human rights, gender and environment that work with different aspects of conflict management and peace building, not forgetting a large number of the international NGOs. The regional organisations however, often follow the language areas, even if Rwanda now often functions as a bridge between the Anglophone East Africa and the mainly francophone DRC and Burundi. A surprisingly dense network exists in between the NGOs in eastern DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, as the distance is so short and the roads good.

The religious organisations play an important role as a bridge between the countries and people and have a wide variety of conflict management related activities. The churches are well established at local level and have a unique network, but at the same time, as history has shown, the churches also play a partisan role at times.

Numerous formal cum informal networks between individuals and institutions exist that are quite difficult to grasp, especially the ideologically based ones. These networks also play an important role, not least in building bridges between different groups. In addition, the turbulent history in the region has created a vast number of people with "cosmopolitan" identities. It is very usual that a Rwandan individual has family members and friends in several of the neighbouring countries.

3.3 Examples of NGO and CBOs working with regional dimensions of the conflict

– Mediation is done by a number of NGOs and faith-based organisations: CARITAS – has organized regional meetings in Burundi and Rwanda and the DRC that brought leaders of the Catholic Church to discuss peace. CARITAS has also drawn up a manifesto for peace in the region and national programmes that address human rights issues, citizenship, small weapons and other pertinent issues.

- Joint Christian Councils in Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan have organized several seminars to discuss the proliferation and trafficking of light arms and small weapons. They are mobilizing community in order to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
- The Protestant Women Association in the DRC is rehabilitating children that are affected by war; it trains women in peace programmes and is promoting regional peace building by reaching out to women in the border areas, like the border between West Nile in northwestern Uganda and the DRC, to discuss peace.
- In Uganda, the local NGOs and the Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) work closely with the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) to assist ex-combatants that are taking advantage of the Amnesty Act (1999) by communicating the provisions of the Act to the affected communities, especially in northern Uganda. GUSCO is assisting in the resettlement and societal reintegration of children that were formerly abducted by rebels and turned into killing machines or sex slaves; and in the resettlement of war veterans and IDPs. Indeed it was noted in the 2002 National Poverty Forum in Kampala that, "the survival of many IDPs, refugees and orphans in Uganda currently depend on humanitarian assistance from Civil Society Organisations, (CSO)". Women play a crucial role in preparing food for families especially trapped in transit camps.
- In Rwanda and Uganda, the political and humanitarian NGOs contribute to peace through monitoring and observing electoral processes, and sensitising the people about their rights in the constitutional-making process.
- In the DRC, the government Centre for Peace Negotiation has been given the responsibility to organise a conference on peace that will bring neighbouring countries together to discuss peace in the region.

3.4 Trade and Private Sector development

One of the more important mechanisms for a sustainable peace in the region is to develop the already existing networks of trade and investments. The private sector in all the GLR countries has indicated great interest in becoming involved in the peace process. They assert that without peace they cannot conduct business. On the other hand, there are also a large number of private sector actors taking advantage of the prevailing disorder and with an interest in maintaining it, in order to continue with informal or illegal activities.

3.5 Challenges

- The ongoing conflict in eastern Congo, the tension in Burundi, the strained relationship between Uganda and Rwanda are some of the challenges that need to be addressed in order to pave the way for peace building and development;
- Other challenges include lack of coordination of the ongoing interventions, and the inability to evaluate the impact of other interventions, both from top-down and bottom-up perspectives.

- Overlapping regional organisations: one challenge is that a membership and integration of Rwanda and Burundi in the EAC, and hence eastern part of the DRC, might not been seen as a positive development from Kinshasa's viewpoint. In addition, we have a number of partly overlapping regional organisations as mentioned above like ECCAS, CPEGL, COPAX, Comesa, SADC.
- However, the main conclusion is that a large number of African institutions and actors exist that have built up experience and capacity in the field of conflict management. It must be of vital importance to strengthen these as much as possible, including regional, governmental and non-governmental organisations and institutions. There appears to be a need to map out which organisations exist and what activities they pursue as well as to sort out the relationships between the different regional and interstate organisations.

4. Crosscutting themes in the regional conflict complex

The Great Lakes' region offers a number of regional challenges, both in terms of the sources of the problem/conflicts having a multi-country character and the consequences of the problem/conflicts affecting several countries. Consequently, the problems cannot be managed if the development in the different states does not pull in the same direction. Processes in a neighbouring country could easily undermine a reform process or aid intervention, even if the intervention as such in a given context is internally coherent. This points at the need to support and coordinate interventions in several countries at same time, as well as to analyse what side effects interventions in one country have on the neighbours. The problem described, is in turn an expression of sources of conflicts and dynamic processes.

The regional conflict complex is multidimensional and compounded by a number of different sources of conflict.

It is difficult to rank the sources in such a complicated conflict configuration. But we think that the amalgamation of structural violence, the manipulation of identities by elites, the inconclusive nation-building processes and insufficient systems/institutions of governance and representation, in combination with inadequate bilateral and regional institutions for conflict management, drive the conflict complex.

4.1 Structural violence – root source one

The root source of the conflicts in the region is the high degree of structural violence that characterises most of the societies in the Great Lakes' area. This includes extreme, and increasing, poverty, exclusion or marginalisation of the majority from economic, social, political, human and cultural rights, inequality in all respects, not least of women, youths and children. This situation creates widening frustration gaps both in the marginalised poor sections of the societies, as among various elites. A high degree of structural violence in combination with incomplete nation and state building processes, lack of inclusive legitimate political processes, power sharing and institutions for maintenance of a certain rule of law, create a situation where structural violence turns to direct violence, both at macro- and micro-level. Structural violence, social exclusion, poverty etc also hollow out cohesion in local communities, fuelling communal conflicts and within families, resulting in domestic violence,

splintered families and collapse of social structures and values. Making the vulnerable even more vulnerable and frustrated, and potentially easier to mobilise by various elites. Structural violence is in that way also a source of regional conflicts. We can talk of structural violence both in terms of *push* and *pull* factors. Increased structural violence could *push* people into migration or into direct violence. For example, in all three countries the land question is one of the most important stepping-stones for the reduction of structural violence. The Kirwanda-speaking minority in eastern DRC is denied rights to land; a structural violence that has generated direct violence. On the other hand, the reduction of structural violence could *pull* people out of violence, for instance if the Kirwanda-speaking minority in DRC could obtain land rights. In a similar way, reduced structural violence in Rwanda, or DRC, or Burundi will *pull* immigrants back from neighbouring countries. One of the most positive developments at the time of writing is the agreement between the transitionary government in DRC and Rwanda to finally disarm, demobilise, repatriate and reintegrate the ex-Far/*Interahamwe* forces in DRC.

The question of poverty reduction is obviously on the agenda of all development organisations, INGOs and NGOs. This is the overall basic theme of the PRS. However, in postconflict environments, it may be necessary to go beyond the PRS, and adopt a *structural violence reduction* approach. In using the expression 'structural violence reduction', we want to emphasise that efforts to address potential conflicts should go beyond the common expression of poverty alleviation. Thus, we see poverty alleviation as a humanitarian imperative in all contexts. However, when we are dealing with conflicts and conflict analysis, more attention should be directed at identifying root causes among the multifold expressions of structural violence, which surround most armed conflicts in Africa. Hence, poverty alleviation is an important part of structural violence reduction, though the concept of structural violence also tries to include the structures and dynamics of political and economic power, which are creating poverty in the first hand. In this way, the concept of structural violence is broader and more useful then human rights. In this sense structural violence is the explanatory variable and poverty and human rights the intermediate variable, that address the institutional setup, power structures and agents that create poverty and disrespect for human rights.

The politically most problematic discussion is to what extent a conscious structural violence reduction approach may 'harm' the conventional macro-economic benchmarks in the short term. We see a need for a further expanded analysis of the reach of PRS in post conflict environments. A structural violence reduction approach, reaching further into the specific conflict situations is required.

4.2 Knowledge production, construction of identities and legitimacy in GLR – root source two

The second most important source of conflicts, to our mind, is the cognitive processes where the histories, identities and interpretations of both historical and current situations are constructed. A key process is the systematic manipulation by elites of uneducated and marginalised

masses, setting off self-sustaining processes of the construction of identities built on fear and stereotypes of the other.

The challenge is to understand identity as a complex, ambiguous, fluid, ever- shifting concept, as a construction, and as culture.

A prime conflict generator in the region are the interpretations of historical atrocities by constructed collectives, legitimising retaliation on individuals, at best loosely connected with the actual event. Constructing history so that blame can be attributed to a certain group constitutes a "legitimate" cause for retribution. Reports about "reality" are never neutral. Whether or not it is the intention, reports on conflicts contain a message of who is to blame and what is the "legitimate" response. For example, a recurrent pattern in conflict reports on Rwanda is that the *Hutu* militia, which responded to the calls of the government's armed forces, started the massacres. Such reports rationalise the intervention of the government by stating, "They started it". No mention is made of circumstances that would place the actions of the so-called *Hutu* militia in an historical context. (Where were these "militia" men from? What is their rationalisation for their actions? What historical atrocities have they been subjected to?).

The role of historical events as a conflict catalyst calls for information pluralism and processes of critical evaluation and contextualisation of "facts".

Regional conflict psychology

The historical and cultural proximity between inhabitants in the region creates what we would call a "regional conflict psychology". This regional conflict psychology is fed by, and feeds, conflicts through the region. Events anywhere in the region are interpreted in the light of this psychology, and add to the narratives in which different groups are either stigmatised or portrayed as martyrs. For example, the interpretation of recent events in Ituri as a conflict between *Hutu* (Lendu) and *Tutsi* (Hema) adds to the pattern of ethnic strife in Burundi and Rwanda. Similarly, FNL's shelling of Bujumbura stands as a reminder to inhabitants of Kigali of what damage can be inflicted by a small group of "violent *Hutu*s".

It is amazing to see how intellectuals, and responsible decision-makers in politics and economics, as well as leading personalities in the civil society of the region, are so entrenched in extremely aggressive perceptions of 'the other', and 'the others' intentions. Reflections about identity and cognitive processes of identity would normally fall outside the framework of international development co-operation. However, in this specific context it seems as if the theory that people act according to their perceptions, not according to what others could see as 'reality', is painstakingly illustrated. Any initiative that takes on the challenge of identity formation processes or regional information and/or scientific networking should be seen as beneficial in a long-term conflict perspective. We believe that a number of more or less embryonic networks already exist in the different spheres of the societies that could be worth examining more closely: the research networks, the exchange programmes between the universities in the region for staff and students, the civil society networks, and not least, the shared popular culture and sports, which could be used as springboards for forging closer links and common identity.

4.3 Elite competition

Competing "reversed mirror" models for management of societies

The state-based elites in Bujumbura and Kigali have chosen different strategies to address the dilemma of ethnicity in their two countries. The relative success of either regime has implications for the legitimacy of the other's strategy. This constitutes the basis for contradictory interests between the two state-elites. If the Burundian strategy, with an explicit and very outspoken approach to ethnical differences and a system of ethnic quotations, proves relatively more successful, the Rwandan strategy, characterised by a "de-ethnicfication" of the society, will be called into question. The reverse is also true.

Rivalry for regional hegemony

In this context, one could also point elite rivalry on a regional level regarding hegemonic power. Elites in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda as well as in DRC try to further their positions through alliances in other countries. However, during the war, this alliance building has been subordinated to the logic of the turmoil, and contributed to the situation with the multiplication of local warlords, often with a weak social base, but with the protection from a government in another country. Patterns of alliances shift rapidly; it is at times very difficult to understand the logic between alliances. The situation in Ituri is an example of how this cynical play for regional influence, and access to resources, could escalate conflicts. In the process, spreading of rumours, disinformation, stereotyping and manipulation of identities all contribute to aggravate an already difficult situation.

Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources

The 'black-hole' syndrome often attributed to the DRC has fuelled the inter- and intra-elite struggle for the resources. The foci of the struggles take different shape depending on the type of resources available. In Rwanda and Burundi, with fewer available natural resources, the control over the state is in focus. While in eastern DRC the struggle has been more directly linked to control over various resources *outside* the state apparatus. It means that different actors could gain from keeping the state weak in DRC, or keeping the struggles running in Burundi in order to extract the resources from DRC more easily.

The heterogeneity of elites, social groups, parties, rebel movements, militias in combination with undeveloped institutions, flexibility and shifting alliance formations add to the complexity of the situation. The low opportunity cost for war/violence adds to the cycles of acute violence.

National elites have conflicting security interest /agendas

For the state elite in Rwanda it is definitely a major interest to control the forces from the former genocidal government residing in DRC. The Rwandan (state) elites have a personal fear of being exposed to a new, unfinished genocide. The intervention in DRC could largely be understood in that context, even if one should not downplay the economic interest and the expansionist sentiments that also exist. This drive for

security through strengthened control in DRC threatens both the *Hutu* elites in Burundi as well as the elites in Uganda. From an Ugandan perspective a disintegration of DRC could be a threat to the Ugandan national cohesion. The Ugandan state is already strongly challenged by insurgencies in the east, north and west. The border between Uganda and DRC cuts apart ethnic groups that are closely related and might opt for self-nation building processes.

The question of conflicting interests as regards mineral resources also has a bearing on the external interventions in the conflict. It would be naïve not to recognise the huge economic interests in DRC's mineral resources from actors in the intervening powers. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the last seven years' restructuring of the mineral sector in the DRC, it goes without saying that the process since the start of the AFDL rebellion has created both winners and losers at all levels in the chain of production. Control of assets and markets from the digging sites to the jewellery shops has changed. In a conflict perspective, it is not evident that the concessions and digging rights should be reinstated to the pre-Kabila situation. Ugandan, Rwandan, and other international interests may have confiscated many resources illegally from the DRC to the detriment of development efforts, but above all they have stolen the profit from someone else, and it would not be too calculated a guess that this someone now intends to retrieve it.

This is also an issue secondary to a development cooperation perspective. However, as soon as we are trying to expand the scope of development to postconflict reconstruction, we do encounter these issues, though not always very visibly. What we can consider as somewhat disturbing in most reporting on the regional conflict is the lack of attention directed to these issues.

This issue can also be linked to our discussion about identity formation and reproduction. Thus, also international media reports contribute to the reproduction of stereotypes. The armed groups and 'militias', that are securing mining sites on behalf of both 'old' concession holders (who are investigating the Ashanti Gold Fields and the Anglo-American links to events in Bunia), and potentially 'new' interests in the process of the re-negotiation of mineral concessions about to start with a new government in place in Kinshasa, are more conveniently described as 'ethnic militias' than as mining sites' guards.

Although this kind of discussion is seldom included in project of program formulations, it is the kind of knowledge that is highly relevant in a local implementation of Mary B Anderson's 'do no harm'-perspective.

4.4 Deficient democracy, governance, legitimacy and citizenship

All countries in the region share a situation of lack of or limping democracy, good governance and a legitimate political order based on a social contract between the ruler and the ruled, providing a foundation for citizenship. The structures, institutions, regulatory frameworks, and the culture of democracy and good governance are weak. Rwanda and Uganda are in somewhat better positions. Consequently, there are

insufficient numbers of arenas from the regional, down to the local level for voicing political dissent, and a lack of the culture of power sharing. Again, the situation is less serious in Uganda and Rwanda.

None of the countries has any experience of democracy of the Western liberal type. A number of more or less elaborated democratic institutions existed in the traditional society. Most of these have been destroyed, or hollowed out, during the postcolonial period. According to democracy theory, democracy is the most efficient way of managing societal conflicts, both within and between countries. It provides a framework for negotiations and brokering between different interests and solving disputes by peaceful means. However, it is also so that democracy theory is based on Western experiences. The experiences from the Great Lakes' region of the rapid introduction of western forms of multi-party systems in the early nineties are deterring. The lesson learnt is that it is more important to focus on the content than on the form. Elections held too early in a postconflict transformation phase might generate conflicts. Without proper institutions and the establishment of a political culture, an early election might lead to the reinforced politicisation of territorially anchored identities, openly or candidly, thus running the risk of devaluating the democratic choice to ethnic belonging and xenophobia. This of course does not mean that we argue against democracy. Focus should be on how to build/strengthen the necessary institutions and preconditions that must exist before an election becomes a meaningful indicator on the degree of democracy in the society, and a meaningful procedure in a postconflict transformation process, rather than on the election process per se. Here a delicate balance on the tightrope between short- and long-term stability is necessary. An early election could be on strong demand from an excluded majority in an authoritarian society, but it could jeopardise long-term stability if the structural violence situation has not changed. However, democracy does not necessarily lead to a reduction of structural violence, particularly if the process is shallow. If democracy should lead to reduction, it is determined by the degree of legitimacy of the system, the degree/capacity of responsiveness of the system and the capacity of the political system to enable people to voice and aggregate voices to political action. The RPFs ideology in Rwanda has been that economic and social rights must first be respected, secondly that people must receive education before political rights can be fully exercised. Thus in order to maintain long-term stability, certain political rights have to be sacrificed in the short-term.

Uganda and Rwanda are again ahead of the Burundi and DRC, new constitutions have been developed through a guided, participatory process. The two countries have chosen different strategies. Uganda is developing the non-party system based on Tanzania's previous one-party system, while Rwanda has kept a 'strongly guided' multi-party system. The 2003 elections in Rwanda, marked the end of the 9-year transition period, and we still do not know if the overwhelming victory for President Kagame and the RPF will lead to a democratic consolidation, or to growing grievances linked to this form of democracy. This should be closely monitored, but so far it seems to be developing in the right direction. The seven-year-long period until next the presidential election will make room to develop the foundations for a more open democratic

process next time. It appears that the political space will open up. Hence, the political process could serve both as source of inspiration for the neighbours, or a threat. In Burundi, an election should be held before the end of 2004, according to the Arusha Agreement. Two issues are at stake: the resources to hold the election are limited, and secondly, and most importantly, there is a fear that the election could intensify the conflicts. The challenge is if it is possible to establish a legitimate way of postponing the elections. The peaceful elections, and the so far peaceful post-election development in Rwanda, could serve as a source of inspiration so that it is possible to hold an election in a highly conflict-ridden society. On the other hand, Rwanda has gone through a 10-year-long transition period.

The concept of social contract, as an overarching and implicit agreement for how a legitimate relation between elites and populations can be built, is an underestimated point of departure in development cooperation. In the Great Lakes' region, it is applicable in many different relations. Let us point at two such relations.

It relates highly to the situation in Rwanda, in the sense that the present government seems to be on its way to implement a unilateral social *modus vivendi*. It could be said to represent a social contract, with only one signatory. The content of a deeper social contract could be a trade-off between certain limitations on advocates of *Hutu* power, in exchange for a broad and deeply sincere development strategy aimed at a complete eradication of poverty among the rural population, and an educational policy with no social restrictions whatsoever. As we have hinted above, this may need more resources than those PRS is contributing to politically oriented affirmative actions. If so, this is the price for a peace and stability strategy.

In the case of DRC, there is a great need for an east-west social contract, involving both local development issues, and a consensus around the roles of all elites, as well as those from the Mobuto period in a perceived disfavoured position, and those who have unconstitutionally gained positions as loyal to the Kabila entourage.

For international development institutions, especially the bilaterals, these are questions for the political dialogue, in which the 'social contract' between donors and governments are implicitly agreed upon.

4.5 Culture of violence, genocide and impunity

In the last decades, the developments in the region have reinforced a culture of violence, at both interpersonal and political levels. In addition, a culture of impunity for politically sanctioned violence has been established, which both generate new violence and hinder postconflict reconciliation. Rebel groups, like the UPC in Ituri, Exfar/*Interahamwe* when they invaded northwest Rwanda or the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, commit large-scale violent harassment and cruelties against the rural population in the areas they are "liberating". Most bizarrely, a culture of genocide has now been exported from Rwanda (and Burundi) and is poisoning the political processes in DRC, Burundi and Uganda. Through manipulation and stereotyping by different elites in intra-elite struggles, the *Tutsi-Hutu* dichotomy is now used for mobilisation in

eastern DRC, Burundi and Uganda. This *Hutu-Tutsi* parallel transforms into a metaphor for de-humanising 'the other', for future extinction. This partly explains the cruelties that are being committed.

In addition, the need for concerted de-stereotyping and material development efforts is visible. All possibilities of mobilising vulnerable population strata on the grounds of visibly different conditions, both material and immaterial, should be central for a sustainable rural livelihood approach. In our conflict perspective, it is often the meeting point between perceived injustices and identity stereotyping that violence finds a room.

In the process of the collapse of societies, rules and norms, the most vulnerable groups suffer most. In the generalised violence against "the other", the demonised enemy, and in a situation where almost anybody could be a member of an armed enemy group, the distinction between civilians and militaries becomes metaphysical. In addition, in a situation of increased frustration and increased structural violence, young men in particular appear to find it necessary to display their power. In this conflict-ridden context traditional patriarchal structures interplay with general collapse of the societies, resulting in, among other things, sexual abuse and sexual violence directed at women, and to a lesser extent against other men. The extent of sexual violence appears to be widespread, but there are few sources that can provide credible information of its real extent. It appears also that the sexual violence is more of a generalised type of violence directed towards the other, rather than a military strategy.

Armed groups

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent is a major challenge for both conflict prevention, postconflict rehabilitation and peace building. The term "rebel" group or "militia" refers to wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandits, at times with a political objective, to relatively well-organised groups. The armed groups are linked to each other in a cobweb of networks, with local, national, regional and international dimensions, often with connections to formal, informal and illegal activities at all levels.

Peace process paradox: brigandage

A paradoxical result of the peace processes is that in the interregnum between "ordered disorder" before the peace agreements and the re-establishment of an institutional state, the level of disorder increases. For example, in DRC the peace process results in the dissolution of ExFar *Interahamwe,* Mayi *Mayi*, *UPC* and other rebel groups. In the process, loose gangs of ex-fighters turn into more or less brigandage as a means of survival. It points at the need for a very rapid creation of the means of surviving without weapons…

4.6 Militarisation of the societies

The protracted conflicts have brought about a general militarisation of all the region's societies, in terms of state budget allocation, lifestyle and the local security situation, which in turn has a direct effect on social, political and economic development.

Arms trade

The virtually unlimited access to weapons in the area is another important source or amplifier of conflict. Control of the trade and distribution of arms are prerequisites for stability in the region. It was difficult to come to grips with, as strong economic and political interests are involved, often in the nexus between the "informal", the "illegal" and the "formal" economy. However, it is important to control sources, distribution and use. The national police authorities cooperate by stopping or monitoring the trade and several NGOs work in the area and have done mapping.

Small arms, as opposed to conventional weapons, are easy and inexpensive to manufacture and transport. Therefore, their production is highly decentralised. Several factories produce weapons in the region. The cost of these weapons is comparatively low. As borders are porous and small arms are easy to hide, they can be traded illegally without much difficulty. The recycling of weapons from different conflicts in the region has increased the supply side of the weapons trade, and expanded the scope of the illegal arms trade. It is in particular the illicit arms trade, on the rise globally and increasingly difficult to monitor, which has caused region-wide concern. The proliferation of small arms emanates from increased demand at the local level, as well as from the easy supply of arms at the regional and international levels. The availability of arms has greatly amplified communal conflicts, e.g., the Ituri and Karimojong areas.

Practically, to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms, it is crucial to implement both a transparency regime and a control regime of all small arms and light weapons, whether they are imported or exported, manufactured, seized, recovered from illicit sources, or acquired through national procurement.

The problem is that in several areas in the region, in particular in eastern DRC, north and east Uganda and the Sudan, the border between formal military structures, rebels and formal and informal economic activities are fluent. In Ituri, e.g., Ugandan military commanders rented guns (or even sold) and men to local rival groups, as well as "security services" to economic actors, thus greatly contributed to the escalation of violence. The arms trade often takes place in the nexus between informal/illegal networks and activities and the formal sector.

There are a number of different initiatives as regards combat against the proliferation of small arms. However, it seems as if good results are not too easy to achieve. The proper underlying issues have a persistent tendency if not addressed in parallel with arms collection. Whether we are talking about increased criminality, cattle rustling, or groups bordering war-lordism, they should be seen as reactions to societal shortcomings at local level.

Child soldiers

The use of child soldiers in the DRC started already with the AFDL rebellion. Along the road to Kinshasa, the AFDKL is said to have assembled around ten thousand child soldiers, or *kadogos*, as they are called. This created an image of adventure and new life for many young people. However, later during the evolving armed conflicts, this situation was completely perverted.

All the rebel forces, all the militias, as well the government army, FAC, have used child soldiers during the war. Many have obviously been forcibly recruited, but the generalised poverty, mainly in the eastern part of the DRC, has also contributed to a process in which many have 'volunteered', in search of protection, possible survival or in search of any group of human beings to join, for many orphans and errant youngsters were in a situation of social dissolution.

This pictured is mirrored in Burundi where all warring parties, including the regular army, are reported to have engaged child soldiers. In Burundi alone, the figures varies between 3,000 to 9,000 child soldiers under arms, while in the Great Lakes Region estimates account for the tens of thousands.

These children become highly traumatised, often lack proper education and thus are a highly destabilising element in a post-conflict transformation process. In addition, because child soldiers are frequently forced to provide sexual services for adult soldiers, they are highly afflicted with HIV/AIDS.

In Rwanda, there are now a large number of grown-up children who participated in the genocide, with unhealed traumas and guilt complexes. They are often stigmatised by the victims of the genocide. Grown-up child militiamen are also in the ExFar Interahamwe forces that are about to be demobilised and repatriated. This will demand special attention in the demobilisation process.

4.7 Regional demographic fluidity

The violent history of the region and the porosity of its national boarders have created a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Some of the people currently characterised as refugees know no other home than the refugee, or IDP, camps, which question the proper categorisation. Another methodological caveat pertains to the elusive exactness in reports on refugees and IDPs. A report on the situation may present the odd combination of very exact numbers of IDPs and refugees, subdivided along different social strata, while at the same time include caveats like "the IDP figures exclude a possible further 100,000 IDP's, and possibly more." (UN OCHA July 31st 2002, pp 5–6). These "margins of error" reveal some of the problematics related to the demographic fluidity in the region. Camps are often located in areas with very a low level of infrastructure. This adds to the general difficulty of the control of their inhabitants and the high level of militarisation. Furthermore, IDPs and refugees are "hard currency" in the cynical market for attention and aid from the international donor community, which calls for the systematic inflation of the figures. Considering this, table 1 below provides an overview of the main population flows in the region.

Table 1: Population flows[15]

Country	Internally displaced	Percent of pop.	Refugees other countries	Percent of pop.	Refugees from other countries	Percent of pop.
Burundi	633 000	9	371 533	5,4	48 958	0,4
DRC	2 000 000	4	252 382	0,5	n.a	
Rwanda	600 000	7	56 686	0,6	34 100	0,4
Tanzania					652 535	1,9

These displaced populations often live in squalid conditions, marked by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services. As will be further elaborated in the part on HIV/Aids, displaced populations tend to be at a greater risk of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

The displaced populations typically constitute a security risk for both the receiving communities and the country of origin. The influx of large groups of people increases the strain on the local communities, and their ability to provide for their own food security. Increases in demand for food, land, water, and sanitation, provide structural conditions conducive to political mobilisation against the displaced populations. Systematic and collective stigmatisation of the displaced groups, for example as *genocidaires* hiding from justice, further hampers the integration in the receiving communities.

However, the presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin also provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, if necessary by force. This was the case in the camps in eastern Zaïre after the Rwandan genocide, making it possible for members of the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and *Interahamwe* to regroup and start their incursions into Rwanda. Burundian armed groups also know how to use refugee camps in Tanzania as safe havens, in order to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members.

Tanzania is by far the largest receiver of refugees, which has generated both incomes and conflicts over scarce resources and insecurity for the population in the areas where the camps are located.

Demobilisation, repatriation and, above all, reintegration of refugees and IDPs is a key issue, both for reducing human suffering and for stabilising the security situation. At the same time, it is a politically sensitive process. How shall returning refugees be integrated, in particular if there is shortage of land or the possessions of the refugees have been taken over by another returning refugee in an earlier period? How shall repatriation and reintegration be carried out without tilting a precarious political balance? How shall crimes and violence committed by various groups be reconciled? The delimitation between who is the victim and who is the perpetrator is often fluid, since both parties have suffered.

[15] Most country data are reported for the second half of 2001. In some countries, the numbers are only a rough estimate of the possible range of persons internally displaced. The Global IDP Database in most of these instances has calculated a median figure using the highest and lowest available estimates.

In fact, the repatriation of refugees is sometimes even more sensitive than the repatriation of demobilised soldiers. Often they are many more, and the situation they are supposed to return to is mostly not less vulnerable than it was at the time of departure. Normally these issues are treated by IOM, which obviously requires financial backing for this.

In the Great Lakes' region, the refugee situation is complicated by the fact that large refugee groups are not only seen as victims of crisis, but in certain important cases, also as perpetrators. We have no specific solutions for the refugee crisis in the region, but it seems to us as if a discussion of coordination between the institutions and national authorities dealing the DDRRR programmes in the region, and those responsible for refugee issues. Especially when it comes to the interface between the 'RR' phase of the demobilisation and the needs for local development activities as part of the reintegration.

There is one small detail deserving some attention. When people are re-assembling after repatriation or resettlement, three different behavioural patterns are represented among them. Some were soldiers, voluntary or drafted, many with a violent history, though they do not necessarily deserve to stand trial for it. Others may have been refugees, just in order to escape that violence. The third category of people often forgotten, are those civilians who stayed on, endeavouring to survive in a troublesome situation. Local environments, characterised by such a mixture, do need a strong local 'do no harm' approach. The main challenge is how to avoid placing these groups against each other. Those who fled should not necessarily come back with a better starting position than those who attempted to stay, and combatants are not necessarily so legitimate in the resettlement communities that they can be accepted as beneficiaries of violence without tension.

4.8 Security sector reform

On a technical level, the issue of security sector reform has been much about how to integrate former rebels into the national army and at the same time downsize the army, in order to make it reasonably large and diversified. Processes of DDRRR are undertaken through the region, with varying degrees of success, and under the framework of different peace agreements, most notably the agreements from Lusaka and Arusha. Rwanda has gone through a moderately successful restructuring of its army and has both integrated a large number of ExFar Interahamwe forces, as well as downsized the forces and created a new national military force. The DDRRR process for the remaining forces in DRC remains to be conducted.

Perhaps the most important single issue in the containment of direct and structural violence in Great Lakes'region is a holistic and long-term commitment to DDRRR processes. The technical aspects of army reforms and the demilitarisation of the population are at best the first step in a solution to the fundamental security problems of the region. Among the key issues in need of addressing are the facilitation of a viable civil livelihood for the demilitarised groups, and the legitimate security dilemmas facing the region's many minorities, for whom the control of the army has become the ultimate guarantee. In Burundi, for example,

the control of the army has equalled not only the control of the state, its resources and positions, but more importantly the security against the perceived threat of extinction through genocide. Whereas many *Tutsi*s today literally think that they will not live if they give up control of the army, many *Hutu*s believe that they need to control the army, or be killed by it. For the *Hutu*s no sustainable solution to the crisis can be reached without a substantial reform of the army, but any attempt to reform of the army without including a solution to the *Tutsi*s' security situation is not likely to be successful.[16]

The network of formal and informal military alliances between governments and rebels in the region calls for a regional approach to "domestic" security problems. Again using the Burundi example, the willingness of the incumbent *Tutsi* elite to reform the army hinges on a comprehensive solution including the FNL and FDD whose strategic agendas and mobilisation patterns are highly regional.

However, later developments in the debate on Security Sector Reform have drawn attention to the linkages between the security sector in a wider sense, and the conditions for development efforts. Thus, in a perspective of human security, it examines both the police and judicial system. The result is, on the one hand a new proximity between human rights issues, and security sector reform, and, on the other hand, efforts to create a stronger linkage between a necessary reorganisation of the security sector at large, and an understanding that its initial breakdown was in fact part of a development crisis.

In terms of development challenges one risk and one possibility emerge from all this. The risk, as far as we see it, is that an integration of military perspectives and development issues may result in the supremacy of the military structure, possibly draining resources from development. The possibility, however, is that for the first time there will be an opportunity of introducing a development perspective earlier in the peace processes, and there will be a broader recognition that development is a substantial part of the conflict resolution, not only something that arrives when the military people have already done their job and enforced a cease-fire upon the warring parties.

One example on how it could be beneficial for humanitarian assistance, or development projects, to come closer to the DDR process considers how the last stage in a DDRRR process should be transferred into a development one. Experience from other demobilisation processes show that when a demobilised soldier is in the last-R phase he has lost all contact with the institutions and the resources that brought him into the process. However, he is still seen as a demobilised soldier, i.e. is still not an ordinary citizen. Thus, there is probably a need for periods of overlapping responsibility, in which development resources can 'co-exist' with demobilisation resources within the livelihood of the individual soldier, in order to reinforce the bridging transfer from soldier identity to a regular citizen.

[16] In a deal aimed at providing the *Tutsi*s with the necessary security guarantee, certain reforms including the reform of the army, required the counter signature of vice President Alphonse Kadege to validate the signature of President Ndayizeye. This leaves UPRONA with the power to block decisions by the government, which was not given to Frodebu during the presidency of Buyoya.

4.9 Justice, reconciliation, rehabilitation and trauma

In a postconflict situation, difficult choices have to be made between justice, reconciliation for the society and its reconstruction. The share volume of injustice after decades of civil war blocks the rudimentary judiciary that exists after a conflict situation, which is so clearly shown in Rwanda with almost 100,000 prisoners still in prison without proper trials ten years after the genocide. A balance has to be struck between catering to the victim's legitimate rights to receive a fair recognition and trial for the tragedies they have endured. On the other hand, the postconflict government has to balance between the victims' legitimate claims, and the need to reconcile all groups in the society.

One of the greatest challenges is how to reconcile populations that have been so deeply affected by violence and social stress. The enormous numbers of severely traumatised people, not least women and children, is not only an expression of immense suffering, but also a time bomb if not properly managed, which the situation in former Yugoslavia so clearly demonstrated. The available expertise and capacity is far too low.

We have confronted some interesting activities in this sense, though the international experiences are more widespread. In Rwanda, a number of interesting developments have taken place, at different levels:

- The costly and apparently inefficient International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha for the instigators of the genocide, a rudimentary reconstruction of the national judiciary, where the budget for the whole judiciary is a fraction of the ICTR.
- The gacaca process, a "modernisation" of "traditional" courts, recently established and about which it is too early to make any firm conclusions. However, the experience so far indicates that it has been fairly successful. There are still a number of challenges that remain to be tackled, like ensuring the trials are reasonably fair.
- Another interesting development is the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission that works with reconciliation from the national to the local level, while a number of CSOs work with reconciliation and trauma counselling at the local level.

All these institutions appear to be seriously underfinanced, especially when compared with the ICTR.

It appears that the mistake made in Rwanda has been the failure to build up the judiciary quickly enough. This might be a lesson to be learnt for post-conflict DRC. The NURC and the gacaca also might be interesting examples to be inspired by, both in Burundi and DRC. However, Rwanda is regarded with great scepticism by its neighbours.

In the DRC there are numerous local groups of women, very often emerging from within victimised communities, and/or religious congregations, which are taking care of traumatised women. These groups are vulnerable in themselves, since they are emerging spontaneously out of a very difficult situation. The most relevant channels to reach at this level would probably be through the churches. There is also a highly appreciated activity at one of CEPAC's hospitals in Bukavo, in which victimised women are taken care of in a rehabilitation process. Also Save the Children-UK in Goma has a seemingly very functional approach to the

rehabilitation of child soldiers, in which the receiving community will gain something out of receiving these resettled children. Similar activities are organised in Rwanda, where volunteer councillors after a short training programme participate in community-based counselling. What seems to a common denominator in these kinds of extremely sensitive activities is the recognition of the primacy of small-scale activities, and strong local support.

In Burundi, there is an ongoing dialogue with a low level of institutionalisation between the government and the civil society as well as within the civil society and at local level. However, the process has, not so far reached a critical stage of institutionalisation. The most critical issue to address is impunity. Most indications point at the reconciliation process being more successful at local level, where people share common challenges, than in the realm of politics where conflicts are the predominant mode of raison-de-etre.

However, reconciliation should not only be seen as affecting the relations between warring parties, and between victim and perpetrator. Reconciliation also has a political meaning in that it regards the recreation of legitimacy for a political system, and its administrative institutions, which has not succeeded in its classical task of protecting its population and guaranteeing its long-term survival. On the contrary, the state itself has been a main promoter and perpetrator of human rights abuses. A substantial reduction of structural violence would be a crucial step in a reconciliatory process between the population and the political system as such.

4.10 Demographic stress and physical isolation

The rapid growth of populations and population density in different areas in the region (parts of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DRC) create increased demand on land, water, firewood, economic resources and social service and if not managed properly, create a breeding ground for frustration and thus a potential for mobilisation. Young unemployed men in rural and urban areas easily become mobilised in ragtag armies creating an opportunity both for incomes (less) and a kind of perverted dignity, i.e.. to be recognised as being part of a human context, larger than yourself, since the community cannot offer anything.

These conditions should be seen in the light of the relative isolation in which the communities, for example in eastern DRC, have been living for many years.

Insufficient, deficient or destroyed infrastructure is a contribution to, as well as a consequence of the conflict. It creates a foundation for isolated rebels, as well as other criminal and war-lordist, groups, as it undermines the development of formal economies and the integration into the national and international economy, as well as society. Denying remote areas access to markets, social service, information, etc. provides a hotbed for any armed group to mobilise frustrated marginalised populations. Economic and social development in urban/central areas but not in the periphery create uneven development and increasing frustration gaps in the periphery, as clearly illustrated by the Ugandan or eastern DRC situation. In addition, it is costly and difficult to control areas with an incomplete infrastructure.

Earlier research on local and rural violence points at the specific risks linked to remote areas in periods of rapid change in the global surroundings. Worldwide research on social banditry and other forms of rural violence seems to confirm that this kind of violence has social and local roots, not least in the feelings of injustice. This means that the local violence we have seen hitherto, and may come to see along the process of peace consolidation, is not always part of the general conflict panorama, such as it appears when seen top-down. From a bottom-up perspective, local violence may as well be part of local tensions and contradictions, though in a period war it may be difficult to distinguish which violence belongs to what conflict. However, many of these local violent activities may only disappear with development and long-term social change.

For a long time to come, these kinds of local outbreaks may continue. In the very specific situation in eastern DRC, with innumerable locally based armed groups, both completely autonomous, and some belonging to the loose network of Mayi-Mayi groups in the region, local tension may easily find a way to being expressed through violence. In such a context, there is a need for negotiating skills and local knowledge, in order to come to grips with the multitudes of local tensions and conflicts, which may escalate into clashes between local communities. Proven capacity and experience exist within both the Life and Peace Institute and other NGOs in the region.

4.11 Natural resources – conflict source and development option

The region is rich in natural resources. As we can see in the section on DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, natural resources are at stake for many actors in the conflict. However, they are also a potential for postconflict rehabilitation and development. There are strong conflicting interests between different groups and actors at different levels, which have been analysed at length, in the literature, and UN reports. Among the challenges, we find the need to develop institutions and frameworks that both integrate/transform the informal to a formal economy, governed by a reasonable rule of law, transparency and efficiency. At the same time, the extraction of resources has to be modernised in a sustainable way, and with as high value added as possible at local level, without marginalising local and regional actors.

Minerals – the international political economy linkages

In particular, the eastern part of DRC is well endowed with minerals. Five layers of actors could be discerned: Trans National Corporations (TNC's), regional, national and local entrepreneurs and state institutions, and at the bottom, local "hackers"/small-scale miners/excavators. There is a risk that the interest of the state, and the national entrepreneurs, of the rapid modernisation of the mining sector in order to increase national tax revenues and investment opportunities, might create a conflict of interest between the national elites, the marginalised local elites and the small-scale extractors. The necessary access to the trans-national mining companies' capital, technology,

knowledge and markets may marginalise and undermine local entrepreneurs, middlemen, and small-scale miners. This may create a breeding ground for new cycles of local mobilisation. Marginalisation of regional actors, i.e., entrepreneurs from neighbouring countries, could be a source of conflict, when lucrative extraction is denied, and conversely, national actors and local actors can perceive regional actors as "looters". The state's and local government's bargaining and monitoring capacities in relation to international (and local) investors are weak. Long-term development in the region requires the establishment of a regional market economy with scope for regional actors to participate in a legitimate way in the exploitation of, and building up of processing capacity for, the natural resources in eastern DRC.

Energy

Cheap and reliable availability of energy, not least electricity, contributes to conflict prevention by creating conditions for rehabilitation, development and a feeling of being included in the modernisation process, on condition that rural and peripheral areas are included. Vice versa, the denial or cutting off, of the energy supply could generate a breeding ground for conflicts, as illustrated by the distribution of electricity in Uganda. Huge hydropower potential exists in the region. The methane gas under Lake Kivu could generate substantial parts of the region's electricity requirements. Rwanda, Burundi and DRC have many smaller rivers that could be utilised for micro-hydropower. A community- based micro hydro plant would then both facilitate the development of the social capital and provide electricity.

Oil is in a similar way a potential source of both development and conflicts. Oil prospection is under way in several areas. Barrick Oil already claims the exploration rights around Lake Albert and Edward. The potential oil resources could fuel the conflict between Uganda and DRC, as well as conflicts between local, national, regional and international interests, as illustrated by the case of southern Sudan.

Forest

The forest resources have been a source of conflict, but are also a key for peace and development. The export of timber and hardwood, in combination with weak monitoring structures, has generated an unsustainable and conflict-prone situation.

The timber trade has driven roads deep into the forest, providing easier access for hunters to areas previously out of reach. Bush meat finds a ready market in the towns and cities of the region; this has long ceased to be a subsistence activity.

However, forest resources have great potential to contribute to the modernisation of the economy, and thus the reduction of structural violence if the export of unprocessed timber could largely be processed locally, and done in a way that would not marginalise nor exclude local people and entrepreneurs. Pulp and paper industry, sawmills, furniture factories are examples of processing industries that are needed for the rehabilitation of homes and offices, furniture, paper for newspapers and school books in a postconflict phase.

Lake resources

The large and deep lakes have vast potential to produce both fish and other products. All larger lakes are border lakes. Lake Tanganyika, which is the second largest and deepest lake in the world, has a larger water volume than the shallow Lake Victoria. It yields 200,000 tons of fish a year, an important source of food and revenue for the shoreline countries. Lakes Kivu, Albert and Edwards are smaller, and do not produce so much fish due to methane gas. The question on how and by whom, the lakes resources should be used is a source of conflict.

Sustainable development and conflicts

The conflicts undermine sustainable use of resources, and vice versa, the unsustainable use of resources is a source of conflict; eroding capacities of land and land pressure etc., increases the frustration gap; deficient husbandry with natural resources in one country spill over into the neighbouring countries.

Tourism

"Ecotourism" and "culturism" have large development potential in the spectacularly beautiful Great Lake's area with its mountains, forests with rich fauna, lakes, rivers and interesting culture. Tourism is closely linked to the husbandry of natural resources and to peace and political stability. Unrest in one vicinity affects the conditions for tourism in close and distant areas. The developments in eastern DRC, with *Interhamwe*/FDLR in the Virunga Mountains, drastically affect the volatile but growing tourism in Rwanda, as well as in western Uganda, which fuels resentment. Competition over tourists and tourist revenues is also a potential source of conflict, with Kenya and Tanzania as an example.

All these different areas do have their own particularities, in terms of relevant institutional frameworks for control and sustainable management. If we would point at any Swedish comparative advantage in natural resource management, it would probably be forestry. Support to the regions' capacity to negotiate with trans-national actors, as well as to develop the rudimentary legal frameworks and institutions that exist for monitoring extraction of natural resources might be an important area to examine.

4.12 HIV/AIDS

The structural violence of HIV/AIDS pandemic is a major killer in the Great Lakes' region. Among the processes by which the HIV/AIDS problematic is accentuated by the regional conflict dynamic are (1) the social and demographic disruption, which increases the general level of vulnerability and risk, and places highly marginalised people, in particular women and children, in a position where security can only be obtained in exchange for sexual services; (2) the use of rape as a weapon to inflict long-term psychological traumas; (3) men under arms trade their social military prestigious positions into a high frequency of sexual interactions and partners.

A recent review commissioned by USAID and UNICEF, "HIV/AIDS and Conflict: Research in Rwanda, Burundi and eastern-DRC",

argues that the major problem with the current approach of the international donor community is not the level of engagement, but rather that its work is "slow and uncoordinated". The countries in the region are reported to have launched multi-sectoral national Aids strategies backed by international, national, and an impressive number of local initiatives and actors. The call is however made for an increase in the evaluation of efforts, coordination in programmes and funding, and transparency in the distribution of funds.

There are, at least two considerations to be made in relation to the HIV/AIDS/violent conflict complex. One concerns the needed efforts to influence contamination patterns and pace. As with all sexually transmitted diseases, the prevention and treatment are culturally bound, and actions need stable local support. It seems as if there is much to learn from the Ugandan experience.

Secondly, in terms of direct links to armed conflicts and violence, the main risks are that an increasing number of orphans may find themselves without any means of survival, and may opt for local violent criminality as part of a livelihood strategy. In the wake of the war, we may expect to have an increasing number of, not only single-headed households, but also child-headed households, since both the war and aids will take its toll under the coming years.

In that way HIV/Aids could generate conflicts, via increased frustration and structural violence: 1) It is often the breadwinner that is contaminated by HIV/AIDS due to the migration patterns gradually decimating the income earning capacity, with the ever-increasing cost for health care. This results in the increased poverty of the individual as well as the family, especially after the husband infects the wife. 2) Regardless if it is a migrating breadwinner or youth that becomes infected it will increase that individual's frustration, which might be mobilised in the form of violent conflicts.

4.13 Interconnection between conflicts – not necessarily direct linked, but still reinforcing the dynamics in the region

Three layers of conflicts can be discerned, regional, national and local/communal. These conflicts are not necessarily directly interlinked. In certain historic situations/conjunctures, the conflicts at all three levels link up and when that occurs, all conflicts escalate dramatically. One example is when the postgenocide development with large flow of refugees to Kivu, occurred at the same time as the Zairian state was collapsing and the local conflicts in Kivu escalated. The conjuncture of events drastically escalated all three conflicts.

There are direct and indirect links between the conflicts in the region. At times, it is difficult for an outside observer to gather enough information to see the linkages. Clandestine networks, the long history of migration and economic exchange in combination with cobwebs of informal, formal and illegal activities bring apparently distant conflicts together. Even if the conflicts in Sudan and northern Uganda appear to have little connection with the development in DRC there are still a number of connections. The Allied Defence Force has its bases in DRC, and refugees from DRC affect Uganda. In addition, there are a number of indirect linkages.

The Karimojong conflict challenges the Uganda state/state elite, which forces the state/elite to spread risk exposure, for instance by engaging itself in Ituri. More weapons in Karimojong or other northern areas could be a motivation for Uganda to be engaged in DRC. Vice versa, the collapse of the nation-state in Congo also threatens the fragile nation-state project in Uganda; different power equations, colliding polices.

It has become common to explain state failure in Africa as a consequence of the inherent cultural traits of African societies and leadership. It would be a defeatist position for international development cooperation to accept that point of departure. Rather, state failure should be seen in a context of weaknesses in legitimacy processes, in which the balance between internal and external sources of legitimacy has been unfortunate. In other words, many governments, for a long time, have been more dependent on externally based legitimacy for their power, than on the need to create a broad internal legitimacy.

The deficiencies of these processes of legitimacy creation have not been confined to either socialist or market-based development strategies, but to how the political system has been able to deliver what it has said it would. In this sense, the breakdown in socialist Somalia does not greatly differ from the breakdown in Ivory Coast or Liberia.

The lesson for development cooperation in a conflict perspective is that internal, micro-regional or provincial inequalities should be in focus of development efforts. In most of the countries of the Great Lakes' region, we see how violent conflicts are, with the possible exception of Rwanda/Burundi, confined to territorially well-defined areas. Thus, conflicts are not based on functional contradictions, which cut across social differentiation all over the territory, but based on grievances, which can be articulated in the name of territorially based identities. Thus, each country has its internal legitimacy difficulties, which stretch into, or encounter, similar tensions in the neighbouring countries. This means that all development activities, including the centralised budget support, should be scrutinised as regards the territorial and distributional effects.

4.14 Conclusion

1) The Great Lakes' region is a comparatively confined geographical area, with high population density and a history of interdependence. There are several very strong regional dynamics, as well as direct and indirect interactions between the conflicts in the region. It is thus necessary to have a clear regional analysis as a basis for actions in the different countries in the region. This does not necessarily mean that implementation must be on a regional level. However, it is necessary to analyse how the situation or intervention in one country affects the neighbours.

2) One third of an ended civil war restarts in Africa. We think that two stepping-stones for the maintenance of peace are on the one hand, "to reduce structural violence", and, on the other, "to contribute to cognitive reintegration". The building of institutions and the reconstitution of the social contract between state and citizens, and the social trust among citizens are steps in order to achieve a successful postconflict transformation.

3) Helping the people of a war-torn country to rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a politically delicate process, which requires financial commitment and programmatic coherence from the international community. It requires a multifaceted, coordinated effort to rebuild not only economic but also and perhaps more importantly, social and political institutions, as well as legitimacy and trust, now devastated by war and violence.

4) The peace process could paradoxically generate widening frustration gaps. Expectations and hope increase. At the same time, it will take a long time to reconstruct economic, political and social structures that are in shambles, which Rwanda clearly illustrates. It will take even longer before an improvement from the prerequisites-conflict situation could be achieved. Withheld international support could, in a delicate transition phase, widen the frustration gap, as for example by undermining the peace process both through increased frustration, and by not rewarding the political leadership endeavouring to broker peace (as in Burundi). In this way, an overcautious approach might risk delegitimising both the peace process, and the donors.

This is an argument for the international community to give substantial support already during the transition period, though it may be very difficult, and carries high transaction costs, and risk doing harm.

The question is how to do this: with what means, which channels to use, where to enter and with what sequencing, with the minimum requirement i.e. not to do any harm. The needs are enormous, the challenges gigantic, the complexity immense and the interplay of forces makes any prediction of likely future development uncertain. Nevertheless, it is our conclusion that the conflicts determine *how, but not how much*, to work in the region, that is to say that the conflicts call on specific strategic considerations on how to work in and on the conflicts. However, the conflicts, as such, do not constitute insurmountable obstacles for engagements.

The strategic question is to select areas: what to do and what not to do.

We will now move directly to a short assessment of alternative scenarios.

Section II.
Scenario Analysis and recommendations

5. Scenario Analysis

In chapter four a number of risk factors were identified based on the fact that the region is constituted by a number of serious challenges. It has a conflict configuration, which unfortunately has generated large-scale violence a number of times in recent history. A number of violent conflicts are still continuing in Uganda and Kenya, a fragile peace prevails in Rwanda and the DRC, and fighting is recurring in Burundi. Tanzania is the exception, but with strong tensions prevailing on the islands.

The complex dynamics of these conflicts precludes a distinct prediction of their development. The following section therefore outlines three different scenarios though to capture the worst, best, and most likely development for the future. Each scenario analysis is structured in accordance with the above conflict analysis:

i. Direct violence
ii. Structural violence
iii. Deficient democratisation, governance, legitimacy and state building
iv. Challenges from asymmetric regional integration
v. Global and (mega-) regional issues

5.1 Worst case scenario

Direct violence

– *Failure of the peace process in the DRC.* There is one military and one political source that could trigger a failure of process in the DRC. The political source would be that the transition government splits, or enters into a stalemate situation, in which the planning for the forthcoming elections comes to a halt. The military signal would be that the restructuring of the armed forces is not concluded, and that each of the armed parties maintains their respective armed forces intact and separated. Such developments could also create a base for withdrawals from both the political process, and the military integration work. Such a development could easily result in renewed fighting, most probably in the east. In such case, Rwanda would fear that its security was threatened by an inconclusive disarmament of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*/Alir/FDLR. If the participation in the government of the RCD-Goma, with a claimed social base in the eastern DRC, is not

considered sufficient to contain these forces, Rwanda might return militarily to the DRC. Uganda would in that case perceive a security threat, and could as well enter into the DRC. Both countries might be tempted to finance the war activities with resources from the DRC. Competition might bring Rwanda and Uganda at loggerheads again and in the worst case bring the two into open conflict, which would greatly destabilise the region both economically, politically and socially.

- *Continued conflict in Burundi* would undermine the peace process, resulting in renewed massive inflows of refugees in Tanzania, and destabilising Rwanda. In the worst case, if the Burundian conflict escalates out of hand, Tanzania might consider that it has to intervene militarily in Burundi, which in turn would provoke both Rwanda and Uganda. If Rwanda supports the government forces, that might lead to the rebels, in collaboration with Interahamwe forces, making counterattacks on Rwandan territory, resulting in the destabilisation of the fragile democratisation process.
- *Intensified armed conflicts in Uganda,* coupled with an intensified involvement in the DRC leads to the undermining of the current regime to uphold even a minimal of national security and unity. The upcoming presidential elections may increase current instability and speed up the derailing of the relative progress in the post-Obote period.
- *Explicit confrontation between Uganda and Tanzania,* caused by their conflicting roles in the Great Lakes conflict. Persistent information suggests that very high-level political actors in Uganda and Tanzania are deeply entrenched in the Great Lakes conflict by means of proxy forces. In this highly complex conflict, with high stakes and great variability of actors and alliances, this may lead to a situation where Ugandan and Tanzanian proxies are put in direct confrontation. Such developments would most probably spill over into the inter-state relations between Uganda and Tanzania. It should be recalled that the history of the Great Lakes conflict entails several examples of former allies taking up arms against each other. The border issue between Uganda and Tanzania could be a triggering factor.
- *No effective arms control*. Abundance of small- and medium-sized arms escalates insecurity and contributes to continuing the militarisation of societies, hindering developmental activities.
- *Intensified civil war in Sudan*, destabilising Kenya and Uganda. The various civil wars in the country have not been solved and military activities are continuing.
- *Resurgence of the conflicts on Africa's horn,* destabilising Kenya and Uganda. This will mean that the situation in Somalia is not finding a long-term peaceful solution. At the same time, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea will emerge once again, as well as numerous internal conflicts in the two countries. Both these developments will undermine the stability in Uganda and in this way indirectly have an impact on the stability in the Great Lakes region.

Structural Violence

- *Increased social rifts* in the whole region. Lack of commitments from all actors, and/or lack of conflict awareness in economic policy, and development programme formulation, and implementation as regards poverty reduction, followed by a continuous deprivation of the majority of populations, will create widened frustration gaps and increase the lack of legitimacy of the recently implemented democratic multiparty systems,which in the end might challenge the nation-state project. Reduced social trust may provide a hotbed for different types of violent political mobilisation against other identity groups, and/or ruling elites, and the proper modernisation project.
- *Inter-elite struggles* may restart the entire conflict cycle again. With the seriously distorted 'images of the other' prevailing in the regions, inter-elite is fighting a major threat. Failure in the DRC to resolve the so-called nationality issue for the *Banyarwandan* population would result in a worst scenario in itself and lead to a withdrawal of the RCD-Goma from governmental participation. Continuing limitation of the political scope for certain *Hutu* politicians could in a worst case dynamise a reinforced '*Hutu* power' mobilisation in the diaspora, possibly a coup d'état.

Deficient democratisation, governance, legitimacy and state building

- *Failure of the fragile democratisation/reconciliation process in Rwanda and Burundi*, bringing instability to both these countries and their neighbours. The failure might include a delegitimisation of the state building projects and thus call into question the national state constructs in the region.
- *Breakdown of the transition process in the DRC.* Political infighting in Kinshasa will increase the regional east-west gap in the country, and the population will see few benefits of the peace agreement. In practice, the entire country continues to be ruled locally by the people and groups, who had the military upper hand at the time of the cease-fire.
- *Escalating conflict in Zanzibar* destabilising Tanzania and leading to the splitting of the Republic of Tanzania into a mainland and a Zanzibar republic. Radical Islamic mobilisation for an Islamic state, comprising the old Sultanate area of Zanzibar and along the coast in Kenya and Tanzania, would gain support from Sudan and Islamic groups in Uganda, and undermine the EAC as well as Kenya and Tanzania. If oil is discovered outside Pemba it will provide an economic base for the independent state, in combination with closer connection to states in the Middle East.
- *Establishment of Al Quaida and similar networks in East Africa.* The alliance with other radical Muslim groups, and the politicisation of a Muslim identity, would turn East Africa into a front line state for the expansion of Islam from the bridgeheads in Zanzibar, Kenyan coast, the Sudan, Northern Uganda (LRA) and the big cities' impoverished Muslim populations, provoke a strong Christian retaliation, the collapse of tourist industries and scare away potential investors.

– *Kenya* – increasing political turbulence after the failure of the new government, possibly leading to intra-state violent conflicts. Certain indications during the last years show that the positive initial signals are not a true picture of events. The K*ikuyu* and *Luo* antagonism has been strengthened, and corruption/nepotism and a general state of tribalism have not been overcome. At the same time, Kibaki has not yet shown himself to differ distinctly from Moi. Instability in Kenya will indirectly have an effect on the stability in the GLR, not least via the insignificant development of the EAC.

Challenges from asymmetric regional integration

– *Loss of current momentum in the EAC integration*: The integration process is highly fragile and dependent on stable domestic developments in the three member states. Continuous biased development patterns or unequal economic growth between the states will increase asymmetries and put pressure on integration. Increased domestic violence in any of the member states may cause the political elite to opt out of the EAC process. Alternatively, they may use the EAC as an exit platform when the domestic power base erodes. In the latter scenario, the high-level political rhetoric for the EAC may increase but will lack real domestic ownership, and a social base.
– Internal asymmetries increased by the rapid efforts of the integration of Rwanda and Burundi, may add to a lost momentum. The two new players are not sufficiently prepared for the new diplomatic environment. New patterns of alliance in the EAC process create internal havoc.
– The unstable political development in the region repels tourists and investments.

Global and (mega) regional issues

– The EU is absorbed by expansion eastwards and internal issues, and will be unable to reform its agricultural and trade polices or increase aid, resulting in a press downward on already artificially low world market prices on agricultural products and reduced access to markets.
– The economy in the US does not recover, and thus will not be the needed locomotive to accelerate world economy, nor will it be an open market for export products from the region. The US administration does not accept stepping down from its subsidies to its agricultural and industrial sector, not even in combination with an increased budget deficit, thus depressing downwards world market prices for maize and cotton and other products, nor will it grant market access to products from the region. The domestic issues will continue to tempt the administration not to fulfil its UN aid objective of 0.7% of its GDP. The perceived external threats will prompt US interest into global security issues and in military expenditure, rather than focus on development in Africa.
– Any insensible expansion of the war on terrorism to the region, coupled with increased engagement in the region's oil and mineral resources, is evidently a possible trigger for violent resistance and/or acts of terrorism.

– *Aid fatigue in Western countries.* Aid to Africa is reduced as bad governance, corruption and conflicts increase transaction costs and hollow out Western taxpayers' willingness to contribute to African development.
– *AU incapacitated by political blockages by member states*. Neither NEPAD, nor its institutions addressing conflict management or human rights, become airborne.

5.2 A best-case scenario

Ideally, a best-case scenario would mirror the worst case, most of the issues would be solved. Nevertheless, there are circumstances and conditions, which not even in a best case scenario would be resolved, neither in the medium, nor in the long run, but must be monitored and addressed for a very long period. A best-case scenario would entail:

Direct violence

– *The peace process in the DRC succeeds,* a legitimate government is established through free and fair elections, and the Congolese state moves towards legitimacy and a legitimate administration is established nationwide. *Interahamwe*/ex-FAR/ALIR/FDLR forces, as well as *Hutu* forces from Burundi, are successfully demobilised after political negotiations, and integrated in their respective country of origin, thereby invalidating military security threats against Rwanda or Burundi.
– *Situation in Burundi stabilises*, the peace agreements are implemented.
– *Control over and/or end to violence in Uganda and Kenya***.** With the assistance of new local defence units and determined actions in Uganda, the conflict in the northern parts of the country will be solved. The new Government in Uganda will show its strength to consolidate democracy and security in the country.
– *Control over and/or an end to violence in the Sudan and the Horn* It is possible to reach a lasting agreement for peace in the Sudan. At the same time, Somalia will re-emerge as a state after years of undefined status. Ethiopia and Eritrea are able to solve mutual, as well as internal differences.

Efficient and effective arms control lead to increased security de-escalation of conflicts and demilitarisation of societies. By regional cooperation, the trade routes for small arms are closed down. Civil society will play an important role here.

Structural violence

– Substantial, visible and palpable improvements in poverty reduction and rural development are taking place. This development is directed specifically to the regions and areas most ridden by armed conflicts, i.e. eastern DRC, including Ituri, northern Uganda and the peasant population in Rwanda. Regional imbalances are treated consciously in order to guarantee territorial equality in terms of living standards in all parts of all countries, and in order to reduce tensions as a

foundation for identity-based violent mobilisation against other groups or the state building efforts. The balance between the alternative costs for war and peace respectively, has been tilted in favour of peace. Poverty reduction goes well beyond what is foreseen in the PRSP, especially in Rwanda.

- Resources for social services increase. Improved education creates both trust in and legitimacy for political structures and the capacity for further development. Expanded health services succeed in curbing the spread of HIV/Aids.
- The framework for a regional market economy is established, including a legal framework for regional and local entrepreneurs to invest in the natural resources in eastern DRC. The booming economy in the triangle, eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, spills over into the rest of the region in terms of improved infrastructure (roads, railways grid systems), connecting eastern DRC to the outlets in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and generating market opportunity. The vast resources create a firm base for the regional economy, not least the tourist industry. The preconditions for a "democratic peace" are established. However, this is one the developments, in which long-term success may threaten the integration of the Kivu provinces, Maniema and Ituri into the DRC.
- The communities in the Great Lakes area experience real progress in their livelihoods, including the reduction of poverty, increased economic development, augmented environmental standards, and a successful address of the HIV/Aids situation. Structural violence is reduced and the frustration gaps narrowed.

Deficient democratisation, governance, legitimacy and state building

- *Elections are held in Rwanda* without major difficulties in 2003, the process and the result being accepted by the majority. The reconciliation process continues. Efficient administration, good governance and political stability bring about preconditions for a rapid economic recovery in Rwanda.
- *Elections are held within the timetable in the DRC,* and the transition period ends without tensions. The main and most burning issue in the DRC is resolved, namely the question of nationality for *Kinyarwanda*-speaking people in the Kivu provinces, as well as for those *Banyamulenge* living in Kinshasa. *Kinyarwanda*-speaking elites are gradually accepted playing a role as Congolese in the reconstruction of the country's political and economic frameworks.
- Burundi: Democratic elections are successfully executed and a new government is legitimised.
- Inclusive democratisation processes established in the EAC member countries
- Political long-term momentum to address corruption and public mismanagement take off in all member states.
- The opposition is allowed to participate freely without dispute in the elections in Tanzania in 2005, and after victory in the election in Zanzibar, the opposition forces are allowed to take over.

– Kenya experiences a continued successful transition of power to NARC, which is also able to sort out the internal contradictions. Through this, the democratic culture is strengthened and the trust in the political process, as well as in the nation-building process.

Challenges from asymmetric regional integration

– The EAC institutions obtain a higher level of autonomy and capacity, and act as a progressive force for the lowering of transaction costs for local and state-level regionalisation, as well as a counterforce against domestic mismanagement.
– Increased regional development with concrete signs of progress at the local level.
– The customs union, the coordination of economic policy, and a common currency are implemented and paves the way for a federation. The EAC conflict resolution mechanism is established together with a peacekeeping force. The amalgamation of the national security structures to an East African Security structure.
– The strong EAC is granted the capacity and mandate to critically address the current market structures at regional and global levels so as to benefit the local level.
– Increased security plus a stable political development in the region, and the successful integration of the EAC (inclusion of Rwanda and Burundi in 2004, a common market, an economic policy). Effective anti-corruption and public sector reforms in all countries create an attractive climate for foreign direct investment and increased tourism, as well as aid. This will accelerate growth in the whole region.

Global and (mega-) regional issues

– It is agreed in the WTO negotiations that the EU and the US change their agricultural and trade policy, in order to give a chance for poor countries to gain access to their markets.
– In the US, a new administration is established with a vision to defeat perceived security threats from the south by political means and development, rather than by military power. Consequently, aid is increased, the small arms embargo and the autonomy of the international criminal court is accepted. The new anti-terrorist agenda is built on the expansion of poor countries' trade. Export grants and subsides to American farmers are substantially reduced.
– Increased aid flows to Africa because of better governance and fewer conflicts.
– The world economy recovers and increases demand on products from poor countries.
– The AU is enabled to develop the capacity and will to develop regional mechanism for conflict management and the monitoring of civil and political rights. Regional customs union provides larger markets for east African products. A unified AU with the capacity to negotiate in international forums manages to change international conventions in favour of African interests.

– The TNC investing in the region accepts the code of conducts, where a larger share of the profits remains in the region. Investments are usually made in joint ventures with local business interests, allowing all elite groups to participate.

5.3 Most likely scenario

Direct violence

– Armed activities in the Great Lakes region will be confined to certain areas of the DRC, Uganda, and Burundi and, to a lesser extent, Kenya.
– At a lower end of an armed conflict continuum, we have to acknowledge the existence of a general social violence, emerging from high rates of criminality, social instability, and proliferation of small arms, which in most environments can be attributed to the lack of development, social marginalisation, exclusion and poverty. Although these manifestations of violence are not normally included in conflict analysis, they do constitute such a threat against development and peace that it must be taken into account in a conflict context. It is not unlikely that as a paradox when peace agreements will be held at national level, insecurity will, during a transition period, increase at the micro-level. Dissolved militias will developed to brigandage as a means of survival until better economic opportunities are established.
– The inter-state conflict potential is low.
– The peace process in the DRC will slowly move ahead. Direct violence has already (December 2003) decreased considerably, though local outbursts may appear. The gradually reduced violence in the DRC tends to improve the security situation also in neighbouring countries, as security threats from the DRC will lose in importance in the diplomatic dialogue. However, both the restructuring of the military forces, not least the integrated Congolese forces, and the demobilisation schemes for foreign forces in the DRC may at times be met by armed resistance, since the need for equal pace in decreasing the military power of different groups is not always taken into account. In adition, military personnel, who are involuntarily demobilised, may rebel locally because of feelings of injustice in the demobilisation schemes.
– The main continuing dynamics behind local eruptions of militarised violence, persistent high rates of criminality and social violence is the slow pace of normalisation in the conflict-ridden rural areas. This will continue for a long time, and may constitute the main reason behind the marked resistance among the *Mayi-Mayi* to demobilise and hand in their weapons. The same reasoning is valid for Ituri
– The elections and further political development in ***Rwanda*** will be stable, even if discontent with the elections will exist. The culture of fear will keep protests at bay, but simultaneously keep the sources of the conflict alive under the surface. The development in eastern DRC, is crucial for a stable development in Rwanda, particularly now that the peace process continues and that the disarmament, repatriation and reintegration of the FDLR/ALIR and their followers, and the separation of the leaders, could be done in a constructive way. A

second risk factor for maintaining a low level of direct violence is that the unarmed opposition in the diasporas gradually becomes integrated in Rwandan politics, and in that way show that there are peaceful means of changing politics in Rwanda. A third risk is the integration of released prisoners. The harsh conditions in the overcrowded prisons most likely have made many of the prisoners frustrated.

- *Burundi* will experience a slow but progressing peace process with occasional drawbacks (including direct violence) and very slow, but noticeable, progress in poverty reduction and similar forms of structural violence. A real democratisation process will progress at the slow pace of increased education, the weaving of social trust, and a sense of a common destiny. Militarily, there would be a continuation along the current process in which the FDD and the government of Burundi first reached an agreement with the blessing and outright support of regional leaders. The support may consist either of direct support to the cease-fire, or of a cut in support of the regional network of the warring party in Burundi. In the second step, the FNL are outmanoeuvred or simply beaten in combat. On the eve of every step towards a solution, some new actors will try to manifest themselves as vital negotiating partners, but these actors must quickly be contained or beaten.
- In Burundi's security sector, former combatants are slowly reintegrated in a process, struggling with frequent setbacks and high financial costs. However, the widespread war fatigue, the low level of local legitimacy for the fighters, and the ongoing DDR programmes manage to keep up a slow momentum in the process. The current elite for a considerable length of time retain control of the army. Any attempts to speed up the security sector reform will be checked by the incumbent elite. It is not unlikely that a 50/50 or even 75/25 percent distribution of *Hutu*s and *Tutsi*s will be reached, but such statistical exercises are of less relevance as long as the control of the command structure remains unchanged. The fear of systematic marginalisation, violence, and even genocide of the *Tutsi*s is not overcome by any institutional mechanisms. However, an uneven peace process, together with the fresh memory of war, decreases the level of violence. As people are allowed to return to their homes and take up farming, this will constitute a decisive sentiment of dividends that feeds into the peace process.
- Uganda is gradually containing the conflicts in the north, but pockets of resistance will remain for a long time, flaring up occasionally. In this case the problems in Karamoja, and the confrontation with the Pokot in Kenya might be the most difficult to solve. Another issue is that the violence is turned into criminality.
- No large-scale conflict will evolve between any of the neighbours in the region, even if at times relations between Uganda and Rwanda might become tense, as well as between Rwanda and the DRC, Uganda and the Sudan, and locally between Uganda and Kenya. The border issue between Uganda and Tanzania will be settled. However, depending on the ability of the Burundians to manage their internal

conflict, relations between Tanzania and Burundi might remain tense. Tanzania suffers severely from the internal conflicts in Burundi and growing increasingly weary of the resulting insecurity, environmental degradation, competition for scarce resources and criminality resulting from the Burundian conflict. The peace process in the DRC will also affect the conflict in Burundi. If it succeeds, the Burundian militias the FDD/FNL, now operating from bases in the DRC, will have more difficulties.

– Gradually increasing control of the arms trade, but still a large number of weapons are in circulation, or hidden, maintaining a potential threat.

Structural violence

– Poverty and structural violence will persist for a long time to come. Both economic growth, and development measured in UNDP's Human Development Index, are long-term structural issues in the region, to say nothing of Africa as a whole. Recent evaluations of the road to the fulfilment of the Millenium goals point at serious doubts as regards the possibilities for success. This is valid also for the entire Great Lakes region. This is probably the most dangerous issue in a conflict perspective, as deprived broad segments of the population, vulnerable for elite mobilisation into violence and rebellions will continue to exist for a long period. As an important condition in the existing armed conflicts, poverty and structural violence will continue to be a powder keg in the entire region.

– Close to the concept of structural violence, we may also see long-term frustration gaps among certain elite groups. We see no immediate solutions to the whole range of elite discrimination in the region covering the political sphere, nor any economic or social participation in the society. For example, we see no signs of any legitimate rapid solution on the issue of citizenship for Kinyarwanda-speaking inhabitants of eastern DRC. In an elite context, this regards mainly the future position in the DRC for the so-called Congolese *Tutsi*, who often claim a role and a position, which would gain very low acceptance among the elites from central and western DRC. However, the issue of citizenship also touches on the Congolese Hutus' possibilities to resolve the question of land rights.

Deficient democratisation, governance, legitimacy and state building

– In Rwanda, the decentralisation reform, the reform of the justice system and the gacaca process will continue to be implemented. The new constitution in combination with the law reform will strengthen the separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, and the public sector reforms will increase the capacity within the public sector. However, the capacity and the institutions will still be very weak for a long time to come, particularly at the local level. The new ombudsman might play an important role in this context. The great challenge is for the newly elected president and government to open up the political scope, both in order to start the democratisation process and as part of the nation and state building

process. It is necessary in order to re-establish trust and legitimacy for the state, as well as for the general reconciliation process. Deficient democratisation and a lack of inclusive attitude and practice might undermine both the reconciliation process and the legitimacy of the state and government.

- In Burundi, a slow and incremental process of national integration is set off, including the political and academic elite. Few signs of progress emerge before the issue of impunity is addressed. A process of national reconciliation is commenced and becomes a battlefield for the strategic construction of histories and identities to which issues of impunity and future power positions are linked. The structural constraints are perhaps the biggest threat to peace after the cognitive constructs of instrumentalised ethnic categories and historical events. Frequent drawbacks are experienced but progress is made with constructive support from international and regional actors.
- The November 2004 Burundi elections will be executed in accordance with the Arusha process and as a final attempt to mitigate the release of donor funds. The election campaign is turned into a rally around ethnicity, impunity, and revenge. The current slow process of progress is substantially set back. Ethnic tensions are not eroded but checked though institutional mechanisms for power sharing and security guarantees for minorities. Ethnic tensions fade out in a society where substantial socio-economic groups experience the benefits of coexistence and mutually benefiting cooperation.
- The democratisation process in the DRC will be continuously fragile, and take time. Lack of a local legitimate administration will be an obstacle for the normalisation of life in local communities.
- The post-election euphoria in Kenya should not be taken for a long-term momentum for reform. The increased political scope, however, may encourage more commitment from civil society with long-term dividends.
- Continued reforms of the public sectors in all the member states including decentralisation will gradually improve governance.
- In Rwanda, the PRSP is implemented according to the timetable. A new rural development strategy is developed and decided upon. One risk is that the temporarily good weather conditions that have prevailed the past few years and given subsistence agriculture better harvests will return to normal, and thus continue the impoverishment of the majority in the rural areas, increasing their frustration. It is crucial that the design and implementation of the PRSP, the decentralisation process and the new rural development strategy really target and reach the poorest in the rural areas and increase the capacity of rural household to improve their economy. Another risk factor is the continued deteriorating world market prices for coffee and tea, in combination with increasing fuel costs would reduce demand as well as dividends for Rwandan products.
- The increased gap between urban areas and rural areas must also be addressed. A risk factor could be that the international donor community reduces aid to Rwanda because of the unwillingness by the newly

elected government to open up the political scope. In such a fragile situation as that of Rwanda, in combination with the high dependence on aid for development, a reduced flow of aid would increase structural violence and undermine the fragile stability.

- HIV will continue to take a high toll, and undermine efforts to rebuild the economy, as well as increase the frustration among the affected families.
- Mental illness because of untreated traumas from genocide and wars, not least among returning militias from the DRC, will challenge the local communities' capacity to manage frustrated people in a situation with extremely meagre resources and changes at the local level.
- The reconciliation process will continue, and slowly a new Rwandan identity will develop, coexisting with an aroused ethnic identity. For this process to take place, it is important that the state has capacity to improve the living conditions, income opportunities and access to social service of the rural and urban poor. A continued dialogue and debate on issues related to the understanding of the history and the question of identity is necessary.
- Uganda is at a very volatile stage of its national consolidation process assigning issues of security and unity to the top of the political agenda. The elections for the presidency in 2006 is already characterising the political climate and Museveni will most likely use substantial means to remain in power. This can be the source of increased violence.
- Tanzania – struggles with the situation in Zanzibar and increasing demands from marginalised groups, but manage to keep political stability and reasonable growth. The elections in 2004 and 2005 will stir up the political climate in particular on Zanzibar and the coast, but will most likely be relatively free and fair and result in a peaceful transition of power to a new president, from the ruling party.

Challenges from asymmetric regional integration

- Proceeding integration within the EAC. Even if the achievements in relation to specific deadlines might be delayed, it will not offset the momentum. The institutions of the EAC will gradually be consolidated and receive an increased, albeit weak, capacity, and start to play a stabilising role in the region. The peace and security mechanism will be granted a mandate and the capacity to play a role in maintaining stability in the region.
- Rwanda will be accepted as a member within a two-to-four-year span. Inclusion of Burundi will most likely be postponed pending developments in the GL conflicts.
- Economic development in a stable Tanzania as well as in Rwanda and more uncertainly in Uganda will contribute to reducing regional imbalance, but regional imbalance will still continue to be a challenge to contend with in the EAC cooperation.
- The development and consolidation of a regional civil society will be an incremental process that will also gradually provide a constructive discourse for keeping reforms on track, and vitalise the debate in the

region. Increasing political acceptance of cross border integration, following the EAC, may spur the formalisation of existing "traditional" cross border networks.

Global and (mega-) regional issues

- Anglo-French tension will continue to be an issue in diplomatic life, as well as a part of the economic and investment strategies.
- Heavy concentration on macro-economic recovery in the DRC, based on a revival of mineral exports and oil/gas resources, may draw attention away from the need to formulate coherent rural development strategies, in which there is a need for small-scale investment resources and rural credit facilities for agriculture and trade. This may be an obstacle for a badly needed structural violence reduction, and an increased rural purchasing power.
- The WHO meeting in Cancun demonstrates the difficulties in establishing a world trade structure that is conducive to Third World countries. In combination with the slow economic recovery in the US and the EU areas, it limits the pulling power for export market-led growth, particularly from small economies with low productivity and high costs.
- The EU will be occupied with its expansion eastwards. At the same time, the EU will be concerned to continue to support poor countries, not least in order to reduce the flow of immigrants/refugees and security threats to the EU. The Nordic and like-minded countries will continue to press for an increase of global aid levels, while maintaining or increasing their own aid. The positive development in the Great Lakes region is likely to attract further development aid.
- The AU will continue to develop its institutional structures, but will continue to have low capacity, if not boosted by resources from outside. However, it will continue to play a vital role in regional peace-making efforts, in combination with the Heads of State initiative in the region.–

6. Approaching a regional cooperation strategy. Policy recommendations

Some positions in the international debate on poverty and conflict have lately begun to downplay the role of poverty in our contemporary global pattern of armed conflicts. In one particular sense, this is playing with words, though it is statistically evident that not all armed conflicts are taking place in the poorest of the poor countries. However, it has never been possible to establish any significant causality between poverty and armed conflict. That is why this discussion today sometimes aims beside the target. The argument against the poverty approach has few, if any, takers. Hence, a pure poverty alleviation approach to conflict-adapted development cooperation is no longer an issue.

We have chosen to use Galtung's distinction between direct and structural violence as a way of describing that the peace process must contain, simultaneously, measures against both its violent expressions – direct violence and structural violence. The armed conflicts lying behind this study have had a most visible expression in the direct violence displayed in the eastern parts of DRC. However, the same war, in our opinion, also contains an increasingly deepening structural violence, which has been continuing for a very long time. This structural violence is not receiving the attention it deserves, as an integrated part of the war we are trying to deal with. Nevertheless, looking at armed conflicts as a continuum, in which expressions of direct and structural violence are simultaneously present, and overlapping, the structural violence deserves much more attention within the international development cooperation institutions, because these are the institutions controlling the instruments to be used against structural violence.

Hence, we intend to widen the concept of poverty, and enrich the 'aid' vocabulary with the expression 'structural violence reduction', as a way of advancing the humanistic imperative of poverty alleviation into 'aid' activities working *in*, and *on*, conflicts. For those opting for work *around* conflicts, this reasoning will be less relevant.

As we see both elite groups and broader layers of the population as active and dynamic participants in armed conflicts, any efforts for long-term conflict resolution have to direct attention to both these components. The expressions we have used from time to time, politicisation and instrumentalisation, reflect our understanding, that there is a meeting point between the politicisation of identity as a bottom-up process,

leading to vulnerability for the top-down elite-based instrumentalisation of politics, and mobilisation for violence. Logically, one dimension of working in, or on, a conflict is to adapt activities to 'do no harm' (working in the conflict), or finding approaches and activities, which may contribute to channelling and handling the politicisation and instrumentalisation processes.

All this discussion may seem superfluous for our main task to operationalise a conflict analysis into concrete actions. However, we have increasingly been convinced that international development cooperation in a conflict setting must increase its understanding of the necessity to establish very close linkages between the conflict analysis and the concrete measures to be implemented.

We have chosen, very much tentatively, to talk about 'cognitive reintegration' and 'structural violence reduction' as collective expressions for counter measures. With cognitive reintegration (or change) we understand changes in the mental structure, which is the 'broker' between the perception of conflict issues, on the one hand, and both attitude and behaviour, on the other, if we borrow the vocabulary of the conflict triangle. Structural violence reduction is, as hinted above, an expansion of poverty alleviation into the realms of conscious conflict management and resolution.

We assume that in a situation where direct violence is ongoing, or recently terminated, elites are relatively more in need of cognitive changes than structural violence reduction, while the opposite would be the situation for broader layers of the population, as well as the rank and file combatants. The rank and file need, obviously, in the long-run, also a change in the conflict perception, though material changes in survival opportunities may be more important in periods of disarmament and demobilisation. Vice versa, discontented and marginalised elite groups would, normally, not suffer from livelihood shortages of material kinds in the short run, but be more receptive as regards new visions and realistic assessments of their role and position in the medium and long run.

Although we are now dealing with a regional conflict analysis, we would like to avoid talking about regional projects, instead linking up to the World Bank terminology, as regards the demobilisation project, discussing in terms of multi-country activities. One important reason for this is that few, if any, projects are regional in any way other than having a cross-border character. Thus, the externally financed activities need a national contracting part, and the projects ideally, should have an institutional capacity building impact within respective country. For example, the demobilisation project in itself does need a state contracting partner to cater for involved the IDA loans. This way of looking at 'regional' activities may also increase possible synergies between cross-border and national activities. Not least in the sense that multi-country needs of coordination may contribute more to cognitive changes of the actors, than possible efforts to create semi-autonomous regional co-ordination institutions.

We will point at five areas of activities with a cross-border character, which we believe have a direct bearing on the conflict. These areas are 1) structural violence alleviation, 2) cognitive reintegration, 3) regional conflict resolution mechanisms, 4) policy formulation and donor coordi-

nation, and 5) research and facilitation of conflict management and prevention strategies.

6.1 Structural Violence Alleviation

When we are introducing the concept of structural violence reduction, we understand the expression in two ways. On the one hand, it is an expansion of poverty alleviation into a conflict perspective. Poverty alleviation in general is not a sufficient approach in conflict and postconflict environments. It is necessary to direct more attention to the specific issues, which we consider to most conflict-prone. On the other hand, structural violence alleviation can also be linked to the question of frustration gaps of the elites, thus containing a high degree of policy issues, not least regarding how the political system and its leadership can increase legitimacy based on a social contract approach.

Sustainable rural livelihood reinforcement

Conventionally, rural development strategies are often seen as a typically development issue, which requires a consolidated cease-fire, as well as substantial steps towards political reform. However, our earlier experiences, confirmed during the present fieldwork, are that violence has not been ongoing always in each place, and not all places have been affected by the war itself. Thus, livelihood reinforcement in the grey zones between conflict actors and in areas less affected by violence would be in important instrument for the emergence of 'islands of civility' in a sea of violence. Hence, it may contribute to the decreased vulnerability for violent mobilisation among young men and destitute layers among the population. In the present regional situation, with a fragile cease-fire in eastern DRC, ongoing low level armed conflicts and widespread social violence, it is more than overdue to reinforce a coherent and conscious local development strategy for sustainable rural livelihood reinforcement.

Such an approach would also constitute a backbone in a long-term social cohesion support, giving impetus to local processes of reconciliation. In the simultaneous approach that we favour, this area of activity should really be parallel to peace negotiations, offering concrete examples of peace brokers' long-term intentions of developing substantially different conditions of life, as an alternative.

In this context, not only the reproductive aspects of the rural livelihood should also be taken into account, but also the productive capacities needed in a transition period from war to peace. There is a general tendency that the importance of rural trade is neglected in these circumstances. In a sustainable rural livelihood approach, rural trade should be seen as an integrated part of agricultural production, since there is no other way for many families to transfer the labour capacity for surplus production into necessary monetary resources.

Facilitation of rural trade includes; 1) construction of feeder roads in order to give marginalised populations access to markets, as well as social service and consumer goods. 2) Support to the construction of rural market places, with proper roofing, water and sanitation facilities. 3) Creating access to credits for commercial actors purchasing agriculture produce as well as for farmers so they are able to buy needed inputs and increases production. 4) It also includes facilitation of extension service

not only to progressive farmers, but to all farmers, as well as 5) curriculum in primary and secondary schools facilitating improved agriculture methods and rural development. Improved infrastructure and credits also needs to be available for starting up commercial activities outside the agriculture sector in the rural areas. The regional dimension here might in first hand be related to the construction of a regional infrastructure, as well as credit systems that allow credits for trade in neighbouring countries.

The overall guiding approach to sustainable rural livelihood reinforcement is that it takes its point of departure in local needs identification, and acknowledges the need for external injections in the local economy in order to break the devastating decapitalisation of both family livelihood economies and the local public administration. Territorial thinking should prevail over the centralised top-down functional development thinking.

This should be an overarching principle for all rural development programmes and projects, and is applicable in all the concerned countries.

Regional market economy and capacity for monitoring and negotiations

A foundation for long-term development in the Great Lakes' region is to establish a regional market economy, with reasonable well-functioning institutions with capacity to facilitate, monitor and regulate, binding together Eastern DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. There is a long history of economic, social, cultural and political relations in the region. However, as the UN reports have pointed out, largely today, this exchange is closer to informal and illegal than to formal trade.

However, this perspective may seen obvious from a general survey, but the practical aspects of Congolese politics and economy are not that easy to reconcile with this. Such a development could as well generate conflicts, as eastern DRC would be closer linked to East Africa, thus withdrawing important resources for the state-building process in DRC. We have in the previous section hinted at the potential conflict between the interest of local, national, regional and international actors.

1) The huge potentials for the development of the natural resources must be framed in a way that both facilitate a process where as much as possible of the gains from the exploitation of the resources remain in the region, and also gradually build up processing facilities and the skills to run them.
2) The capacity to negotiate with large-scale TNC, with large accumulated experience and legal resources is limited in the region. In addition, corruption and the general chaos that have prevailed in DRC have facilitated neither commercial exploitation nor the striking of fair deals. The recent work by a UN commission points out that multinational corporations should be held accountable for, and demonstrate their compliance with, international human rights standards, labour and environmental practices (UN Wire 20030814). For this to happen, pressure is needed both from the industrialised countries and from poor countries where TNC operates. The striving

for greater coherence between different policy areas that GLOBKOM proposed might suggest that the Swedish government, as part of a regional strategy in the Great Lakes, also monitor the Swedish-related companies' activities in the region, or do this in dialogue with the home countries of other TNC's that are active in the region, like Germany, Belgium, France, the UK, Canada and the USA.

3) The establishment of an efficient and socially responsible market economy, linking together the region, is an important feature of the peace process. Mutual economic interest and trade have proved to be important factors for the maintenance of peace. For this to happen, the market needs efficient entrepreneurs, institutions and frameworks. Access to credits is a crucial factor for regional and local entrepreneurs, as well as access to markets and energy, which hints at the need for infrastructural investment.
4) Efficient legal and tax systems are a prerequisite for the establishment of a socially acceptable market economy that generates an economic base for the societies, in a sustainable manner.
5) Other areas that might be considered to support, are regional interests groups like the chambers of commerce and professional organisations. Trade unions are of particular importance in order to strengthen the bargaining power of the labour force.
6) We also believe that an inward-looking economic policy, such as a strong complementary force to the upcoming privatisations and structural reform of the mineral sector, in order to create space for internal accumulation, should be promoted.

Regional infrastructure

Transport and telecommunication systems, if existing, are inadequate; a situation that both hinders economic development and integration, while enabling and facilitating rebel groups to hide away.

1) A natural gas generator using the gas in Lake Kivu could provide a substantial input to a common power grid for rural electrification.
2) One of the more peace-promoting measures would be to facilitate a "peace link" from Dar es Salaam[17], to Kisangani via Kigali, by railway from the dry port in Isakara to Kigali and by road from Goma to Kisangani (The road Kigali-Goma is reasonable). It would stimulate the economic development and integration of the region. It would provide the region with a fast and cheap link to the world market. For the isolated but fertile and natural resource-rich DRC, it would open up for economic development, and it could provide the resource-poor Rwanda with income opportunities. Its landlockedness makes import and export expensive; often two borders have to be passed causing delays and cost, especially with the high cost of transport due to high fuel prices. Factors that on the one hand, reduce the competitiveness of export from the region and on the other make consumption and production more expensive. The railway and road could be built using mainly manual methods and thus provide income

[17] Dar es Salaam means the "haven of peace" in Kisswahili

opportunities and skills particularly for the young and un-employed men who easily become mobilised in less constructive activities. Transporting more of export and import by train is environmentally friendly, easier to control and tax, and lessens the damage to the roads, and perhaps reduce the spread of HIV. It would also facilitate the integration of Rwanda and Burundi into EAC. The railway Kigali-Isakara is listed in NEPADs 20-year plan for infrastructural development in Africa.

However, in balancing regional needs to national needs, it is extremely important that eastern DRC is also linked westwards, to the rest of the country.

Regional public administration support

Such an approach is based on the fact, that in terms of political administration, electoral systems and laws, representativeness and proportionality, the three countries DRC, Rwanda and Burundi have a common very strong bipolar approach. Any discrepancies in favour of one or another between the national systems may create biases and cross-border references for political demands. This argument is not an argument for simple mainstreaming, but a call for attention as regards the deeply entrenched images of 'otherness' between different identity groups, represented in more than one country.

6.2 "Cognitive reintegration"

One lasting impression from the current fieldwork is the extraordinary lack of capacity for critical historical assessments, even among otherwise intelligent people at elite level. We sometimes also find a somewhat disturbing aggressiveness among Congolese church people, in relation to people of Rwandan origin. Although the historical record of conflicts with religious justifications is not always favourable, this combination is nevertheless disturbing, if we see the Congolese civil society as a basic pillar for future reconciliation. From these observations, grow the apparent need to transform 'images of the enemy'. At the grass root level, this kind of work must be done in close connection to basic livelihood improvement for everybody. At elite level it is more demanding, and it requires some reflective thoughts.

1) One line of thought we have encountered regards the need of deeper historical research among regional researchers themselves. Too many colonial myths seem to persist in collective memories, without modern scientific questioning. Such a questioning could be a research theme, if it is purely based on the research interests of the actors themselves. A revised, or updated, historical 'grand narrative' is called for. A "professors"' conference on regional history, and relevant follow-up activities, could constitute a turning point in this sense. Future revision of schoolbooks constitutes one possible long-term outcome, as well as inputs for reinforced journalism education. This will also create a number of new confrontative dialogue arenas, in the formation process of new legitimate and hegemonic social forces.

2) On an operational level this can be achieved by support for the sensitising and training of media on the role of information in conflicts, dialogue on the content of history in educational material used at all levels of education. This could include seminars for teachers and university researchers in the social sciences, teacher trainee's currently undergoing education, and authors of educational material for all educational levels.

Regional identity and belonging

Another area for interventions could be to strengthen the regional identity, the "imagined community" of the Great Lakes, rather than on the fragmented ethnicities. Experiences could be drawn from post-war Europe where both the Nordic identity and the European identities were reinvented and strengthened, bringing former enemies into the same club. Interventions could take different forms and in different sectors:

1) Exchange programmes for professionals, students, scholars
2) Support for regional sports events – football is very popular and attracts large crowds and some female sports activity in order to encourage the participation of girls
3) Support for regional cultural events – there is an immense possibility to reach large parts of the population in the area as *Mayi-Mayi* is so widely spoken. Music and lyrics are popular media. Regional popular music festivals could be held, with lyrics competitions that promote reconciliation and peace;
4) Support regional media activities – radio is a cheap medium with the largest coverage. Support the production of documentary programmes for deconstructing distorted perceptions of identities; promote knowledge and solidarity with people in the region. Today very little information reaches, for instance, the rural areas in Rwanda, people are kept uninformed and become easy prey for rumours or disinformation. A fact-based regional channel with debates, documentaries, information programmes on agricultural husbandry or similar topics, could contribute to peace building. Radio and theatre could be another possibility, as well as educative soap operas.

Reconciliation and trauma counselling

The immense need for reconciliation and trauma counselling might be possible to address via a regional programme.

1) A regional training and research unit could be established (or if one already exists, be supported), providing training for voluntary or semi-professional councillors. Vast experience of community-based counselling exists in South Africa for example, that might be possible to link up with. In this way, the necessity to threat the terrible experiences people have had, especially women, children, demobilised soldiers and child soldiers, could be turned to advantage.
2) Training counsellors from different parts of the region, with the help of facilitators also from different parts of the region is in itself a contributory factor to peace building.

3) With increasing experience, the regional trauma counselling training centre could become an international recognised training and research unit that could be used in other conflict-ridden areas in Africa.

Limited experience also exists in Sweden. It is mainly within larger NGOs like the Red Cross, and, to a more limited extent, in local government units for counselling.

Regional civil society

Another important cornerstone in a regional strategy is to support the development of the regional civil society. Several, more or less embryonic, regional civil society and professional networks exist, for instance within the human rights, gender and the environmental sector. The religious organisations also have a certain regional cooperation. Nevertheless, it is not unusual that NGOs, rather than being genuinely national, are, in fact, more or less branches of international NGO's.

1) A fund for the application of regional activities could be established, in order to strengthen the often weak and vulnerable local NGOs, both to contribute to better understanding and exchange between the different communities, and to constitute a balance to authoritarian national governments. The NGOs are one of the more important counterweights to authoritarian governments. A number of experienced NGOs exist whose experience and capacity could be used to strengthen less experienced NGOs in rural areas.
2) This could also include the facilitation of contacts with civil societies in the wider region, Tanzania, Kenya and then on an African level.
3) This could include support for NGOs to be able to participate in policymaking processes in African intergovernmental organisations like AU, EAC, the African Commission for Human Rights, etc.
4) The political society, in terms of political parties, must not be forgotten. To assist weak national political parties in building networks with parties in the region in order to exchange ideas, and gain exposure. It is, however, a delicate issue to support political parties in a post-conflict situation, but at the same time, they are building stones in the democratisation process. It might be that such support could go via the parliaments. But that would exclude the parties in the diaspora and outside the parliament.

At the same time it is important to analyse the CSO carefully. Who do these CSO represent? What are the values a certain CSO are promoting? How do other actors perceive a particular CSO? Several CSO represents special interest and negative attitudes. A well intended support could thus if not thoroughly analysed even prolong or deepen conflicts.

6.3 Regional conflict resolution mechanisms

The strengthening of bilateral and regional mechanisms for conflict management is one of the most important areas to support, in terms of long-term capacity building, ownership and sustainability. AU, EAC and SADC develop capacity and units for peace and conflict management.

Our impression is that AU now has both the political will and the capacity to take a larger responsibility for managing crises in Africa. AU has recently displayed its capacity with the work in Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Heads of State initiative, for example, in the Ivory Coast and a number of initiatives in DRC and Burundi. However, the capacity is still limited. SADC also has built up a significant capacity and EAC is one its way. We are aware that Sweden already supports these initiatives in various ways, but it appears to be worthwhile to strengthen the capacity of these institutions, or other regional mechanisms, in order to work with security issues in the Great Lakes' Region.

1) One possibility could be to establish a fund from which peace monitoring or peace-enforcing programmes could apply for funds for financing African interventions, including paying for the use of African forces.
2) Sweden could assist AU in drawing more attention to the crises in the Great Lakes through supporting the AU to employ an experienced (African) officer to work in the region.
3) Sweden could assist the African Commission for Human Rights capacity to monitor the conflict in the Great Lakes' Region
4) The sub-regional organisations, like EAC and SADC, could be facilitated to assume a greater responsibility for the conflicts in the region. The Burundian peace process model, where AU/SADC via SA logistics and financial support combined with troops from Mozambique and Ethiopia on the ground, seems to be an interesting model that is worth evaluating and supporting.
5) The Heads of State initiative in the Great Lakes' region appears to have been one of the most important institutions for regional conflict management, without support from outside to our knowledge. Support to build up a small secretariat for the Heads of State initiatives in GLR might be an important contribution to facilitate its work.
6) At times several parallel processes are running, both at international, regional, bilateral and local level. To strengthen the coordination of and information about different peace-making activities could be an arena to support, not least in making the processes more inclusive.

6.4 Policy level and donor coordination

In a number of areas regional institutions and policies are developing.

1) It might be advisable to put emphasis on support to, on the one hand, capacity for policy formulation on regional level, and, on the other, promote a dialogue on policy issues.
2) Assisting in establishing a culture of inclusiveness in policy formulation.
3) Weak capacities put a lot of the responsibility on the donors to coordinate their activities, not least in order to reduce the burden for the recipient countries.
4) It might be that the regional level could be operational for donor coordination.

6.5 Demobilisation

A successful demobilisation process is a prerequisite for a positive scenario. The balance between its different components (in terms of DDRRR dearmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) differs between different countries. There are still very few ongoing activities, and the MDRP is presently clearly overfinanced. The most relevant activity is the RRR activities related to Rwanda and the repatriation of the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* combatants. The DD activities related to the Rwanda RRR programme are financed within the MONUC mandate. It is still on a voluntary base, and very few combatants have been demobilised.

It should also be noted that it is only the funding procedures, which are regionally, and multi-donor, based. All execution will be carried through the national programmes, needed for eligibility for funding.

The next main task will be the upcoming demobilisation process in DRC. It regards both the downsizing of the new governmental armed forces, and the irregular forces of different kinds, including the *Mayi-Mayi* movement. They

will later be important also within Burundi and Uganda. RRR will mainly apply to Rwanda and Burundi, while RR will be concentrated to DRC and Uganda.

In such a differentiated situation, a capacity for the differentiations of measures, or subprojects is called for. This applies not only to military hierarchy, high-ranking and middle-range officers do obviously have different practical and social needs than the rank-and-file. However, differentiation also in relation to specific group issues may be important to take into account. For example, the re-structuring of the *Hutu* forces in eastern DRC, which has taken place over the years, may imply that many of those today considered *Hutu* forces, in reality do have quite another history than the original people from ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*. Thus, the actual needs may differ substantially between different countries and actors.

One of the crucial issues in any demobilisation and reintegration programme is how local programme activities can be smoothly transferred to normal development activities. For many combatants in small militia groups, and even within the *Mayi-Mayi* movement, as well as other ragtag armies, the difference between being a combatant and being a civilian is often rather blurred. Thus, an early start of a developmental normalisation process in local communities, may work in favour of the RR stages in the demobilisation schemes, in the sense that they are targeting all members of the local communities.

Without going into details, this area of activity will be a vital one for many years to come. Sida's engagement should, *at least,* continue at the same level throughout the strategy period. Such a commitment, facilitating movement from demobilisation schemes into local long-term integration could alone swallow whatever contribution Sida and the government of Sweden would like to make during the strategy period. Since this is a multi-country program, the RR component could be specifically tailored for the different countries, as well as specifically directed to any certain country. For a continuous Swedish engagement in demobilisation pro-

grams, concentration should be on the later stages of the process, i.a. resettlement and reintegration.

This area of activity also contains, for example, actions against the proliferation of small arms

6.6 Regional programme/capacity on research and facilitation of conflict management and peace building

There is today, on the one hand, little information or documentation available on the complex societal setup in the region, or on the ongoing processes and, on the other, limited human capacity in the field of conflict management and peace building.

1 Several higher institutes of learning now establish programmes for training and research in conflict management. Such units exist for instance in Goma, Bukavu and Butare, it might also exist in Bujumbura. Mbarara University in Uganda is not very far behind either. These institutions could be the nexus in regional programme for training and research on conflict and postconflict management-related issues, maybe linked to the Universities in Tanzania and Kenya as well. They are all situated in relatively close range, but all are struggling with similar problems of capacity building in a devastated environment. In the same way as with reconciliation and trauma counselling programmes, this kind of programme could turn the disadvantage of living in a conflict-ridden society into an advantage. Few areas in the world provide better opportunities for research on conflict and conflict management. Through strengthening the capacity of both training and analysis, an important contribution to peace building could be achieved. Conflict management-related issues could be brought into teacher training programmes, and be a compulsory part of the university programme, in a similar way as development studies is compulsory.

2 Other regional education programmes could as well be considered where a regional network could be conducive to professional development and peace building with schools of journalism, economics, and law.

6.7 Sweden's role

We think that Sweden has an important role to play in the Great Lakes' area. Sweden does not have a colonial heritage or geopolitical aspirations in the region. Sweden is also regarded as interesting role model for the post-conflict societies in the making with our long history of peace, balance between state and market and welfare society. In terms of casualties, the wars in the region have produced the largest numbers since the Second World War. Extremely fragile peace processes are now underway in DRC and Burundi. The needs in the region are enormous, and at the same time overshadowed, not least by the developments in Middle East. At the same time, it is a very dynamic period in the region's history, where Sweden could be a partner in the formation of the new states and societies in GLR:

1 On the international level, Sweden shall support all international efforts to achieve and sustain peace in the region. We suggest that Sweden takes a more active role in UN and its departments as well as in EU, in order to support activities with the aim of building peace and development in the Great Lakes' regions. Not least important is to keep the Great Lakes on the agenda. Sweden should not only take a passive role and support the initiative of others, but also play a more active role, initiate proposals and campaign for them. One such important issue is that of the different international actors coordinating their policies in order to pull in the same direction and not undermine each other's activities. It is also important to promote solutions that are based on the needs and interests of the Great Lakes' region, and not based on Western geopolitical or narrow economic or nationalistic interests. A second issue is to advocate in all international negotiations and rule-setting arenas, like WTO, for an international order that favours poor countries like the Great Lakes' countries rather then the industrialised countries. A third issue is to establish a responsible rules and corporate governance, when DRC and the region, in a post-conflict phase will open up for international investments.
2 This would require that a person, at high level in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assumes a special responsibility to follow the events and act on the international arena. At present, one person has such a role in Southern Africa and another has been appointed the EU coordinator for the area Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry.
3 This might also need a stronger Swedish presence in the region, as well as a Swedish knowledge base.

6.6 Concluding suggestions

The type of support that should be given should of course be developed in dialogue with all the various actors in the region, with the overall objective of the largest degree possible of ownership and sustainability. The ideas given here are points of departure in that process.

Nevertheless, we would like to suggest some general guidelines that might be used when selecting where and how to intervene:

1 Conflicts as such are *not* a hindrance for, or an excuse for not intervening in, development cooperation. The conflict situation, however, frames *how* the cooperation should be designed. It is an expression of political interest or other priorities, that decides whether aid should be given or not. Thus, according to our point of departure, a rapid transfer from a humanitarian approach to a development approach is called for.
2 We thus argue for increased development cooperation in these vastly devastated areas, where a number of positive developments could now be discerned, both in Rwanda, DRC and perhaps in Burundi. Moreover, developments in the region will have large repercussions in Uganda, Tanzania, and to a certain extent via Uganda and Sudan, in Kenya. All are countries with a long history of development coopera-

tion with Sweden, and where vast sums of Swedish taxpayers' money have been invested; investments that might be partly lost if the conflict escalates again. It is important to assist these countries in the fragile post-conflict transformation phase to enable the rapid rebuilding of economic, social and physical institutions, in such a way that a clear and beneficial peace dividend will be palpable for the whole populations, as well as for the elites. The opportunity cost for war and violence must be increased, and the peace dividend more quickly felt both by the population — and maybe more importantly—by elites at different levels. It would be a great mistake not to be part of the peace-building process. Sweden also has a long history in the region, as well as a long history of peace and an efficient democracy, market economy, as well as administration and civil societies. Such experience is invaluable in the region today. Neither do we have a colonial history of vested political and economic interest in the region, which affords us some credibility, as well as confidence. The smallness of Rwanda and Burundi, and to a lesser extent Eastern DRC, makes it possible to accomplish an impact with limited resources.

3 Rwanda has gone through an impressive post-conflict rehabilitation and has now built up a comparatively efficient institutional setup, and is endeavouring to establish a new Rwandan identity. Rwanda is in a delicate transition period; the most important root cause of the conflict is still there: poverty. For a number of years, Sweden has now built up expertise and contacts in the country. Sweden has a very good reputation in Rwanda for being a tough dialogue partner, and a persistent donor. It appears to us that this 'investment' should be used as a stepping-stone for further aid relations with Rwanda. Stability in Rwanda is also an important cornerstone for peaceful development in the region.

4 We also think that it is important to work and to continue to work with an intense policy dialogue. There is an obvious dilemma as regards the criticism against weaknesses in Rwanda's human rights record. On the one hand, it cannot be taken for granted that these weaknesses have passed their peak, while on the other hand, exit is not a viable option if 'we' want to support an improved development. A reinforced policy dialogue is a relevant answer to this dilemma. Such a dialogue should focus on the need to strengthen sustainable rural livelihood reinforcement, far beyond what is conceived in the PRS. Fulfilling the PRS, as regards poverty alleviation, is clearly not enough in order to constitute a trade-off against a poor human rights record, and it is certainly not enough in order to reach the level of structural violence reduction, that we deem necessary in such a traumatic postconflict perspective. Sufficient strength in a political dialogue with this approach would probably need an upgrading of the Swedish diplomatic representation in Kigali, preferably to have a Swedish embassy in the region.

5 Assistance to Burundi should also be considered augmenting, and a bilateral programme should be developed during the current strategy period so that Burundi could be a program country in the next strategy period.

6 In order to meet the imperative to focus and concentrate, we suggest that an increased presence in DRC should focus on eastern DRC. The closeness geographically, economically and culturally to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, both means that stabilisation in eastern DRC stabilises also the rest of the region, and it is easier to administer, coordinate and monitor interventions in that way. A well-developed network of Swedish NGOs also exists in the region and in order to facilitate both coordination and legitimacy building in DRC, there is a need for Sida reinforcement at the embassy in Kinshasa.

Increased interventions in eastern DRC and Burundi could preferably be administered from a post in the region, in order to facilitate a better flow of information and ease up administration, rather then being administered from Nairobi. The UK and the Netherlands administer their aid in the region via their embassies in Kigali. Legitimacy needs would still require an extended presence in Kinshasa.

However, increased support for the region must be based on careful elaborated strategy and needs to be guided by intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground in the different countries:

1) Generally strive to balance central power structures in order to support a balance of power inside and outside the state apparatus as well as to contribute to an inclusive, reconciliatory and democratic culture, local level development and a pluralistic society.
2) Maintain a close and open dialogue on human rights issues.
3) Support to DRC and Burundi should be based on sectors and districts/provinces, rather then countries. This means that in a situation that characterises Burundi and DRC today, there are always local areas with no violence in the middle of deep conflicts.
4) A high degree of flexibility should characterise the interventions, so that activities could easily be moved or stopped.
5) Close cooperation with other donors, and linking up with multilateral regional programmes are essential.
6) Depending on the country, it might be considered beneficial to work with many small projects, rather than with huge projects with high initial investment costs and therefore less flexible.
7) The channels and contacts already in use should continue to be used. However, an effort to widen the kind of Swedish NGOs to be used should be considered. Sida should also consider using established governmental and indigenous NGOs to a larger extent, especially now when we are approaching a post-conflict situation. This would both strengthen local capacity and avoid creation/maintaining parallel structures.

Schematic overview of scenarios and linkages to development aid interventions.

Best case scenario	Most likely scenario	Worst Case scenario
Structual Violence Alleviation -Rural development based on SRL -Regional infrastructure -Local food security -Chamber of commerce	**Structual Violence Alleviation** Rural development based on SRL –Regional infrastructure -Local food security	**Structual Violence Alleviation** -Humanitarian assistance -Livelihood reinforcement
Cognitive Reintegration -Trauma counselling -Regional history research -Media development -Intra-regional exchange programs -Music festivals -Regional civil society	**Cognitive Reintegration** -Trauma counseling -Regional history research -Conflict analysis seminars -Media development -Music festivals -Regional civil society	**Cognitive Reintegration** -Trauma counseling -Regional history research -Conflict analysis seminars -Media development -Regional civil society
Regional conflict resolution -Support to regional conflict mechanisms	**Regional conflict resolution** Support to regional conflict mechanisms	**Regional conflict resolution** -Support to regional conflict mechanisms -UN peace enforcement -Problem-solving approach to negotiation facilitation
Policy and Donor coordination -Regional integration	**Policy and Donor coordination** -DDRRR-Regional policy dialogue -Small arms proliferation	**Policy and Donor coordination** -DDRRR -Regional dialogue for humanitarian assistance
Research and conflict facilitation -Common research on conflict management, teacher training -School of journalism	**Research and conflict facilitation** -Common research on conflict management, teacher training -School of journalism	**Research and conflict facilitation** -Common research on conflict management

Section III.
Country analyses

Section III analyses the major countries in the Great Lake conflicts. Each chapter make a historic overview/background to the current conflict situation in each country as well to the regional dimensions of the conflicts. The cross cutting issues that emerged from the country analyses appeared in chapter 4, scenarios for the countries is included in chapter 5 and policy recommendations in chapter 6. Thus the country studies should read together with these chapters.

Structural points of departure Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DRC



The area that later became splintered by colonial borders into six different countries with different colonial administrations and dynamics was, for several hundred years preceding colonialism, interlinked culturally, economically and politically. Societies in the Great Lakes region were in a process of state formation based on diversified economic, political, social and cultural structures and institutions. Economic and cultural exchange, migration, as well as rivalry and conflicts, characterised the 30 well-institutionalised kingdoms. Part of today's Kivus in DRC was at times incorporated in the Rwandan kingdom.

From the mid-19th century, the rivalry between the two largest and most well-organised and expansionary kingdoms, Rwanda and Buganda, shaped the political dynamic in the region.



Thus, from the 17th century up until 1961, Rwanda was a highly stratified monarchical polity. The state was remarkably well organised, centralised, and hierarchical. Moreover, militias have played an important role, primarily in Rwanda's wars of conquest and national defence. The militias featured a strong corporate sense and came later to play important economic and social roles in addition to their military duties. The militias were

of mixed *Hutu* and *Tutsi* membership, and it was not uncommon for a *Hutu* to be in command.

The unification process of the numerous "micro states" existing in Rwanda's "fragmented world" of hills and valleys, starting from mid-18th century, was slow and inconclusive. Wars were frequent. However, the conflicts were not between "*Tutsis*" and "*Hutus"* but rather between an expanding centre and the resistance on the periphery, on the one hand, and between Rwanda and its neighbours on the other. In addition, several *Hutu* principalities survived in the north, northwest and south-west. These were incorporated in the central kingdom, primarily with the help of the European colonisers in the 1926–1930s. It was in these areas that the strongest resentment of *Tutsi* dominance emerged in anti-colonial struggle. And it became the social base for the Habyarimana and later for the *genocidare* regime (Prunier 1999)

A second important structural point of departure is the paradox of high population density and smallness of Rwanda and Burundi — and the abundance of land and natural resources in today's DRC, and to a lesser extent in Tanzania and Uganda. Already in the 19th century, the combination of altitude (no malaria or tsetse flies) climate, agro-economic conditions and developed political and economic institutions, created preconditions for increased productivity and high population density. Today Rwanda and Burundi have the highest population density on the African mainland, with 345 respective 265 inhabitants per square km.[18] The smallness of the countries[19] creates pressure on all kind of resources, not least land. On the other hand, the smallness also makes it easier to establish political control, build infrastructure or provide social service.

Thirdly, migration to less densely populated or more economically developed areas in today's DRC, Tanzania and Uganda has a long tradition. The Lake Kivu area had among the highest density of white population in the Congo during the colonial era. It was considered as the highland area of the Congo, with close links to the settler culture in Rhodesia, South Africa and Kenya. Labour to the farms, plantations, factories and mines were also recruited from Burundi and Rwanda. Labour migration was also frequent to Uganda and Tanganyika, creating substantial groups of Banyarwanda immigrants in the neighbouring countries. Kinyarwanda is the largest language spoken in east and central Africa, besides Kiswahili.(Pottier 2002)

A fourth issue is that the mystification and politisation of myths and identities. It is interesting to compare how the European image of the great lakes region has shifted from " a lost heaven" in the 19th century to hell in late 20th. Myths, rumours, stereotyping and constructions of an imagined reality and manipulation of identities by different elites are at the core of the conflict complex. Without coming to grips with these cognitive processes, it is difficult to build peace – or understand the conflict dynamic. Rwanda had developed comparatively strong indig-

[18] If one only includes arable land the area in these mountainous countries the population density would be two- three times as high. At the same time, it should be noted that several areas around the Lake Victoria have an almost similarly high population density.

[19] With its 26,000 respective 28000 square km, Rwanda and Burundi are smaller than the Swedish county of Småland, and even taken together, the surface of Burundi and Rwanda is still smaller than e.g., the South Kivu province in DRC.

enous political and social structure long before colonialism. The politisation, and polarisation, of ethnicity began already in the 19th century and was accentuated under the warrior King Rwabugiri's regime (1860–1895). Two aspects should be noted: firstly that all shared the same language, culture, religion, territory and secondly, that intermarriages were frequent, with a certain social mobility. (Sellström and Wohlgemut 1996)

The character of the categories "*Hutu*" and "*Tutsi*" is disputable. Against the primordial assumption of well-defined discrete ethnic identities, a second school of thought argues that the organising principle and identity in precolonial Rwanda was based on the clans, rather then on ethnicity, at least up to the mid-19th century. Even if the term *Hutu* and *Tutsi* existed in the precolonial era, it did not have the same meaning and significance as during colonial times and onwards. The meaning of ethnic identity varied between space and over time. The categories *Hutu* and *Tutsi* were rather socio-economic categories, or descriptions of occupation: agriculturalist versus cattle herders. (Chrâetien 2003)

Generally, the hardcore "*Tutsi*" position is that polarisation started first with colonialism, and the *Hutu* revolution in particular, while the hard core "*Hutu*" position, is that the *Tutsis* were foreign invaders, occupying *Hutu* land from the 16th century and onwards, and remained a distinct ethnic group oppressing and marginalising *Hutus*.

A fifth issue is that during the colonial era, today's Burundi and Rwanda were administered as provinces within the Belgian Congo, thus sharing a common history, administrative procedures, an education system, a labour market etc., – and not least a feeling of belonging together. A common heritage in both Burundi and Rwanda was the limited investment in terms of both infrastructure, education, administration or economic modernisation, even if the colonial policy differed in the two provinces.

Sixth, Rwanda and Burundi are and have been characterised by marginalisation, extreme poverty, little urbanisation and few villages. On the HDI 2003, Rwanda is ranked as 158 out of 175, below Kenya (146) and Uganda (147), but above Tanzania (160), DRC (167) and Burundi (171).

Seventh, in the second half of the 20th century, Rwanda, Burundi and to a lesser extent DRC and Uganda have shared a history of communal conflict, which has resulted in death and internal and external refugee flows on a massive scale. It is impossible to understand the history or current conditions of one country without reference to its neighbour(s). *Hutu* leaders in Rwanda and *Tutsi* leaders in Burundi, both at national as well as local levels, have skilfully exploited inter-group tensions and violence in the neighbouring state in order to justify their methods of political monopoly (dictatorship), physical exclusion (provoking refugee flows), and physical elimination (genocide). Ambitious politicians in both countries have employed an effective nightmare vision, which runs something like this: "Look across the border and see what will happen to us (*Hutu*s in Rwanda, *Tutsi*s in Burundi) if we lose power and they take over." At the same time it is important to point out that there is strong nationalist feelings in both countries. *Tutsis* or *Hutus* in Rwanda and Burundi are foremost Rwandan or Burundian, and do not necessar-

ily identify themselves directly linked with people from the same "ethnic identity" on the other side of the border.

Eight, the conflicts has resulted in large scale refugee flows, intensifying the regional dimension of the conflicts, creating environmental challenges, resentment and political instability in the host countries, as well as in the country of origin. The large flow of people over the borders have creased a situation where a large section of the population is outside the country and thus establishing the opposition in the diaspora as important political actors – often used as a pawn in the game by political forces in the host country, regional or international actors.

7. Conflict analysis Rwanda

7.1 Introduction

The 10-year transition period from the peace agreement in 1993 formally ended with the referendum on the new constitution in May 2003 and the Presidential and Legislative elections in August and September/October 2003. The first multiparty elections since independence have been concluded nine years after an extreme situation, and in a regional context with ongoing violent conflicts. It must be judged out from those preconditions. However, human rights organisations and the EU election monitors have pointed at a number of human rights abuses, taking place both before and under the elections. On the other hand, no violence occurred before, during or after the elections, in contrast to almost all neighbouring countries recent elections. It must be regarded as the first step towards reconciliation and democratisation, not as an end of a democratisation process. The number of *Hutus* both in the government and in the parliament have increased, paving the way for a new Rwandan identity where cultural identity exists parallel to a strong feeling of being a Rwandan citizen. Despite all its flaws, we consider it a hopeful point of departure for the process of reconciliation that will take decades, if not generations to conclude.

7.2 Historic overview of the emergence of major structures in the Rwandan conflict complex – the root causes

The extremely cruel history of Rwanda, with recurrent cycles of violence culminating in the genocide in 1994, leaves no one untouched, and like the holocaust, must never be forgotten. It awakes strong feelings, among both Rwandans and foreigners. It awakes a guilt complex within the international community, as well as in Africa, where actors fuelled and/or failed to intervene to stop the genocide. It has created deep distrust and suspicion both between fellow countrymen in Rwanda, and a distrust in state as well as in the international society. It challenges aid policies/practices, security/foreign policy as well as social science. The events that led to the genocide, the genocide itself and the consequences of the genocide will mark development in Rwanda, and in the region, for many generations.

To assess and understand the contemporary political situation in Rwanda, there is a need to have a well-grounded historic perspective, in

order to interpret today's events in a relevant context. The interpretation of Rwanda history is highly contentious and as such, as the *perception* of the history, frame the way one understands and interprets contemporary, as well as future, politics or reforms in almost every dimension. Thus, there is also a need for an understanding of the different frameworks for an interpretation of Rwandan history, and what implication they have for the interpretation of contemporary events. That is why we have chosen to have a rather lengthy historical chapter, to show how deeply entrenched the ideas that lead to the genocide are in Rwandan society, and thus how delicate the post-genocidal development is. The hate propaganda and genocidal ideas started already from the first years of independence.

Below we will outline some themes we consider are necessary to bear in mind when interpreting the situation in Rwanda today.

Colonialism — the creation of Tutsi supremacy, polarisation and race identities

German colonial (1899–1916) rule and Belgian trusteeship (1916–1961) were shaped by the racist ideologies prevailing in Europe at the time. A mythology was created, the "*Hamitic* thesis", where the *Tutsis* were perceived as racially superior to the inferior *Hutus* and *Twas* ,with the white race at the top of the hierarchy. The stereotypes characterising the first explorers' and missionaries' perception of the societies in the region, in combination with misperceptions, lack of information and ideological projections, laid the foundation for a colonial ethnicfication process and construction of *Hutu* and *Tutsi* identities. The Europeans reinforced the central kingdom, the ruling royal clan and the "*Tutsification*" process. The balance of power that existed in the precolonial era, where, e.g., the chiefdoms were divided into three positions, the chief of the land, the chief of the pastures and the chief of the men, where the chief of the land was often a *Hutu*, was replaced by a centralised system under one chief. *Hutu* chiefs were fired. Indirect rule and the apartheid-like policy of ethnology drastically sharpened the ethnicfication process from the twenties and onwards[20]. The white fathers of the Catholic Church played an important role in the process.

This politically motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially constructed categories of a mythological precolonial past, created an extremely hierarchal society, with the ascribed "aristocratic" "*Hamitic*" *Tutsi* minority at the top, with a monopoly of political and administrative power, and the "inferior" "Bantu" *Hutus* and *Twa* marginalised at the bottom; a policy where the *Tutsi* elites in collaboration with the colonial masters constructed a heroic artificial history. The "*Tutsi*" was reconstructed as a superior racial category with "scientific" higher qualities in

[20] 1926: Belgians decide that the population of Rwanda should be classified as either *Tutsi* or *Hutu*. Unlike in previous times, when the *Hutu- Tutsi* distinction was fluid (prosperous peasants could become *Tutsi*s, while *Tutsi*s who fell on hard economic times could suffer reduced social status and become *Hutus*), this Belgian administrative measure now strictly designates those who own more than ten cows as *Tutsi* and all others as *Hutu*, with no possibility of movement between the two groups. Imposing a Belgian practice, all citizens are issued with national identification cards which include an entry for tribe. Thus, the complicated hierarchy of precolonial times is simplified, with more power concentrated at the top, and fewer benefits and prerogatives accruing to those at the bottom. In addition, Europeans want a uniform territorial system and therefore eliminate the pockets of autonomy, which had existed in precolonial Rwanda. Some of these autonomous regions are in fact *Hutu*-controlled, further reducing the status of that group and enhancing *Tutsi* supremacy under European tutelage

terms of intelligence, leadership skills, beauty, physical and mental strength, hard working, disciplined etc., compared with the inferior indolent, undisciplined, ugly but jovial *Bantu Hutu*.

A powder keg of superiority/inferiority complexes, excluded the majority from education, political and economic opportunities, downgrading its social status, and human value, and consequently increasing its frustration and potential for being mobilised. In the process, the colonial intervention caused the groups to become distinctly political categories, and provided fuel to the emerging hatred against the *Tutsi* dominance. Even if the "*Tutsi*" community was highly diversified and the living conditions for the majority of the "*Tutsis*" did not differ that much from the better off "*Hutus*". Moreover, the difference narrowed during the fifties. [21]

These racial stereotypes created from a mythological past, based on a farfetched ideology of human value and virtually based on physical appearance, become one of the most powerful, and destructive, discourses in the region; an instrument used systematically by various elites in mobilising in its struggle for power, overriding all other political discourses up to today. A discourse that reproduced itself to such an extent that the discourse itself become more "real" then "reality", both as a threat image and a role model.

Decolonialisation — the politisation of ethnicity and establishment of violence as political strategy

Economic and political changes during the fifties brought about infighting between the conservative, political and administrative *Tutsi* elite, refusing democratisation, demanded not only by the emerging *Hutu* elite, but also by a more progressive *Tutsi* counter elite. The new *Hutu* elite, consisting of teachers, priests, medical and agricultural auxiliaries, whose influences could be relied upon by artisans, traders and truckers, demanded the redress of economic and political balance of power and the ending of "*Tutsi* feudalism". The political movements and ideas that emerged were pruned along the imagined ethnic/racial identities. The "Ba*Hutu* Manifesto" in 1957 states: "*The problem is basically that of the political monopoly of one race. (…) this political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly (…) turned into a cultural monopoly which condemns the desperate BaHutu to be for ever subaltern workers (…)*".[22] The *Tutsi* court notables published a document stating that *Tutsi* ancestors had reduced the *Hutus* by force and founded the Rwandan state. No fraternizing between *Tutsis* and *Hutus* was possible. The political rivalry was, however, limited to the elite's. For the vast majority, living together on the hills in subsistence economies, the ethnic antagonism had yet not taken over as the overriding ordering structure. (Chrétien 2003)

The political parties formed, quickly turned into ethnic-based parties. The first, in 1957, was Grégoire Kayibanda's "*Hutu Social Movement*" (MSM) and Gitera's APROSOMA (*Association For the Social Promotion of the*

[21] In a household budget survey carried out in the mid-fifties, the average income for the *Tutsi* households (excluding holders of political offices) was estimated at 4439 BF and for *Hutu* households at 4249 Bf. (Prunier 1999)

[22] Cited from Prunier 1999:45

Masses). In 1959, the conservative *Tutsis* established UNAR (*Rwandese National Union*), demanding immediate independence in order to maintain the monarchy. To counter UNAR, the Belgians, that had begun to shift policy, supported the establishment of a moderate party, RADER (*Rwandese Democratic Union*), started by reformist- oriented T*utsi*s. The party was frowned upon by both the monarchist *Tutsi* elite and accused of being a colonial creation. Liberal *Tutsi* opinions thus had difficulties in prevailing.

In 1959, Kayibanda transformed MSM to MDR-PARMEHUTU (*Rwandese Democratic Movement/Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation*). The two *Hutu* parties had different regional bases, APROSOMA in today's Butare area, while PARMEHUTU had its base in Gitarama-Ruhengeri, the areas where *Tutsi* dominance was established first with the help of the colonialists.

The abrupt change of colonial policy in late fifties, shifting from supporting the *Tutsi* aristocracy to the majority *Hutu*, paved the way for the "*Hutu* revolution" in 1959–61, the transition from a *Tutsi*-led monarchy to a *Hutu*-led independent republic in 1962. During a mere three-year period the whole system of administration and governance was shifted and a new *Hutu* political elite replaced the old *Tutsi* elite. New institutions had to be built. In the power and institutional vacuum that arose from the withdrawal of colonial indirect rule, the de-legitimised monarchy, the struggle for state power and the redress of historical injustices, brought about a new dimension of political and social instability, and a potential for future ethnic violence. Cycles of political violence flared up.

The Belgians started to replace the *Tutsi* chiefs by *Hutu* chiefs in early 1960. These immediately organised the persecution of *Tutsi*s on the hills they controlled, particularly in the northwest. In the local elections in 1960, only 19 *Tutsi* chiefs became elected as opposed to 210 *Hutu*. The *Hutu* camp was not, however, a unified political force. It was split in a number of different camps. In September 1961, PARMEHUTU won an overwhelming victory in an UN-supervised referendum. With the granting of independence from Belgium in July 1962, Grégoire Kayibanda, became the country's first president.

It is important to view the development during these formative years in the regional context. The uprisings in Leopoldville and Katanga shaped the UN, the Belgian as well as the Rwandan political elites. In addition, the *Mau Mau* uprising was a source of inspiration and threat, as were the developments in Uganda.

Independence – the inversion of dominance, exclusion and establishment of the diaspora as political discourse

The new nation was born in blood. PARMEHUTUs programme reinterpreted the underpinning of racist ideologies, turning it against the *Tutsi*, claiming to "restore the country to its owners" and inviting the BaTutsies to "return to Abyssinia" (Chrétien 2003). The PARMEHUTU interpretation of *demokarasi* was conceived as the power of the "humble" majority of the people, thus equating demography with democracy. At the same time it was conceived as the legitimate revenge of the indigenous *BaHutu* against the "foreign" minority. What

Mamdani has analysed as a second independence against the "settlers", the *Tutsi*.(Mamdani 2001).

In the process of replacing one privileged elite by another and replacing one oppressive system by another, at least 500 people were killed, most of them *Tutsis*. 22,000 *Tutsis* were internally displaced and 130,000 fled, out of an estimated population of 450, 000,[23] establishing the diaspora as one of the building blocks in the political discourse. The largest number, around 50,000, settled in Burundi, where the UPRONA party supported their fellow *Tutsi* cause in Rwanda. *Tutsi* refugees started armed incursions against Rwanda from 1960. Fearful of *Tutsi* political ambitions in the postcolonial era, *Hutu* hegemony was maintained by the systematic persecution of *Tutsi*s and the increasing subversion of democratic institutions to *Hutu* nationalist leaders and agendas. The *Tutsi* diaspora gradually felt more marginalised. In December 1963, an ill-planned and desperate surprise attack was mounted from the Burundian camps, supported by Burundi. Belgian troops helped Kayibanda stop the ill-equipped operation outside Kigali. In a massive wave of repression, an estimated 10,000 *Tutsi*s were killed between December 1963 and January 1964, including all the remaining *Tutsi* politicians. At the end of 1964, the number of refugees increased to 336,000, or 75% of the estimated *Tutsi* population at the time. 200,000 fled to Burundi and 78,000 to Uganda. With the amnesty law 1962 for political massacres, the policy of fear and impunity was established.

It is as well important to point out that the hate propaganda and several of the building stones in the genocidal ideology was outlined and distributed already during this period. The MDR, abolished by force in May 2003, has its historic roots in this political culture.

First Republic — the consolidation of monarchist forms of governance under the guise of a republic

Exile politics were dead. The only result had been to strengthen the personal power of Kayibanda. Rwanda developed to a remarkably organised state with a high degree of authoritarian control from the centre during the first and second republics. In a paradoxical development, the *Hutu* president re-established the same governance style and institutions as the *Tutsi* kings: Remoteness, authoritarianism, secretiveness, balance of power between lineages and regions, and paternalistic patron-client relations through favouritism, corruption and appointments and nominations. A political discourse of stereotyping and hatred against *Tutsi* was established, mirrored in textbooks in schools, media and popular songs. *Tutsi*s was systematically marginalised within the state administration, politics as well as the education system.

Even if an authoritarian regime it was considered to be a developmentalist one, guided by firm Christian morals. The historic link between Rwanda Belgium and the Catholic Church gave the regime a certain international backing. Not the least by Christian Democrats in Belgium and the Netherlands.[24] France also had an interest to support

[23] The numbers of killed and exiled are highly politicised. These figures are based on Prunier's 1999 conservative estimation.

[24] The close link between the church and the colonial administration can for instance exemplified with the fact that the last Belgian colonial governor had Bishops title.

francophone countries. However, gradually dissatisfaction with Kayibanda's regimes grew, both internally and externally. The economy where in crisis in the end of the sixties. International actors started to look for an alternative to the corrupt, uneducated and unsophisticated Kayibanda. Internally, increased tension between *Hutus* from northern Gisenyi and Ruhengiri, the areas where *Tutsi* dominance was imposed late and thus more hostile to dialogue and power sharing, vis-à-vis those from the rest of the country. The *Tutsi* massacre of *Hutu*s in Burundi in 1972, with massive inflows of terrified *Hutu* refugees to Rwanda and Tanzania, was used by the Kayibanda as a pretext to mobilise *Hutus* against the *Tutsi*s in order to strengthen his tottering regime. The militias were re-activated. The strategy failed. Even if the *Tutsi*s were harassed and excluded, the militias started infighting, settling communal conflicts and turning against authoritarian leaders. In the process several 100,000 new refugees left the country, even if few were killed. However, Kayibanda's exploitation of ethnic fears failed to save his regime.

Second Republic: Development dictatorship, reduced political violence

Hutu counter elites dissatisfied with the authoritarian leadership and insecurity, and with support from Belgium, France and Mobutu in Zaire, brought forward the head of the army, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1973. President Habyarimana dissolved the National Assembly, abolished all autonomous political activity and reinforced the state ideology of *Hutu* power. In 1975, Habyarimana established a one-party state under the control of the *National Revolutionary Movement for Development* (MRND). The authoritarian MRND, which was dominated by *Hutu*s from Habyarimana's political base in the north of the country, controlled the political arena in Rwanda for the next fifteen years. President Habyarimana was re-elected in 1978, 1983 and 1988 in restricted national elections. In practice, Rwanda was ruled by military dictatorship, with an effective secret service.

Violence against the remaining *Tutsi*s stopped. The *Tutsi* were virtually excluded from political and military posts, but were allowed to play limited roles in the public sector, government posts and have limited access to education. The private sector, however, was not restricted. *Tutsi*s came to play prominent roles as entrepreneurs, not least in international trade, a situation that gave rise to later frictions. At the end of the period, the *Tutsi*s had managed to establish themselves in several sectors beyond the supposed quota of 9%.

Political stability, a well-organised society and administration gave Rwanda a reputation as a benevolent authoritarian developmental state and attracted large aid contracts. Relations to especially France were cordial. Power, however, was concentrated to a small group close to the president, with the help of effective control mechanisms all the way down the micro level in a hierarchical top down structure. A period of comparative rapid economic and social development prevailed from mid-seventies. GNP per capita increased and the economy diversified. In comparison with the situation prevailing in Uganda, Zaire and Burundi at the time, Habyarimana's regime had the reputation of being an African success story, "Africa's Switzerland" (Uvin 1998).7.3

7.3 Five proxy factors behind the genocide of 1994

Increased structural violence: Economic crises and frustration

The fall of the coffee and tea prices in the early eighties triggered the economic crises[25]. Aid dependency and budget deficits increased. Harsh "shock therapy" structural adjustment programmes increased unemployment, inflation and reduced social service and real wages. A policy that in combination with increasing land shortage hit hard at the majority of the population. Inequality increased. Rural land was accumulated by a few at the expense of the many. In 1990, one quarter of the rural population was landless, in some districts by up to 50%. In particular, the young men's situation became worse. Without land they could neither marry nor earn an income, and had little hope for the future. (IPEP 2000)

The positive macro-economic indicators in the earlier period concealed a situation of increasing structural violence. With the economic crisis, the structural violence worsened. Inequality and poverty increased, deprivation of all kinds of rights as well. The social political system was based on multiple exclusion, humiliation and disempowerment, in particular of the rural masses. Structural violence linked to impunity undermines the legitimacy of the state and normative structures that hold states and societies together. Structural violence creates frustration, anger and resentment, which contribute to the erosion of social capital and norms in the society. A population that is cynical, angry and frustrated is predisposed to scapegoating and projection, vulnerable for manipulation and desperate for change. Chronic unemployment created a base for hate mobilisation. (Uvin 1998)

Intra elite conflict – the Akazu challenged from other regions

The military dictatorship, controlled by a small clique of *Hutus* from the northwest, increasingly frustrated the *Hutu* elite's from other regions. The small faction that controlled the state was called the *Akazu* (the little house). Its core consisted of the President's wife, family and close associates. It was the centre of political, mercantile and military machinery. Through favouritism and corruption, control and enrichment were maintained. The marginalised elites outside the narrow insider group grew increasingly anxious of the arrogance, corruption, mismanagement and the regional favouritism displayed by the *Akazu*. The pressure for power sharing and democratisation emerged both from within and from the international community, threatening the privileges of the *Akazu*. (IPEP 2000)

Impunity and fear

The two-generation-old unsolved issues of impunity for genocidal and other violent crimes, created a culture that political violence was legitimate. The legacy of fear created through generations of authoritarian governments, using all kind of methods to stay in power, paved the way for the elite mobilisation of the poor peasants.

[25] Income from Coffee export declined from $144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993.

The refugees and the diaspora-regionalisation of the conflict

The refugee crises in several waves, created a situation where the most important opposition was outside the country and a foundation for armed resurrection. UNHCR estimated that there were around 900,000 Rwandan refugees in the neighbouring countries. They where denied citizenship in their home country and in most cases also in the country of residence. Creating a volatile regional conflict configuration of rapidly moving population flows, depending on changes in policies of the host country – as well as political mobilisation and violence both inside the host country and against the home country.

RPF's attack

From Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front started its attacks on Rwanda in 1990. The *Akazu* used the attacks as a pretext to fight back rival *Hutu* elites, through mobilising the frustrated masses.

7.4 Triggers; the peace process, democratisation, Burundi

The democratisation process – regional-based parties challenging the "Akazu" power and privileges

In the summer of 1991, from mounting political pressure from *Hutu* opposition *inside* Rwanda, and the international community, Habyarimana was pressed to re-establish a multi-party system, notably the *Republican Democratic Movement* (MDR), the *Social Democrat Party* (PSD), the *Liberal Party* (PL) and the *Christian Democrat Party* (PDC). However, behind the democratic discourse, strong regional divisions remained. The MRND (*National Revolutionary Movement for Development*) represented the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, the fiefdom of President Habyarimana, and the symbol of *Hutu* power in the north. The MDR PARMEHUTU, a revival of the party led by the first President, Grégoire Kayibanda, represented the southern prefectures of Gitarama and Butare and brought together the pro-south *Hutu* political class that was excluded from power in 1973 by the pro-north regime of President Habyarimana. The PSD also brings together the excluded southerners, mostly from Butare. The PL drew *Tutsi* support and was rapidly absorbed by an internal wing of the RPF, which launched its first military operations from Uganda on October 1st 1990.

The civil war resulted in the gradual polarisation of political lines. The "*Akazu*" realised that now it was not only threatened by *Hutu* elites but also by the hated *Tutsi* elite. For fear of losing power, the ethnic card was played again. The *Akazu* and its associates started an intense manipulation of ethnic identities. Hate propaganda against the "foreign invaders" and their associates, the moderate *Hutus,* started already from 1990.

The *Hutu* extremists, represented by the *Coalition for the Defence of the Republic* (CDR, extremist *Hutu* party), and the MRND, managed to mobilise the opposition parties and build an anti- *Tutsi* bloc to counter the RPF threat. The MDR split into two factions: the MDR Power clan symbolised by the concept of PARMEHUTU, born out of the 1959 "social revolution" on the one hand, and an moderate clan on the other. All major party actually had ParmeHutu fractions, including the PL.

In the end, the politics of ethnic division proved more powerful than the regionalist, democratic stance prove, and resulted in the formation of the "*Hutu* power" bloc that planned the genocide An efficient propaganda machinery was established, producing powerful narratives anchored in the racist ideology developed during the colonial era and the 1959 social revolution. One of the more enduring was the so-called "Bahima thesis" where the Habyarimana propaganda machinery proclaimed that Museveni and RPF jointly planned to invade Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Congo and Western Tanzania in order to create a mythical "*Bahima*" empire, joining forces with the presumably supportive "*Tutsis*" in these areas. A thesis that also got support from Tanzania and *Hutus* in Burundi, and thus reinforcing the regional conflict complex.

For the RPF, it is clear that the multi-party system was incapable of stemming the extremist tide that led to the genocide. From then on, the movement was convinced that the only way of banishing ethnic divisions would be to impose a discourse of unity.(International Crisis Group 2002a)

Several massacres on *Tutsis* and moderate *Hutus* were carried out in the period 1990–1993. More then 8,000 were jailed.

The political development in the region

In Uganda, increasing popular dissent with *Tutsi* refugees made Museveni start to marginalise *Tutsi*s in the late eighties, pushing them to attempt to change the regime in Rwanda so they could return. Then the dramatic development in Burundi, culminating in the massacres of 250,000 *Hutu*s in 1993, and the murder of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected *Hutu* president, both threatened the elite and the majority of *Hutu*s in Rwanda. It appeared to confirm and strengthen the racial anti- *Tutsi* propaganda in Rwanda. In DRC, the Banyamulenge were increasingly marginalised by the Mobuto regime as well as facing increased popular dissent. These processes on the one hand pressed the *Tutsi* diaspora to try to bring about a change in Rwanda, and on the other sharpened the conflict with the *Hutu* elite in power in Rwanda.

The Arusha peace process

RPF escalated its military offensive against the Kigali government in early 1993. Under pressure from Western and African states and institutions, most notably the OAU and Tanzania, President Habyarimana signed the Arusha peace accord in August 1993

The Arusha Accords (August 19993) outlined a plan for power sharing with the *Hutu* opposition and the *Tutsi* rebels, integration of the armies, establishment of post-conflict institutions, a timetable for the transition and international monitoring by the UN. The Habyarimana regime's commitment to implementing the Arusha Accords was, however, limited. Extremists within the *Hutu* power movement began to dominate both the political discourse and the actions of the government. The *Hutu* parties organised militias and death squads, the most infamous being the ruling parties militia, the "Interahamwe", as local defence units against the enemy, trained and led by the presidential guard and the military command via local political structures.

The peace accord was regarded by *Hutu* hardliners as too favourable towards RPF, threatening to marginalise *Hutu* power. The power-sharing agreement and the integration of the two security forces would lead to a drastic reduction of the old elite's power and control of the state. In combination with reforms of the judiciary, in a context with excessive corruption, the old elite would once more have to face prosecution, if the agreement should be implemented.

7.5 The Genocide and its consequence for today's Rwanda

President Habyarimana, together with President Ntaryamira of Burundi, was killed on April 7th 1994 when his plane was shot down on its approach to Kigali airport, when returning from talks on the Arusha peace process, where he had seemed poised to yield to pressures from other presidents in the region to put the peace accords into motion. Within hours, the *Hutu* militias engaged in ethnic cleansing against *Tutsi*s and *Hutu* opponents, in a severely efficient combination of military operation, local militias and mobilised peasants. With the legacy of fear and impunity, many were forced under death threat to kill loved ones, relatives, neighbours or friends. It was not an anarchic blood bath, but a well-planned and systematic killing, following prepared lists of prominent *Tutsis*, *Tutsi* relatives, as well moderate and prominent *Hutus* who supported the peace accord. Politically, the most important consequence was the popularisation of the genocide ideology thru intensive propaganda via radio, papers, officials, community leaders, and at times church leaders.

Structural Violence and Politicisation of ethnicity

As we have seen, the Rwanda genocide grew out of an explosive struggle for resources, in similarity to the crisis in Kivu, which embattled politicians ethnicised to their advantage. A crises rooted in class and regional interest (the northwest versus the south) was turned into a conflict for which an ethnic minority, " the *Tutsi*", were held responsible. The ideas of *Hutu* power as a revolutionary movement against a feudal oppression by an alien *Hamitic Tutsi* elite started to develop in the fifties and shaped the "*Hutu* revolution" of 1959. With increasing economic difficulties at the end of the eighties, the situation for the already impoverished majority deteriorated.

The political elite, from the northwest, in control of the state apparatus, used the RPF invasion in 1990 to redirect the hatred and the potential political violence of the poor, especially by the angry, desperate young *Hutu* men, away from the rich and against "the *Tutsi*"; the latter being wrongly portrayed as invariably aristocratic and privileged, despite the fact that the privileged class were *Hutus* from the northwest, thus, marginalising the *Hutu* elite from the South. With the help of intensive propaganda, portraying RPF as returning alien invaders, to reinstate the feudal oppression of the *Hutu* majority, hatred against the *Tutsi* was whipped up and became deeply entrenched in the society. *Hutu* power should terminate forever the *Tutsi* threat through extinction. An ideology that is still very alive in the *Hutu* diaspora, and possibly as well might exist in pockets inside Rwanda in milder forms. (Pottier 2002)

Refugee flows, diaspora as opposition and security threat

It is impossible to understand Rwandan development without taking into account the cyclical waves of violence against *Tutsi*s in 1959–63, and in 1972, the massacres on the *Hutu*s in Burundi in 1972 and in 1993, the persecution of the *Tutsi*s in Uganda in the sixties, early eighties and late eighties, and more recently in DRC, which has created Africa's largest refugee flows.

In the first period it is estimated that up to 900,000 Rwandans, mainly *Tutsi*s residing in the neighbouring countries, and a further million in other African countries and mainly in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, the US and the Netherlands. This means that almost one-third of the population was outside the country.[26] They became the Palestinians, or Jews, of Africa. They were neither welcome back to Rwanda nor could obtain citizenship in the countries in which they resided.

In similarity to many refugee populations, the only means of improving their situation was through education. Thus, the diaspora in general acquired a much higher level of education than those people who remained in Rwanda. The diaspora also became the most important political opposition and threat to the Rwandan government, as well as being influential in the countries where they resided as lobby groups. Diaspora politics became a framework for Rwandan politics, a framework that is still valid, and it was the Ugandan diaspora that formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front and succeeded in invading Rwanda and interrupting the genocide.

The *genocidare* government in turn, with its militias and perpetrators of the genocide, shepherded around two million (mostly *Hutu*) refugees with them *out* to Zaire and Tanzania, and to Burundi in 1994, creating fierce opposition and a security threat against the new government, and the important lobby group in the Western countries where they were staying.

At the same time, about one million, mainly *Tutsi* refugees *returned* to Rwanda, most had left, either as very young or had been born in exile. In addition, when the *Hutu* extremists in the camps in Zaire started to attack perceived *Tutsi*s in the Kivus, a further 700,000 people returned to Rwanda. When Rwanda attacked and demolished the refugee camps in Zaire in 1996, around one million people returned from Zaire and Tanzania, this time mainly *Hutus*. In addition, waves of refugees have come from Burundi at different times in history.

These extremely large flows of people in and out of the country create a double challenge, in terms of both managing the accommodation of incoming people, and replacing outgoing, at the same time as the most important political opposition is lodge in the diaspora.

The role of the international society – unintentionally facilitating genocide and its aftermath?

The role different actors in the international society have played since the colonial time has created a careful and nationalistic stance among the current ruling elite in Rwanda against the international community. The Habyarimana regime had extensive international support, even if the widespread corruption created resentment at the end of the eighties.

[26] The estimation of refugees is politicised and varies between different sources. UNHCR estimated that there were 900,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries in 1990.

Major Western powers and the UN received the information both about the plans for the genocide from 1991 and about the handing out of weapons to militias from October 1993, as well as on the massacres of the *Tutsi*s that started from late 1990, as a revenge for the RPF invasion.

Despite this, the Habyarimana regime received political and military support, in particular from France. French military trained the rapidly growing army after the launching of the RPF attacks in 1990, and it participated in military operations against RPF, preventing, among other things, RPF from capturing Kigali in 1993. If that had succeeded, it might have stopped the genocide. French military built up the presidential guard, that later trained the militias. The driving force behind the action was that the French officials fumed at what they saw as an "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" to shut them out of central Africa, first in Rwanda and then in the Congo. (Callamard 1999; Shaun 2000)

Human Rights Watch claimed that companies related to the French government continued to supply the *genocidare* government with arms even under the genocide via Goma, and after the genocide in Zaire, but it is denied by France (Human Rights Watch 1995). In 1990, Egypt became an important supplier of weapons, and the first contract was initiated by Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, by then Minister of State for foreign affairs. The delivery of weapons continued up to six weeks before the genocide. (Melvern 2000; Waal 1997). Other important suppliers were Albania, China and South Africa.

When RPF advanced in May/June 1994 in order to stop the genocide, the *genocidare* government and most of its officials, as well as its army, fled either directly or via the French Operation Turquoise, virtually intact, to Zaire.

The genocide could have been prevented or at least been reduced, with an intervention, in due time, provided that the will had been there. (IPEP 2000; Melvern 2000; Prunier 1999; Uvin 1998). General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, claimed that if UNAMIR had obtained the desired peace enforcement mandate and an additional 2,500 blue helmets, the genocide could have been stopped, or at least drastically reduced the number of victims. Instead, troops were *withdrawn*. It could be compared with the 3,000 troops the US sent *after* the genocide to Goma to assist in setting up the refugee camps and preventing a public health crisis.

An early intervention had not only avoided the extreme human suffering in connection with the genocide and the enormous costs for the refugee camps and the rebuilding of Rwanda, but also most likely prevented the largest war since the second world war, the almost nine years of war in DRC/the Great Lakes region, with three-to-four million victims. This could have been achieved at a fraction of the cost with which the international community had supported the Habyarimana government, that had planned and executed the genocide; alternatively, at a fraction of the cost the international society, hypocritically, provided for the humanitarian assistance *after* the genocide, which largely became a support of the perpetrators of the genocide. [27]

[27] Funds were and are available, the issue is to mobilise political will and build capacity to be able to intervene — and decide how and when to intervene in order to do at least a minimum of harm. This needs knowledge of the situation on the ground, on a micro as well as on meso and macro level in order to know the short- and long-term implications of the pursued interventions. It also needs flexibility and broad alliances, free from narrow geopolitical ambitions.

Today, it is well known and documented that interventions that were done *after* the genocide *drastically prolonged and deepen*ed the conflict in the region, due to lack of political will before and in an early stage of genocide, and because of the lack of information and analytical capacity to understand the consequences of the humanitarian interventions after the genocide (Human Rights Watch 1999; Melvern 2000; Pottier 2002; Rieff 2002; Waal 1997). Moreover the interventions eroded existing local capacity as well (Juma and Suhrke 2002).

7.6 The conflict configuration – from a Rwandan perspective

The evacuation of refugees from Rwanda by the *genocidare* government was a military strategy to undermine the credibility of the new Rwandan government. The camps provided an effective humanitarian sanctuary for members of the former Rwandan government, army and militias. Protected from prosecution, they resided in camps with impunity and manipulated the aid structures to increase their military and political power. It enabled them to resume the killing they started in April 1994 and to sabotage reconstruction and reconciliation attempts in Rwanda.

The refugees, however, were a mix of bona fide refugees and officials from the old government and perpetrators of the genocide. The former politicians and military retained strong control over the refugees by the use of violence, coercion, authority, propaganda and social networks. The camp leaders prevented the refugees from returning and injected them with hatred and genocidal rhetoric for over two years. The provision of humanitarian assistance by the US, the EU and others helped the perpetrators of the genocide to control more than one million people against their will. Zairian authorities facilitated the rearming and training of the former Rwandan government forces (ex-FAR) and militias in Zaire. Ex-Far was provided with the territorial base on which the army could reorganise, and permitted army and officials free movement.

Moreover, they were supplied with weapons and supplies, both by Zaire, and by France, and indirectly by the international humanitarian assistance that provided food and shelter for the ex-armies' soldiers. In the camps, a self-proclaimed government was reorganised, from ministerial level down to the village level with the officials from the *genocidare* government. The refugees were largely "regrouped" in their old village structure. A highly organized military structure, "*The Rwandan Armed Forces Command*", was established with 22,000 soldiers. In addition, 10,000 to 50,000 militias were living in the camps. Recruitment in Eastern Zaire/DRC as well as in the camps added to the force.

The Ex-Far and former government had considerable financial and military resources: the banks were emptied and available cash and all moveable assets, including vehicles, machinery, military hardware, with six helicopters, armoured vehicles, artillery, etc., requisitioned or looted from Rwanda before they retreated. "We have money, we left Rwanda nothing but the houses" claimed Colonel Anselme Nkuliyekubona. It is well documented how Ex-Far purchased considerable amounts of weapons from July 1994 and onwards, not least from China, Israel, South Africa and Albania.

Cross-border attacks deep into Rwanda started almost immediately after the exodus, adding weight to the constant repetition of the exile

government that they would re-invade Rwanda, and reclaim power by force and conclude the genocide. The aim of the operations was to create a general feeling of insecurity, to kill returning refugees, in order to increase the reluctance of refugees to return; to provoke reprisals by RPF against civilian population suspected of sympathizing with *Hutu* rebels; to destroy the infrastructure and property in order to place additional burden on and undermine the transitional government's efforts to rebuild Rwanda; to kill genocide survivors and potential witnesses. (Terry 2002; Uvin 1998)

The camps fuelled the regional instability. The *Hutu* extremists in the camps joined forces with *Hutus* in Eastern Zaire and started attacks on the *Tutsis* in Zaire, with the aim of creating an ethnically cleansed *Tutu* land in the Kivus. Mobutu played out the ethnic card in order to strengthen his position and instigated hostilities against the Banyamulenge, a *Tutsi*-related group that have lived for generations in Zaire. In 1996 their Congolese citizenship was withdrawn and they were ordered to leave the Kivus. As a result, four hundred thousand Zairian *Tutsi* fled back to Rwanda, some but not all were Rwandan refugees from the earlier conflicts. The insecurity provided ground for the Zairian rebellion.

Repeated appeal from the Rwandan government to disarm the camps without international actions – Rwanda dissolve the camps – Congo war 1. The transitional government in Rwanda appealed time after time to Mobutu and to the international community to separate the war criminals from the civilian refugees, to disarm the militias in the camps and to stop the attacks on Rwanda. UNHCR and NGOs also took initiatives to demilitarise the camps, but did not receive international support and mandate to do that.

After two and a half years of continued insecurity in Rwanda, the Rwandan government felt that it had to act by itself. After repeated warnings, the camps were attacked and destroyed by the Rwandan army and Zairian rebel forces in 1996. In the process, more then seven hundred thousand people returned to Rwanda from the camps, more or less voluntarily, while around two hundred thousand people fled westwards in Zaire. It is unknown how many of these that died. Rwanda and Uganda supported the Zairian rebellion with the tacit consent of the US, and Kabila took power in Kinshasa in spring 1997 (see the section on DRC).

Laurent Kabila was concerned about Rwanda's and Uganda's influence in DRC, which could undermine his Congolese legitimacy. He gradually distanced his government from his Rwandan compatriots and sent them back in 1998. Kabila started to develop relations with Angola, Zimbabwe and the Ugandan arch-enemy the Sudan, while at the same time supporting Ex-Far Interahamwe forces. The ExFAR/ Interahamwe forces regrouped and renamed themselves AliR (Rwandan Liberation Army) and started an insurrection in northwest Rwanda (the old *Hutu* power base) in late 1997. More then 600,000 people became IDPs in Rwanda. These events led to the second war in DRC in 1998.

The transitional government stopped the insurrection inside the country, but at a high cost to human life and infringements on human rights. The new DRC government continued to support Ex/Far

Interahamwe forces as a proxy army against Rwanda, which was perceived as a serious security threat from the Rwandan side. To counter, Rwanda maintained troops in eastern DRC and supported the RCD in the Kivus, and other proxy groups in other areas of DRC, financed by available resources in DRC.

Rwandan and Ugandan interest clashed in Kisangani 1998, severing the relations between Museveni and Kagame, and continued with a series of incidents up to 2003. The *Hutu* groups regrouped in 2000 under the name FDLR (*Rwandan Democratic Liberation Forces*), fed and armed by Kinshasa and in the range of 20,000 to 30,000 men, continuing as proxy fighters for the DRC, maintaining a real or perceived threat to the Rwandan governing elite.

The Congolese peace accord stipulated a disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation of FDLR forces and other rebel groups, a withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of a transitionary government. Accordingly, Rwanda withdrew its troops. However, the Kabila government continued to support the FDLR, because the DRC lacked an effective military force in the east. Thus, far from disappearing, the problem of the Rwandan opposition becomes more complicated. The FDLR links up with the *Concertation permanente de l'opposition démocratique rwandaise* (CPODR), which groups together almost all Rwanda's exiled opposition parties, including *Tutsi* genocide survivors, and calls for a suspension of Rwanda's transition timetable, while denouncing the authoritarianism of the RPF. At the same time, its military command continues reorganising troops and preparing destabilisation operations in case its political strategy fails.

For its part, the Rwandan government refused to recognise, let alone negotiate with, an opposition it perceives as *génocidaire* and terrorist and refused to accept any international intervention in what it considers as an internal matter. Rwanda pursued its agenda by seeking to minimise internal political opposition before the 2003 elections and by supporting RCD. This political strategy permits the exiled opposition to find more support inside the country and has only heightened tensions (International Crisis Group 2002b; International Crisis Group 2003).

FDLR continued to receive support even after the inauguration of the transitional government in DRC in July 2003. The latest confirmed shipment of supplies recorded, at the time of writing, is from late August 2003. Even if the capacity of the FDLR is too weak to be a real threat to the well-trained and well-equipped Rwandan military forces, it is still an enemy force of 15,000 to 30,000 soldiers with the explicit ideology of overthrowing the government and eventually finalising the genocide, is a sufficient threat to any state to maintain a legitimate high security level.

However, it is debatable whether the RPF government is overstating the capacity of the rebels in order to legitimise its presence in DRC and to maintain a limited political space in Rwanda. The hypocrisy of the international community first to provide support for an authoritarian government planning and implementing genocide, then to provide neither support, nor to prevent, or stop genocide. Worst of all, the international community has supported the perpetrators and exile government indirectly in the refugee camps, and has not imposed enough pressure on the Kinshasa government to disarm AliR/FDLR, thereby

creating an ambiguous attitude against the international community in the ruling elite in Rwanda.

In Rwanda, there is widespread feeling that its security concerns are treated differently from, for instance, Uganda's.

7.7 Internal effects of genocide: Destroyed society and state machinery, mass murder, traumatised survivors and perpetrators

It is impossible to understand the situation in Rwanda, today and for a long time in the future, without taking into account the heritage from the genocide.

1) The genocide, with 500, 000 to 1,2 million killed in 100 days[28], carried out by one of history's largest social movements with several hundred thousands involved directly or indirectly generating two million external refugees and one million IDPs, is in all its horrifying aspects *an inevitable condition* that, for a very long time to come, will characterise the political development in Rwanda and the region. Apart from the extreme human suffering, the number of victims, perpetrators and refugees moving in or out of the country make almost every family directly affected in one way or another. In addition to the killed and refugees, there were 500,000 women who become widowed, and up to 40 percent of the households are today female headed. In July 2003, it is estimated that more then 400,000 children are orphans (10% of all children), with one or both parents dead or disappeared; and around 250, 000 households are child headed. 140,000 were detained for genocide-related crimes at the peak in 1998, without proper trial, lodged in facilities built for 17,000 prisoners.

2) The extreme cruelty, in combination with the mass participation in the killings, has created a society where a large part of the population is deeply traumatised, and suffering from mental illness, both surviving victims, bystanders and perpetrators and in particular the children. A large part of the population has actually several deeply traumatic experiences in their lives because of the turbulent political history of the country and region.[29] Since there are only two specialists in the country, the capacity of dealing with the trauma in Rwanda today is extremely limited.

The most traumatised, called "the living dead", might not be as great a future challenge as those who have repressed the painful experiences and continue to live with untreated and repressed traumas. Besides a low life quality for the individual, these potentially aggressive unstable "living bombs", constitute a long-term risk factor for the society.

3) The widespread use of sexual violence created deeply traumatised women and children, but also a cynically "slow time bomb" in the form of one of Africa's highest prevalence of AIDS. In a recent study, 66% of

[28] Prunier make a careful calculation and estimate the number of victims to be in the range 500, 000 – 800,000, in recent papers produced by governmental officials based on the government's estimations, the figure ranges between 800,000 – 1.2m.

[29] In addition we have the victims of the RPFs invasion to stop the genocide in 1994, the 400 – 4,000 at Kibero in 1995, the 2,000 – 10,000 in the conflict in the northwest in 1997, and of course the tensof thousands in DRC in 1994–2002. The government claims that most of these victims were killed in combat and cannot be compared with the victims of the genocide.

the genocide widows were infected by aids. (Prevalence of AIDS was high even before the genocide.)

4) The genocide has torn apart the social fabric of the society and crushed social trust, both in the state and its institutions and between citizens. The state was the creator of insecurity, not the guarantee of security.

5) The genocide and its aftermath have created a deeply divided society of perpetrators, victims, survivors, and returnees from different waves of exodus, providing a hotbed for future conflicts.

6) The genocide has also resulted in an enormous loss of human capital, as it targeted all *Tutsi*, but particularly the remaining *Tutsi* elite as well as moderate *Hutus,* which largely tended to be among the educated. Almost the whole state elite fled when RPF gradually took control over the country.

7) Material and institutional destruction. The country was very poor already before the genocide, with more then 60 percent of the population of 8.1 million living in poverty and 90 percent of the labour force engaged in subsistence agriculture.

Thus, the 1994 genocide destroyed the country's social fabric, human resource base, institutional capacity, and economic and social infrastructure virtually extinguishing the rudimentary islands of modernity that existed. It severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and eroded the country's ability to attract private and external investment

The challenges to rebuild the country were and still are enormous, and the capacity is limited. The right to return for different generations of refugees not the least creates challenges how to manage the distribution of the scarce land.

The challenges of the transitional period – mechanism for security, reconstruction, nation-building and reconciliation

The composition of the transitional government followed the peace accord from 1993. That is that there where no "Dayton accord" after the genocide. All parties except those directly connected to the genocide was represented in the transitional government, including MDR. In practice RPF was and is the dominating politically force, not the least based on its control of the military.

The new government stood in front of a Herculean task of rebuilding the whole state, the institutions, the destroyed physical assets, and in front of all to transform the structures that had generated the genocide and heal the invisible glue that makes a society: to build a nation, to rebuild the society as such and to re-establish trust in-between people, as well as peoples trust in the state institutions. And maybe most important, to develop a new identity based on Rwandanhood and citizenship , i.e., to establish a new social contract between the state and the citizens.

The transition period can be divided in two major phases: 1) the search for internal and external security 1994–1998/99. 2) Rebuilding the nation 1998/99 –2003.

The new government had to balance between reconciliation of the whole society and justice for the victims. Integration of former combatants in the army had to been made. It had to rapidly address the root causes that generated the genocide —poverty. All in the context of insecurity in the region and with huge inflows of people in the country.

RPF tactics and policies were coined by a militaristic, movement based, social engineering and top down approach. Economic social rights were put before political rights. It was based on RPF analysis that the priority order was, subsequently: restoration of peace and security, reconciliation, poverty reduction, decentralisation and democratisation.

One of the first tasks was to redefine the traditional role that the Rwandan State has played. This meant moving from a top-down, autocratic approach associated with the past to developing local self-government structures, which could facilitate collective action. All political considerations were based on an extreme fear for new ethnic division and consequently a careful balance between opening political spaces but at the same time avoid a new cycle of ethnic based mobilisation.

The political and economic reforms, under a new leadership, aimed at creating a "New Rwanda". These political reforms are rooted in RPFs ideology of a "participatory approach", which according to RPF means that the population and the leadership work together to transform the country. Two main goals are required before beginning this process: educating the population and making the elite more responsible. Once this has been achieved and the effects of bad governance by previous regimes have disappeared, the Rwandan people will be emancipated from their current obscurantism and able to fully exercise their civil and political liberties. This emancipation should be based on three principles:

Educating the population The decades of authoritarianism, from the long monarchical tradition through to the one-party regime led by President Habyarimana, resulted in the concentration of political and economic power, and the reinforcement of top-down administrative control over the population. This control was so tight that the government was able to manipulate the population into committing genocide. For the RPF, it is important to help the population resist such political manipulation by tackling key issues such as hunger, illiteracy and obscurantism and by gradually instilling democratic principles. "Democracy must follow a "process", and help to find solutions to Rwandans problems." "To give the floor The RPF does not foresee banning political parties, but rather obliging them to subscribe to its overall plan for a new Rwandan society. A strict code of conduct was designed to govern all political activity. On a local and national level, the people will monitor the behaviour of their leaders through the power of their vote.

Reforming the institutions The first stage in implementing this objective was to introduce decentralisation. It involved setting up local government structures elected by the people, and close to them. The drafting of a new constitution should ensure a balance between central and local government. It should also provide an institutional framework to consolidate the RPF's political platform. The new constitution does not envisage the immediate arrival of democracy, but proposes a framework in which this would be achievable. Only at the end of this process of re-education will the respect for political liberties be guaranteed. For the time being, a strong, "enlightened" leadership is required to maintain the country's unity. (ICG 2002)

The political and social fragility in Rwanda forced RPF to as quickly as possible trying to reform the society. The reforms could be said to be based on a number of balances:

– Maintaining RPF hegemony versus achieving reconciliation
– Reconciliation/reconstruction versus political space:
– Economic rights versus political and civil rights:

RPF took initially a heavy-handed approach, with reference to precarious security situation. The consultations had the character of guided participatory approach – what RPF termed as *consensual democracy*. Towards 1998, after internal security had been achieved, it appeared clearly to RPF and the GNU that the militaristic solutions and instrument no longer was conducive. Series of grass roots consultation had started already from 1996/97, but it was with the first larger national meeting within RPF in February 1998 since 1994, that a new agenda was set up and a major shift occurred in RPF attitude and strategy. It was decided that it was necessary to start up a nation wide dialogue on the next steps. A large number of national level consultations followed during 1998/99, commonly referred to as *Urugwiro* meeting after the "village" where President Bizimungu usually conducted the meetings. The aim with the meetings was to discuss political strategies and reforms among various elites and build an elite consensus for the way ahead. An agenda was brought forward focusing on public sector reforms; legal sector reforms, support to parliament, decentralisation and rewriting of the constitution — and measures to foster reconciliation, a change in attitudes and justice. Reforms like the unity and reconciliation commission and the gacaca courts was as well discussed as the *Urugwiro* meetings. The discussions were later formulated in a policy program, Vision 2020, which was approved by the transitional parliament. One of the most burning issues at the meetings was how to handle more then 40 years of hate propaganda and the ideology of Hutu power. It should be remembered in this context how desperately shallow the different Rwandan elites were after the genocide, and how great the needs were at the same time for skilled people. It meant that many close relatives, husbands, wife's etc. to perpetrators of genocide participated in the meetings, as well as have governmental positions.

The historic role of MDR and its relation to genocidal ideologies were as well discussed. MDR at that time admitted that it had an ambiguous relation to the genocide ideology.

Reforms and policy making: Rebuilding the nation 1998/99–2003

A number of processes have been initiated during the years resulting in a number of key reforms. It can be noted that all reforms have started with extensive processes of dialogue and participation from different stakeholders, on national as well as on local level. The view on character of these processes differs. The government claim that it is a part of a genuine efforts trying to establish participatory forms of governance. Critics of the government and RPF claim that the processes are firmly guided from the government and aiming to mobilise the society behind different pre formulated agendas rather then being participatory. Some of the more important are;

Decentralisation process. Since 2000, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has embarked on an ambitious decentralization exercise.

Four policy documents have guided this experience to date and set the strategic objectives of the efforts in five areas: 1) Enabling local participation in decision making and project implementation; 2) Strengthening accountability and transparency by making local leaders directly accountable to communities; 3) Enhancing the responsiveness of public administration to local environments; 4) Developing sustainable economic planning and management capacity; and 5) Enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in all aspects of public service delivery.

A number of changes have been implemented. A new local government structure has been established and elections have been held at local and the new district level in 1999 and 2001 respectively. So far the effects on the local level are marginal mainly due to lack of human and financial resources. However, the decentralisation process is an important step in the democratisation process. The senior level of the administration is committed to the reforms, but there are is also resistance at the central administration at middle and lower level of the administration against devolving power and resources to the periphery.

A comprehensive PRSP has been developed in a participatory process both within the government, and with civil society and the donor community. It encompasses a comprehensive poverty diagnosis; country ownership with the Government in the lead; a frank discussion of issues and challenges faced: a comprehensive strategy on socio-economic transformation of the country with a long-term perspective; and a detailed plan for monitoring and evaluation. It is innovative in linking its analysis and strategies to traditional decision and problem resolution systems. The strategy in the PRS program ranked after importance: Rural development and agricultural transformation; human development; economic infrastructure; governance; private sector development; institutional capacity building. In order to target the rural poor, a rural development strategy is under development, in close cooperation with the EU. IMF approved the PRS in 2002. A follow up report was presented in May 2003. After one year of implementation the effects of the implementation of the PRS so far are naturally limited. However, the structures for implementation and follow up are now in place and progress has been made in particular in education sector.

Drafting of a new constitution. After consultations with the populations, a new constitution was approved in a referendum in May 2003. The opposition and some human rights organisations critic against the report focus on a number of claw back clauses and provisions for limiting the freedoms of assembly, speech and the press. And that the key institutions in the judiciary and the administrative will be oversighted by RPF. The forum of the political parties has been criticised to be an instrument for control of the parties.

The government argue that those limitations must be there in order to guide the society in the post-conflict transformation. In particular the paragraphs on *divisionism* has turned out to be problematic, since no clear definition is provided. The lack of a clear definition of what divisionism entails enable the government to interpret unwanted opposition or critisism as divisionism. The government used the accusation of *divisionism* several times in order to undermine opposition for example during the election campaign. In it however very difficult to verify either

the opposition accusations of misuse of divisionism or the governments claims are the right ones. (see MDR below).

It can be noted that at the country wide consultations, the popular opinion was opposed to the idea of a multi-party system, based on the traumas of the 1960s and early 1990s.

The establishment of a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). NURC has done an impressive job in many fields in order to facilitate reconciliation. "Solidarity" camps are held with returning refugees, demobilised soldiers, prisoners, students, and local cadres. However, NURC is often critisised for not being independent and being tool for the government to implement its policies.

The human rights commission appear to be less independent from the government, but follow up on reported human rights abuses. The mandate of the Commission is "To investigate and follow-up on human rights violations committed by anyone on the Rwandan territory, especially State organs and individuals under the cover of State organs as well as any national organizations working in Rwanda." Article 4 provides some elaboration, indicating in particular that the functions of the Commission are: "To sensitize and train the Rwandan population in matters of Human Rights" and to inform "relevant authorities to eventually initiate judicial proceedings in case of Human Rights violations by anyone." It is unclear if the Commission is only to inform authorities who will then begin judicial proceedings or if the Commission itself may initiate such proceedings. Article 5 charges the Commission to report on "all detected cases of violations of Human Rights to the Office of the President of the Republic, the Government, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court," and Article 6 further specifies that the Commission must submit a yearly report on its activities to the President, with copies to the government, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. It is not mandated that Commission reports be made public. According to Article 2, the Commission is independent but it is not necessarily permanent. The article specifies only that it is established for "an unspecified period."

Law reforms commission are working on revisions of the system of justice and the laws. Some of the guiding principles for the work are to establish a clear separation of powers between the different branches of the government; a stronger institution for checks and balances, efficient system of justice.

Justice system. The capacity of the justice system is extremely low already before the genocide. Lack of all kind of resources including trained judges in combination with an inefficient structure has created an enormous backlog. Still around 80000 people are imprisoned without proper trial since the genocide. The situation in the prisons is very bad. The low salaries of the judges invite corruption. With the law reform hopefully this situation gradually will change.

Gacaca. A system of participatory justice known as Gacaca has also been established. The aim with the system is to allow Rwandans to establish the truth about the 1994 genocide and contributes to the trial and judgment of those suspected of genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Proponents of the *gacaca* process argue that the new justice forums could remedy these problems as well as confer additional benefits on victims and offenders alike. First, it is believed that the *gacaca* tribunals could significantly accelerate the prosecutions.[30] By gathering all the suspects, witnesses and survivors in one place and inviting them to speak freely, there should be opportunities for both the guilty and the innocent to be to be identified much more rapidly than in the individual cases tried under the genocide law. Secondly, judging the perpetrators in the same cellule, sector, commune and prefecture as where the crimes were committed enhances the visibility of justice, brings it down to the local people and engages them as active participants in the judicial process. The advantage of increased participation is that more of the community will perceive justice being done. This is significant because justice, and more specifically, the perception of justice being rendered is a prerequisite to civil order and the resumption of normal social relations. Moreover, *gacaca* will provide a platform for perpetrators to apologise and seek forgiveness directly from survivors. Finally, it is hoped that the *gacaca* initiative will facilitate the truth eliciting process, a necessary step towards reconciliation. If successful, a full picture about the events of the genocide in the local area should emerge and be publicly recognized, especially as trials will take place at the cell level.

Nevertheless, there remain many concerns regarding the ability of the *gacaca* courts to fulfil these expectations. Among these are the material questions of the various jurisdictions, their functioning and efficacy, the quality of testimonies and the administration of sentences as well as the mechanics of victim indemnisation.[31] Other issues that have arisen are whether the population is prepared to participate, what degree of truth will be told, and how different segments of Rwandan society perceive *gacaca*.

The police. A national police force have been established and are under reform and training.

Security sector reform and demobilisation. The former Rwandan Patriotic Army has been transformed and integrated with the former Forces Armed Rwandese, including returning armed groups from DRC to a new National Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). In the process so far 47,828 soldiers have been demobilised. [32] The integration of the demobilised soldiers is a great challenge.

Under the demobilisation program a further 6400 soldiers will be demobilised 2003–2004, and a projected 15,000 ex-FAR personnel will receive a recognition of service allowance, and 21,468 ex-combatants returning from DRC will be re-integrated into local communities. It will generate tensions and challenges. The NURC appear to have been doing a successful job with the creation of "solidarity camps" as well working with reconciliation and monitoring the integration of ex-soldiers in different parts of Rwanda.

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[30] *Ibid*. at 45.

[31] *Supra* note 17 at 12.

[32] RDF (ex- RPA): 1997– 2001 = 18,692, 2001– 2003 = 13,011= 31,703
Ex- FAR (Not integrated into RDF and not involved in rebellion, (2002/3)= 12,258
Ex- Armed groups from D.R.C (2001/3)=3867
Total = 47,828

7.9 Brief analysis of the main actors

Rwanda Patriotic Front

The major political force is Rwandan Patriotic Front. Thru the history and the control of the state and security apparatuses it has a large advantage over all other political forces. In similarity with other political parties in the country it does not have branches at the local level. But thru its control of the administration the majority of local leaders belong to RPF. In response to criticism, the RPF justifies this concentration of power by the state of emergency that prevailed after the genocide.

One of the major institutions in RPF is it executive committee that meets weekly. It is a forum for lively debates, have the reputation for being an intellectually vital organ with a lot of room for free thinking, but all decisions are made based on a consensus. It is unclear how this consensus is reached. It also unclear how important the executive committee is in practice for decision-making. It appears to many observers that president Kagame together with a small group of associates is the core of the movement, This position have, however, been strongly critizised by others for underestimating the heterogeneity and intra elite fighting within RPF it self. RPF is so broad that it is not easy for a small faction to control it.

What is RPF's character?

The character of RPF is debated. It consider it self, officially, as a multiethnic movement, aiming at creating a new democratic Rwanda, free from ethnic based politics. Not as a *Tutsi* party. Prominent *Hutus* has always been members on all levels of the party, RPF argues. In addition a deep restructuring have taken place since the February 1998 meeting starting the Urugwiro process.

Critics, not the least in the opposition, and among the human rights organisations as well as researcher has argued that RPF mainly is governed by a small group of *Tutsi*s with a common background in Uganda, or even originating from the same prefecture in Rwanda. Even if the first president, Bizimungu, was a *Hutu*, it was the vice president and minister of defence Kagame that had the real power. The Belgian researcher Philip Reyntjens[33], argues that a small militaristic-mercantile *Tutsi* elite controls Rwanda.

However, the RPF and the government seem to attract criticism. If *Hutus* not are included in the government or in the RPF, RPF is accused for marginalising them, if *Hutus* are included, RPF is accused for opportunism and those included for being co-opted. What is clear is that currently the majority in all bodies are *Hutus.* If that category at all is useful in todays Rwanda.

RPF is not a coherent party. Hardliners in the security sector are members as well as both radical and moderate individuals and groups.

The opposition could be subdivided in the internal and the external, diaspora opposition.

[33] Prof. Reyntjes have a long history in Rwanda, with close ties to both first and second republic governments. He participated in the formulation of the first constitution during the Kayribanda dictatorship as well as the second constitution under Habyarimana, which was both a de facto and de jure one party constitution. He was an advisor of Habyarimana. He is regarded as close to the European Christian Democratic Movements.

The diaspora opposition

The external opposition could be grouped into the armed and the unarmed opposition.

The most influential *armed external opposition* is the former *génocidaire* government and its military wing including the militias operation from DRC, *Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR*. It is a complex and confusing entity of more or less well organised groups containing both hardliners propagating for a "final solution" i.e., finishing the genocide and reinstate a "*Hutu power*" government, as well as more moderate. As written above the support first from Mobutu later from the different Kabila governments has been a lifeline for the *ExFAR/Interhamwe/ALiR*. Its military capacity is substantial, as described above, and have at several times launched attacks on Rwanda and occupied parts of the countries territory. Rwanda therefore still remains a country at war, and behaves so.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) appeared as the first political movement to call itself the spokesperson for the Rwandan Hutu military forces active in the Congo in 2000. The FDLR is a political structure created by the (ALiR) in an attempt to eliminate the movement's negative image. Its political representatives did not participate in the genocide, but do not necessarily distinguish themselves from its ideology. Officially, the FDLR denies its ties with the AliR and claims to have separate military units. Moreover, the FDLR considers the ALiR to be non-existent.

However, most observers agree that the military leadership of the FDLR is still dominated by ex-FAR officers, some of whom have changed their names. Even though the majority of the troops are not ex-FAR or militiamen, the movement has not gained credibility. It has not proved that the underlying ideology behind their action is not violently anti-Tutsi. Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka is President of the FDLR. The presence of important figures that were not officially involved in the genocide lends an air of credibility which is neutralised by the fact that some of the members, such as the President and the spokesperson, belong to parties born out of the intellectual circles that instigated the radical Hutu ideology. Moreover, the political leadership of the FDLR is paralysed by its military leadership (derived from the FAR general staff, including persons wanted by the ICTR), which does not dare to show itself, but rather, tries to lead the movement from behind the scenes.

A small-armed opposition also exists in Uganda, headed by Major Furuma, with unclear social base and support.

Unarmed diaspora opposition: In 1996, Faustin Twagiramungu, former Prime Minister, and Seth Sendashonga, former Minister of the Interior, fled Rwanda and founded the "Resistance Forces for Democracy" (FDR), based in Nairobi. These two Hutu personalities, one from the moderate wing of the MDR and the other from the RPF, had no responsibility in the genocide and enjoyed a certain political credibility in Rwanda. However, once they were operating from outside the country, they were cut off from their support base in Rwanda and were faced with a Hutu refugee community that was becoming more and more radical, whether or not it had participated in the genocide. The exile from Rwanda due to the RPF victory in 1994, the attack on the Hutu refugee camps, the

deaths of tens, even hundreds of thousands of Hutus in the various massacres during the first war in the Congo, and the difficulties of refugee life all accentuated the extremist position. Given this general trend, the FDR could not find a moderate political base. Consequently, the movement was obliged to align itself with the Democratic Rally for the Return of Refugees (RDR), which emanates directly from "Hutu power". Which discredited Twagiramungu inside Rwanda, and undermined his credibility as a presidential candidate in 2003.

The increasing frustration from the survivors of the genocide in exile and inside Rwanda gave birth to two francophone Tutsi-run movements: The Alliance for National Regeneration (ARENA), in the US and NATION, in Belgium, both was established in 2001. ARENA brings together many personalities from the political class that emerged in Rwanda after the genocide and the RPF victory and proposes as its platform to fight against the RPF's drift towards authoritarianism. Among the ranks of ARENA are Joseph Sebarenzi (Tutsi genocide survivor and former president of the Parliament until 2000) and Pierre Célestin Rwigyema (former Primer Minister, MDR).

A clan of Tutsi monarchist exist but they are extremely divided.

In 2002/2003 new alliances were formed between the different diaspora parties/interest groups. Parts of the *Tutsi* party Arena and Nation appeared to have formed an alliance with the Hutu based FDLR, ADRN IGIHANGO. Interesting enough, the political programs have come to be close to the RPF programs and the new constitution. The major difference being emphasis on greater openness about the ethnic problems and seeking institutional solutions and critique of authoritarian leadership style of RPF.

The relative strength, political programs and social base of these opposition parties are difficult to get reliable information about. They appear to have weak and fragmented structures, riddled by internal power struggles. Deriving strength from being a pawn in the regional conflict, rather then by own force and capacity. Alliances and groups are formed and dissolved in cobwebs difficult to follow for an outsider. It is important to analyse the character, social base and driving force behind the different opposition groups.

Different social groups in Rwanda

It can in this context be important to distinguish between *Tutsi* survivors that lived in Rwanda during the genocide, *Tutsis* that where in the diaspora either in Uganda, DRC, Burundi, Tanzania or in western world, *Hutus* that did not participate in the genocide and *Hutus* that commanded genocide activities and *Hutus* that perpetrated genocidal activities, but on order. In addition the *Hutus* in the diaspora.

The internal opposition – MDR not the least

The eight opposition parties that were participating in the transitional government and parliament have not been allowed to operate on branch level, in similarity with RPF. The opposition parties have thus been unable to develop a wider social base. They have mostly been confined to operations at the national level and all besides two have worked as support parties to the government. As described above the parties repre-

sents different regional elites and groups. The only opposition party that had a wider social base was MDR and to a certain extent the liberal party. MDR was dissolved after a parliamentary inquiry established that the party was *divisionist* in may 2003. Human rights organisations claim that it is a clear violation of the freedom of speech and assembly. But several observers also have pointed at the fact that the political language in Rwanda is very symbolic and indirect and that some of the statements from MDR thus could be regarded as *divisionist.* Providing that one agree on how to define *divisionism* and that the law on *divisionism* is justified. Other long term observers of Rwandan politics has displayed the historic roots of MDR and its policies to the *Hutupower* of the 1950s, the hate propaganda of the first and second republic leading up to genocide. The party have had time since 1994 to clear its books and make up with its past. The party was urged to do during the Urugwiro meetings 1998/99 and the following years. Internal power struggle between the moderate faction and the *Hutupower* fraction paralysed the party. It is difficult for an outsider to fully account for either of the positions, but apparently MDR have not made up with its past. On the other hand the timing of the parliamentarian decision to dissolve the party just a few months before the upcoming election are interpreted by other observers as sign of an authoritarian government to dissolve one of the few threats for maintained hegemony.

The Liberal party (PL), which until 2000 was considered an RPF ally, showed signs of a desire for independence by attempting to take over the cause of genocide survivors. Since it was considered to be the voice of genocide survivors, PL offered a Tutsi alternative to the current regime and challenged the legitimacy of the RPF's line on the genocide.

The rise of influential politicians in the official parties was thus systematically halted, leaving the latter deprived of credible leaders. The forum of parties, established in 1994, controls activities of parties and presides over the appointment, without any rule of transparency. The ban on local branches prevents opposition parties from spreading across the country.

With no grass-roots structures, they are little more than an elite group of leaders whose political combat is limited to obtaining positions of responsibility.

Other actors

The churches are important actors in terms of being the most well organised structure outside the state apparatuses. The churches are the by far best organised institution on local level, including local governmental institutions, and as such have the widest out reach. The churches have generally retreated from involvement in public affairs in the wake of what is perceived to have been the instrumentalization of their hierarchies by the genocidal project. The churches provide an important range of social services, as a means for spreading their messages. There are signs that the churches again start to involve them selves in public life. One problem for the church, particularly the catholic church was that it as a strategy came to put it self very close the majority, the *Hutu*, and to a certain extent still is regarded as a supporter of the *Hutu* against the dominating minority. The Churches has not yet come out

clearly with their role in the running up to the genocide and the genocide itself.

The Transitional Parliament/Parliament. The formal democratic structures have not been that democratic. The Transitional Assembly has been very weak compared with the executive. And there has been week links between the MPs and their constituencies. This is a consequence of the peace accord that stipulated that parliament should be composed according to the pre genocide situation – apart from the banned genocidare party. There is a need for a strengthening of the newly elected parliament so it could play its role efficiently as counterbalance to the more well organised executive.

The civil society is, as everything else, coined by the genocide, the security situation that have limited the political space and the poverty of the country. In the name of balancing internal and external security threats, the government have controlled the civil society, quite heavily handed at times. Several NGO representatives described a situation of harassment from the authorities, including arbitrary arrestment and self-censorship to avoid this. The situation has however, improved from 2001. Despite this there exist a large number of NGOs and CBOs in the country. The strongest and most well organised could be found within the gender networks, the human rights sector and to a certain extent on the environmental side. Most NGOs, however, are based in Kigali. But most suffers from lack of resources and few have a wider social base. Civil society in Rwanda currently lacks the ability to influence government policy, to hold accountable government structures, to promote citizenship rights or to effectively represent the interests of poor people in political decision-making. Conditions for an effective civil society, based on democratic values, independent from the state, and enjoying political and social rights and freedoms did not exist in Rwanda prior to 1994. Despite fundamental changes since then, these factors continue to shape and limit dialogue between civil society and government in Rwanda.

Few organisations meet the criteria often used to describe fully developed civil society: a degree of autonomy, of institutionalisation, of embeddedness and a capacity for public engagement. With few exceptions, national CSOs are described, including by themselves, as organisationally, financially, conceptually, and managerially weak. The absence of political society in Rwanda has led to problems of how to aggregate and channel interests among civil society organisations including questions being raised about the legitimacy and representativeness of civil society organisations seeking to be included in policy making.

The media is weak. Absence of reading culture and purchasing power limits the distribution of the printed media. Radio and TV with wider distribution exists. Critic of the government and its policies are allowed, but must not incite *divisionism*. And in similarity with the regulation of the room for manoeuvre of the political parties the interpretation of the concept is ambiguous. Self-censorship is necessary in order to get information from governmental offices. Journalist have been arrested. According to human rights organisations because of critical reporting. According to the government the last cases of arrestment had to do with slander and bad journalism.

Donors are among the most important political actors in Rwanda. Emerging from the absence of a strong opposition and press, the donor community provide both an important dialogue partner to the government on development and human rights issues, as well as watch dog. A delicate and at times problematic situation that at times evokes frictions between the government and the donor community. Donors' agenda, priorities and interests at time clash with the government – or other political actors in Rwanda. Knowledge and information on the complex political situation is not always available for decisions makers in donor countries. Preconceived ideas or geopolitical considerations – or pressure from strong lobby groups in the donors home countries, might affect donors decisions.

7.10 Today's situation

Rwanda has with the elections formally ended the 9-year transition period. Peace and stability has been established inside the country. For the first time in Rwanda's independent history a popularly elected government rules the country. A number of institutions has been rehabilitated and/or new been developed. And a comparably efficient administration has been established and it has launched and implemented a number of reforms.

However, one line of critique argues that it is a ruling clique that controls the executive and key functions in the government. In similarity with the King and the previous presidents, it is a small group with close ties to Kagame that runs the country. All *Hutu* ministers were controlled by a *Tutsi* general secretary, it is claimed. Reyntjens argues that a mercantile bureaucratic class has taken over the state and use the institutions to enrich themselves and maintain patron client relations (Reyntjens 2001). There exist strong political under currents, of course, in Rwandan politics. The prevailing culture of secretiveness makes it difficult to really know what people think and what is going on. Strong political opponents are reported to have left the country voluntary or by force. Five people are reported be missing. Journalists are reported to have been harassed, but according to the government this is only the case when the factual base of articles not have been correct.

The weak parliament, civil society, opposition and media do no manage to pursue effective check and balances of the executive. On the other hand through on going reforms, check and balances are created within the system. Not the least the decentralisation reform, the NURC, and Human Rights Commission, the new constitution with ombudsman – and a new legislative. Several of the institutions needed for the establishment of a representative democratically governed country thus has been or are about to be established. On the other hand, several of these institutions, like NURC, the Human Rights Commission and the new office of the ombudsman, could barely be perceived as independent or autonomous institutions. Particularly the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman is regarded to be close to the government.

The investments in education are also starting to yield result and a young new generation of educated people, are entering the labour market.

Economy-level of structural violence still high

Rwanda has made significant progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy. The macro economic indicators are decent. Rwanda received approval for debt relief from the IMF in late 2000 and continued to make progress on inflation, privatization, and GDP growth. The PRS was approved in July 2002. But, even if the economy grew with 9% last year, the growth was mainly limited to urban areas, the construction sector (new hotels and offices) and tourism. Sectors that has little bearing on the situation for the majority. This in fact is another time bomb. Nine years after genocide the per capita annual income has increased, but still not beyond the pre-genocide $230. The share of the population living in poverty is still much larger then before the genocide. Even if the number of people in poverty has decreased from 82,3% after the genocide to 68% 2000. Small-scale commercial activities have increased, but the industrial base remains limited. The country is heavily dependent on aid. Even if Rwanda has among the lowest inflation in the region and an impressive growth rate, the needs are enormous. Inequality is very high and on the increase. The country is very small, landlocked and lack significant (known) natural resources. Human capital is still lagging behind, even if social service delivery has improved considerably. But still the level of education is extremely low. The quality of both education and health is low. 30% do not have any education at all, 60% primary education, 7,1% post primary education and only 0,4% have some tertiary education. Even if the facilities have been expanded, the quality of both education and health is low. (PRSP 2002). Fear and mistrust impact on networks of social exchange and reciprocity, limiting cooping strategies for the poor.

To conclude: it means that despite ongoing reforms and 10 years of transition, still several of the most important root causes to the genocide is present: low productivity in agriculture; poverty; exclusion-marginalisation; inequality; and landlessness.

Table 2 Movements in Poverty since 1985

Year	Percentage of households below the poverty line		
	Rural	Urban	Total
1985	48.4	16.1	45.7
1990	50.3	16.8	47.5
1994	82.4	27.5	77.8
1995	76.6	25.5	72.4
1996	75.3	25.1	71.1
1997	74.1	24.7	70.0
1998	70.7	23.6	66.8
1999	69.3	23.1	65.4
2000 est	67.9	22.6	64.1

Source:Rwanda PRSP 2002

Mechanisms for Unity, Reconciliation, Justice and Peace

The immense suffering from the extreme cruelties has created immense challenges both on the personal level and societal level how to be able to continue to live, reconcile and mending the social fabric. With 106 000 prisoners in jail (80 000 after release in 2003) the Gacaca courts is hoped to ease the situation, both for the prisoners and their families. So far it appears to be mixed feelings about the process.

Still a deep distrust is a central feature of Rwandan society. Distrust between people, along ethnic and regional lines as well as between individuals and the state. (Uvin/Unsworth 2002)

Work with reconciliation is done by several institutions at different levels, including primary schools and the University. The Unity and Reconciliation Commission are coordinating several of the activities.

The biggest risks with the work are that it will expose responsibility as well as might risk undermining the accountability of the peace and reconciliation process. Trauma will be reactivated. In the context of deep distrust and suspicions, not the least at the local level, the balance between the justice of the victims and reconciliation is a fine thread to balance. Peace and reconciliation also brings about hope for a better

future. If this peace dividend continues to be elusive, it will generate widening frustration gaps.

Survivors

One of the dilemmas for the government has been to balance between reconciliation and achieving compensation for the survivors, that mainly of course are *Tutsi* related. Particularly the widows and the children have had to stand back in order for the government not to appear to be to supporting *Tutsis*.

The stigma attached to being raped by the Interahamwe had caused many victims to remain silent about their ordeal. The health situation of the victims are bad, not the least psychological scars and trauma. The widows and their children are largely overlooked in a country trying to rebuild nine years after the genocide. Only a handful of these women, mostly in the capital Kigali, receive medical care and counselling.

If these victims situation will not improve, not the least for the now growing up children of the widows, it will build in a future tension in the society. The frustration, not the least among young men unable to find a living, might again be mobilised by political elites for shortsighted gains.

Transition to Democracy? The 2003 election

The situation of human rights in Rwanda can be analyzed in light of two aspects: 1) efforts aimed at rebuilding institutions required for a democratic system and reconciliation; 2) the extent to which Rwanda complies to the international rules and norms. In other words, the need to establish principles to constrain the power of government and the creation of an obligation on the part of government to adhere on prescribed and publicly known rules. In this regard, as mentioned above, while the country also encountered significant setbacks in areas of democratic governance, including some requiring an immediate response in terms of the respect of human rights, Rwanda made progress in some areas of its transition from a long-entrenched authoritarian, to a more pluralistic, representative democracy.

The elections autumn 2003 should in that context be regarded as a starting point of a democratisation process in a highly divided and fragile country with extremely weak national identity, rather than an end point of a transition to democracy. Thus, focus should be on the broader political developments and long-term development prospect rather then only be judged on the electoral procedure as such.

Nevertheless, the election process as such was both relatively unfair and unfree. RPF most likely started to engineer the elections from the elections to the local and districts level in 1999 and 2001 respectively, undermining the room to manoeuvre for the opposition at local and national level. The ruling party and the opposition had extremely unequal resource base for campaigning, undermining serious challenge to RPF. In addition there were reports about intimidation of competing candidates and parties, lack of transparency at counting of the votes etc.

The elections were however, conducted with almost no violence, which must be regarded as an achievement.

The extreme high voters turnout and the high score for Kagame in the presidential election indicate that there where irregularities. In case

of that it remains unclear if those where orchestrated from the centre or a result of local RPF administrator's ambitions to secure a high score in their constituencies. One should neither underestimate the tradition of a well-organised and centralised system of governance. It might be that voter's felt that they had to vote, or even were more or less forced to vote. It could also be that a large part of the population de facto saw Kagame as the only possible candidate. Nobody questions, however, Kagame's victory. It is percentage that is disputed, as well as the uneven playing field.

The parliamentary elections where according to some observers to some extent more democratic than the presidential elections. MP candidates had the opportunity to campaigning round the country. But still the playing field was extremely uneven, few opposition candidates had the means to organise campaigns. On the other hand few candidates used the opportunity to debate political programmes. It should, however, be noted that several of the oppositions top names had prominent positions in the government as well. It should be noted that the EU election observers where critical against the procedures at both elections.

With the election, the number of *Hutus* in the government and in the parliament has increased and apparently many *Hutus* voted for a *Tutsi* president. This could be regarded as a step forward towards reconciliation.

With the elections the transition period is over, formally. Peace and stability prevails internally. Policies and institutions in key areas have been rebuilt or established. The President, the Government and the Parliament are for the first time in the post colonial history, despite all it flaws, elected in a multiparty election, which appears to have gained legitimacy. The elections thus should be judged out from what the new leadership delivers in terms of a democratic culture and institutions the coming five-seven years. Security sector reform has created a new National Defence Force and integrated different forces as well as demobilised almost 50 000 soldiers. A new constitution have been acknowledge in a referendum. Local government reforms underway as well as a reform of the judiciary. A number of innovative institutions for conflict management, reconciliation and post-conflict rehabilitation have been established. The national commissions for Unity and Reconciliation and the Gacaca courts for instance.

7.11 Challenges – Risk for future conflicts

The situation is, however, still fragile. In order to avoid new cycles of direct violence, either emanating from the region or with regional implications, a number of challenges must be managed. (See also the scenario analysis, chapter 5).

- The overarching difficulty is to manage a multiplicity of tensions between diverging interests, not the least over scarce resources.
- Under the surface the structural violence that generated the genocide in 1994 prevail, or even have increased. If economic development fails to reach the majority the frustrated and marginalised people might be mobilised again. The extreme poverty must be broken; at least so there is a hope that the next generation will have a better situation.

- Land pressure and demographic development still provide a hotbed for frustration, in particular now when different generations of refugees and ExFar/Interahamwe combatants are coming back; at the same time as a large scale demobilisation is undertaken. Signs of changes are however coming on the local level, improvement in the health and education system, not the least. But there is a need for tangible change for the majority in order to continue to manage the desperate and traumatised population.
- The demobilisation and integration of both the Rwandan army and of the ExFAR Interahamwe is a huge challenge. In addition the release of 10 000s of prisoners as well as integration of people going trough the Gacaca processes will increase tensions in local communities.
- The unhealed wounds of Genocide: Lack of trust between people and between people and the state, the need to "mending" society and establish a new social contract between the state and the citizens.
- The eradication of the ideology underpinning the genocide. Effects of 40 years of intensive propaganda take time to change. In particular if the economic situation for the majority do not change.
- The victim's situation must be improved and the traumas at leas somehow healed; otherwise another future source of conflict will be generated.
- If the new government fail to develop inclusive political processes, from local to national level, people's resentment might increase. Of particular importance is to find a way for competing elites to get access to political space, without resorting to violence.
- The high level of illiteracy on the one hand makes people an easy prey for manipulation by political elites. It also undermines possibilities to develop the country. The low level of education creates a dramatic lack of capacity, in a situation with great administrative as well as economic challenges.
- The development in DRC has a large effect on the Rwanda, if the peace process fails or if the militias are not disarmed, demobilised and integrated, the situation will most likely have a dramatic effect on Rwanda in several ways.
- In a similar way will the development of the peace process in Burundi have influence on the situation in Rwanda, albeit most likely less important than a few years back when the state in Rwanda was less well established.
- The development in Uganda also has implications for the development in Rwanda. If the Ugandan government continues to be challenged from inside, and maybe in addition from the Sudan, its policies against DRC and Rwanda might change again to a more expansionistic strategy in order to strengthen its power base. However, for the time being the relations between Uganda and Rwanda is better then ever.

7.12 Conclusions and the role of the international society

The develop cooperation must take its departure in the context of Rwanda's violent history and deeply divided society. All interventions must be made with peace and conflict management as an overarching principle. The development in Rwanda must be seen as a long-term state, nation-building and reconciliation process. One of the most important prerequisites for this to take place is structural violence reduction. Evaluations must be based on assessment of the general direction of the development, rather then on shortsighted benchmarks. Impressive progress has been made. Not the least have peace prevailed in the country since 1998, albeit under hard pressure from outside. A number of important reforms have been developed in consultative processes and started to be implemented. The government tries to balance on a thin line to establish prerequisites for sustainable peace and unity, trough PRS process that will undermine the structural violence that enabled the political mobilisation based on identity. Important step have been taken towards reconciliation and maybe as well towards a more democratic political development. The situation is however fragile, hardliners on both sides are still very active. The population is deeply traumatised; the poverty is deep and more wide spread then before the genocide. The victims' situation is very difficult. The justice system in crisis and more then 80 000 people still in prison without adequate trials. The Human Rights situation has improved, but still leaves a lot more to desire. For example are the five missing person from 2002/2003 still not accounted for. Rwanda's development must as well be analysed in a regional context.

We think that the point of departure should be to keep as large part of the Rwandan society *connected* to a wider international community, to assist in building networks and most important of all, keep a constant dialogue with both the government as well as with other sections of the society on issues of human rights, democracy and reconciliation.

1) Few countries more desperately need international support in order to rebuild its society in order to avoid a new genocide or war based on continued frustration over increasing structural violence
2) Support should on the one hand be devoted to support the government's efforts to build the institutions that are needed for an efficient and well-governed state and the PRS. But also on the other hand at the same time contribute to create as much balance of power in terms of effective independent judiciary, ombudsman, strong parliament, strong local councils, strong civil society, democratic culture and strong and free media and if possible strong oppositions parties. Reconciliation without democratic spaces will be impossible in the long run.
3) Reconciliation also means healing the traumatised individuals, not the least the woman and children victims from the genocide. The NURC and related governmental institutions as well as NGOs appear to be working well in that field.
4) *Direct violence reduction.* This field appear to relatively well covered by the IBRDs different DDRRR programs. The demobilisation and reintegration of the rebels in DRC and Burundi will be big challenge

and must be done in a regional context.

5) *Structural violence reduction*. This is one of the most important issues for long-term stability of the region and Rwanda. It includes support aiming to a) increased productivity in agriculture; b) Reforms of the banking and credit system, including micro credits. c) Creating income opportunities outside the public administration and the agricultural sector in order to make it possible for elite to reproduce without competing over the political power. d) Infrastructure like the " Peace link" Dar es Salaam – Kigali-Kisangani, with railway connection Kigali-Dar and road Goma – Kisangani. It would lower import costs, give higher exports dividends and better ability to compete thru lower prices and more efficient transport. Electrification should not only look into large-scale grid systems but also into the use of solar power and micro hydrostations. Support to the PRSP is one step in the right direction. But the rural development strategy would in this context be even more important.

6) *"Cognitive reintegration*". To promote cognitive reintegration and national reconciliation is a major challenge. A number of possibilities could be envisaged; a) by further educating and training media in reporting that does not entrench ethnic violence and stigmatisation. b) Rewriting of the history (already underway by NURC and the University), distribution of the new history in schoolbooks and popularised media. c) Support to cultural events aimed a fostering cognitive reintegration, like sports events, cultural festivals. Popular culture, including soap operas, with wide distribution. d) Support to education on all levels, not the least at the University /tertiary level in order to rapidly build up domestic competence, both for development purpose and for the need of creating more broad minded citizens, less easy to manipulate.

7) Democracy and good governance: Capacity building in administration, support to décentralisation

8) Combine the effort to decrease the administrative cost on Rwandan and Swedish side with an ambition to link Swedish actors more closely to development cooperation in Rwanda in order to enhance capacity base in Sweden as well as public interest for the hitherto unknown Rwanda in Sweden. Now it is mainly the religious organisations in Sweden, some universities and Sida Sala.

9) Strengthen authority of Swedish representation, to enable efficient high level dialogue, not the least on human rights and democratic governance issues.

10) All development cooperation should aim to legitimate rather then under mine state structures, but at the same time strive:

- To develop and maintain a critical partnership with the new Government;
- To support all efforts from both Government, the opposition and the Civil society to promote a more inclusive and participatory reconciliation process at all levels of Rwanda society;
- To help the Government and civil society to benefit from the experiences of other post-transitional countries in efforts to promote democ-

racy, Human Rights, reconciliation and equal justice;

- To make sure that the Government is taking concrete and proper measures to clear the socio-political climate to allow an effective and equal participation of all Rwandan citizens, by first of all, creating a favourable environment for free expression, sine qua non conditions for
- The establishment of sustainable peace and genuine democracy.
- To get the Government to organise a contradictory and inclusive national debate modalities and atmosphere of open and critical exchange of views in all spheres.
- To integrate all political components, including political parties in exile that are firmly engaged in political struggle and recognising genocide without ambiguity.
- To push for and support a free, critical and high quality mass media. For a further discussion on regional interventions see chapter 6 above.

8. Conflict Analysis of Burundi

8.1 History as pretext

History is a source of conflict in Burundi. Every historical account of the conflict has political connotations as the interpretation of history often serves to legitimise violence as "retaliation" or "pro-active", while neighbours and family suddenly are draped in a lethal language of ethnicity. On a general level, two different historical narrations can be identified in the literature as well as in the interviews with concerned actors in today's conflict. One vision sets the start of the current conflict at the 1993 elections and the assassination of Burundi's first elected president Ndadaye. Most telling with this version is not its content, but its omissions. Among events left out are the decades of systematic marginalisation of the majority of the population (mainly Hutu, but also including many Tutsis), and the 1972 massacres of some 250,000 people (including much of the burgeoning Hutu elite). Not surprisingly then, these omissions are among the cornerstones of the second narration of the Burundi story. Again a general pattern can be detected in which Hutus embrace the second story while the incumbent Tutsi elite fosters the first.

With objectivity and impartiality out of sight, one way of starting an account of the Burundi conflict is with the death of King Ntare Rugamba around 1850. After the King's death the power dynamic in Burundi shifted from a centralised kingdom to take a more feudal-like appearance with strong princes, the Ganwas, ruling different parts of the country. With the sons of Rugamba seeking to manifest their power base, Burundi expanded into a political entity twice the size of their father's nuclear kingdom. The social stratification and division of powers within the princedoms are not decisively documented in historical sources. However, in contrast to Rwanda, it seems as if the level of homogenisation between ethnic and economic groups was quite high. The loyalty of the powerful Rwandian army gave the Rwandian chiefs a relative independence that was used to perpetuate and substantiate asymmetric relations. While not necessarily holding what would today pass as "legitimacy", the feudal element in Burundi provided an element of institutional competition which called on the Ganwas to be relatively more sensitive to the demands of the masses. Historical accounts suggest that the monarchical system of the Ganwas was frequently the target of joint

rebellions of Hutu and Tutsi groups. However, the very existence in Burundi of the Ganwa class, being neither Hutu nor Tutsi and thus able to function as an arbitrator in the distribution of goods and justice between these groups, can be seen as an explanatory factor for differences in the history of conflicts between Burundi and Rwanda.

On the eve of the colonial period, Burundi was fragmented into four rather distinct spheres of influence each with its own geographic area and under its respective Ganwa leadership. From the perspective of the current power struggle in Burundi the most interesting feature in the precolonial distribution of power is the marginalised position of the Bururi area inhabited by the Tutsi group known as the Hima. A dominating theme in the postcolonial power struggle is how this group, though their control of the army, and hence the state, has turned its position as the "underdogs" of the precolonial system into a position from which it has controlled much of Burundi from independence until today.

Burundi was colonised first by Germany in 1899 and then ruled by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate, from 1916 to 1962, when Burundi gained its independence. Following a familiar pattern, the colonial powers introduced a package of burdenson the masses including compulsory labour, taxation, and obligatory crop cultivation. Illustrating the connection between demands from international markets, increased scarcity of natural resources and conflict in Burundi, the pressure derived from these demands made local people turn to the Ganwas for protection and aid. This strengthened the Ganwas at the expense of lineage powers in the country and hence the centralisation of power was increased. The centralisation of power in the Ganwas provided the colonial rulers with a small number of political actors by which they could manipulate the country using their familiar divide and rule strategy.

The high level of centralisation that characterises today's Burundi was further entrenched by a series of administrative reforms. For example, from 1929 to 1945 the number of chefferies (chiefdoms) was cut down from 133 to 35. During the same reform the colonials further entrenched marginalisation of Hutus in Burundi. Out of the 133 chiefs in 1929, there were 27 known Hutus; in 1945 there were none. Using the number of chiefs as an indication of power, the Tutsis slightly increased their positions during the reform. The winners of the colonial administrative reform were two Ganwa groups known as Batare and Bezi. Before the rise to power of the current Tutsi/Hima rulers, we would see the demise of these two groups.

During the years prior to independence, the power struggle in Burundi indicated that colonialism would be replaced by a return to a sort of precolonial, monarchical system under the leadership of the Batare group and its leader prince Louis Rwagasore. In contrast to the precolonial period, the struggle was no longer about the control of certain chiefdoms but about capturing the state apparatus that was becoming the nexus of power, wealth, and security. What is more, the power struggle had taken on political colours and Rwagasore had founded the political party UPRONA that managed to transcend existing divisions in society and gained wide political support. (UPRONA won 58

of the 64 seats in the 1961 legislative elections which was part of the political reform process prior to independence). For various reasons the Belgians and the UN through their weight behind UPRONA's main opponents, the Bezi's party PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien). However, from a regional perspective, it is interesting to note that Rwagasore was widely associated with the agenda of Patrice Lubumba in what was becoming Zaire. As a historical presidency of today's strong connections to Tanzania, it is also interesting to note that discussions on far-reaching political integration was undertaken between Rwagasore and Julius Nyerere.

The assassination of Rwagasore in 1961 seriously undermined the viability of the monarchical system in Burundi. Given a symbolic position at independence, the system played a stabilising role during the first years of independence. But it could not contain nor channel the increasing discontent amongst the Hutu population. The discontent was instead manifested in the 1965 coup in which a group of Hutu military officers made an attempt to obtain the state powers. The coup was mainly directed at the monarchs, and was successful in that it eroded whatever power was left for the monarchs. Contrary to the expectations of the coup leaders, however, the coup did not lead to Hutu rule but was in fact used as a political pretext to accelerate the system of Tutsi domination. In the eyes of many Burundian Tutsis, the 1965 coup attempt was an early warning that the bloody events in Rwanda 1959 and the subsequent accession to power by the Hutus was now about to be repeated in Burundi. This association between Rwanda and Burundi formed a significant part of the legitimisation of the subsequent bid for power by Tutsi/Hima fractions in the army. Much like today, the events during the decisive years of the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrate that the Great Lake regions share a conflict psychology in which the collective construction of events and others constituted "legitimate" reasons to retaliate on what a more objective assessment probably would discount as the acts of a small extremist elite.

From the debacle of the first years of independence and the 1965 coup rose a new president, Michel Micombero. Interestingly, he can be characterised by reference to a set of characteristics that are representative of three Burundian presidents up to the 1993 elections: Michel Micombero (president from 1965–76), Jean Baptist Bagaza (1976–87), and Pierre Buyoya (1987–93) were all trained army officers of Hima descent, i.e. being a Tutsi group from Bururi province.

With the inauguration of Micombero, Burundi embarked on its post-colonial, self- reinforcing cycle of structural and direct violence. The cycle was fed by a complex of structural and political factors around the nexus of ethnic and geographic stratification and control with different social groups trying to obtain some degree of livelihood under increasing structural constraints. The dramatic events of 1965 were followed by new and violent uprisings in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. During the particularly savage violence in 1972, Micombero received support from Zaire's Mubutu as the Hutu uprising at the time was construed as a common enemy: the Mulelists. In the 1972 events, an estimated 250,000 people were killed including most of the educated Hutus. Another 150,000 Burundians fled the country in terror, seeking refuge in neigh-

bouring Tanzania where the vast majority remain to this day. The 1972 events unleashed a cycle of violence which has continued until the present time. During these cycles, periods of relative calm and security have been replaced by periods of killings and disorder.

Both the Second and Third Republics that followed Micombero's First Republic were inaugurated by bloodless coups. Both Republics offered a new set of political rhetoric and, to some extent, institutional reform. The call for "National Unity" under Bagaza's turn at the presidency turned out to be little more than a rhetorical disguise for continued marginalisation perpetuated in his educational reform, secularisation of society and state, and half-baked "villagisation" programme. The Structural Adjustment Programme introduced in 1986 contributed to feeding the rhetoric and hopes of reform but not the people. The political reforms undertaken by Buyoya increased the diversification of power, including the installation of a Hutu as Prime Minister. However, it was not until Buyoya was convinced by international and domestic actors to put democracy to the test that Burundi arrived at its biggest postcolonial window of opportunity. Following the adoption of a new constitution and introduction of a multiparty system, Melchior Ndadaye emerged as the winner of the June 1993 first democratic presidential election since independence. Buyoya's eventual handover of power increased hope for long-term stability and broader political participation, and Burundi was hailed internationally as a symbol of peaceful democratic transition in Africa.

This fledgling hope was, however, abruptly shattered when President Ndadaye was assassinated on October 21st 1993, only four months after gaining power. The assassination unleashed yet again years of accumulated fear, resentment and rage. Massacres carried out in retribution for the killing of the president led to reprisals undertaken by the army to regain control of the countryside. Tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands of others fled their homes and country, mainly into Tanzania and former Zaire. Those lucky enough to escape with their lives lost nearly everything else, including their homes, their land, their livestock and their future. The events of 1993 spurred a cycle of violence with a total toll until today of some 300,000 lives, 600 000 to 800,000 regional refugees, and 280,000 to 380,000 IDP.

After the assassination, Burundi was ruled by a succession of weak and divided administrations and unrest continued. In March 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights went as far as to refer to the ongoing civil war embroiling Burundi as a "genocide by attrition". Just four months later, Major Buyoya returned to power through a bloodless putsch, which was widely condemned by neighbouring countries and the international community. Under the auspices of the UN, economic sanctions were imposed and remained until January 1999. Under the leadership of the former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and after two-and-a-half years of negotiations in Arusha, nineteen Burundian political parties signed a peace agreement on August 28th 2000, in the presence of United States President, Bill Clinton, and many regional Heads of State. Signed under intense pressure from the facilitator, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, and from regional leaders, the agreement did not include a cease-fire agreement (protocol III), although it did establish three protocols (I, II, IV), which establish a

clear programme, including the creation of a transitional government, national assembly and senate, tasked with advancing the cause of reconciliation, democracy and reconstruction.

Summing up Burundi's political history

Burundi's political history can be depicted as a series of provocations and reactions where opposing groups take turn in identifying the others as the primus motor in an endless historical regression to justify the next wave of violence. The most significant features of this deplorable dynamic are:

1. The erosion of the precolonial monarchical system.
2. Colonial rules fails to create a functioning state but succeeded in entrenching imagined ethnic identities: In the context of a strategy of divide and rule the colonial powers introduced and supported economic structures and a culture of ethnic categories that in fact have shallow sociologic and historic foundations but provided a "tool kit" instrumental to putting up different components of Burundi's population against one another.
3. The centralisation of patronage resources in the state apparatus making the state the main instrument of group domination and an arena for competition between segments of the dominant group, but never anything that could be described as a legal-rational institution.
4. The centralisation of the state apparatus with all tax revenues being deported to Bujumbura and all public officials appointed from the capital.
5. The failure to install majority rule with security guarantees for the Tutsi elite who use the national army for its protection.
6. The systematic, violent and bloody system of minority rule by different constellations of elite networks centred around the Tutsi minority in general and the Hima from Bururi in particular, making geography the second most salient line of political mobilisation after ethnicity.

8.2 Themes in Burundi's conflict configuration

The conflict configuration in Burundi is multidimensional and compounded by a number of different sources of conflict. We think that the amalgamation of four factors are the key to understanding the conflict complex. Each of these factors are elaborated in the section below. Moreover, they guide the forthcoming section *Approaching a cooperative strategy for Burundi*:

- Direct violence
- Structural violence
- Production of knowledge and identities
- Deficiencies in the rule of law and democratic governance

Each of these factors should be understand as process oriented and hence not as either cause or effect of the conflict. Each factor contributes to the conflict complex, and is at the same time part of the same complex in a way that challenges distinctions between dependent and independent variables in conflict analysis.

In addition, we would like to stress that the conflict in Burundi is intricately interwoven into the regional conflict configuration of the Great Lake region. The sources of the conflicts have a multi-country character and the consequences of the conflicts affect several countries. Consequently, the problems cannot be managed if the development in the different states does not pull in the same direction. Processes in a neighbouring country could easily undermine a reform process or aid intervention, even if the intervention as such in a given context is internally coherent. This points at the need to support and coordinate interventions in several countries at same time — as well as analyse what side effects interventions in one country have on the neighbours. The problem described, is in turn an expression of sources of conflicts and dynamic processes. A number of the sources of conflicts are, however, also sources of development, if managed properly.

8.3 Direct violence in Burundi

Geographic variability

Burundi is characterised by variations in the level of direct violence in different parts of the countries. Only on a few occasions during the decades of conflict in Burundi has the conflict pattern been homogenous throughout the country. Each stage of the conflict has been simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict which makes awaiting a national cease-fire in Burundi a futile exercise. At any particular time, different geographical areas will be hit by violence while others are relatively peaceful.

Actor flexibility

The conflict in Burundi has shown a high degree of variation in the set-up of actors engaged in direct violence. Low level of institutionalisation of actors, high costs of communication with geographically dispersed troops, and the accessibility of arms, has led to the repeated break-up of actors into sub-units taking on new names and new leadership.

In addition, the fractions show a surprisingly high level of flexibility in the patterns of alliances. The absence of clearly manifested goals facilitates a pragmatic approach in the constellation and change of actor alliances and networks and some groups seem to lack a coherent, long term goal or military strategy. As one commentator put it "Their goal is on their nose, so they can't see it". Instead fighting in itself has become a self-generating objective for groups typically consisting of a high proportion of child soldiers and young fighters brought up and traumatised by war.

Militarisation of societies throughout the region

The long drawn-out conflicts have brought about a general militarisation of all Burundi, both in terms of budget allocation, lifestyle and security situation. Interlinked to the militarisation of society is a staggering level of criminalisation of the every-day lives of millions of people which amount to a generally very high level of insecurity.

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent is a major challenge both for conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilita-

tion and peace building. The term "rebel" group or "militia" refers to wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandit, at times with a political objective, but not necessary so, to relatively well organised groups. As is further elaborated in the section below, the armed groups in Burundi are linked to a cobweb of networks, with local, national, regional and international dimensions, often with formal and informal connections and illegal activities on all levels.

In this context one could also point to elite rivalry on a regional level regarding hegemonic power. As will be evident from the section below, hegemonic efforts from elites Tanzania stand out via the support to FDD and the "Hutu-movement". In addition, Burundi is also affected by elites in Uganda and Rwanda as well as in DRC who try to further its positions. The efforts are often channelled through proxies on other countries' territories. This has contributed to the situation with multiplication of local warlords, often with weak social bases, but with protection from a government in another country. Patterns of alliances shift with a speed and flexibility that sometimes defies an outsider's comprehension. In the process, spreading of rumours, disinformation, stereotyping and manipulation of identities all contribute to aggravating an already difficult situation.

8.4 Main actors in Burundi's conflict configuration

FNL, the oldest of the Hutu-oriented rebel groups and currently under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa, is linked up to and gains support from Hutu oriented groups based in DRC, i.e. Interahamwe, Ex-Far, and Mayi-Mayi. The low level of institutionalisation of FNL and the DRC based groups calls into question any coordination between the groups. Nevertheless FNL are said to consist of 3–4000 men under arms. The support from DRC allegedly consists mainly of supplies of food and arms, and temporary shelter from the fighting in Burundi. There also seems to be a political/ideological link between FNL and Hutu-based groups in DRC that prompts the idea of an increased Hutu power in the region. Unconfirmed sources would claim that, together, these groups nurture a dream of a "Hutu-land" located somewhere in the borderland of Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. The actual viability of an alliance formed around a common dream, is questionable due to the low level of institutionalisation of these groups.

FDD under Peter Nkurunziza is the largest Hutu based group in Burundi with 10–20,000 men under arms. The main support base is in Tanzania. Evidently, the support comes from refugee camps in Tanzania and consists of supplies of military equipment, funds, food, and personnel. FDD, as well as FNL, obtain much of their material base though looting and informal taxation of the local population. FDD is said to have at least a core of very well organised fighters that are structured on the pattern of the Burundi National Army.

Several independent sources point to individual members of the Tanzanian government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs, offering political and strategic support to FDD. The motive for this support is not clear but personal profit through the exploitation of patron-client relations is a likely candidate. It is not clear to what degree

the Tanzanian adventure in Burundi has the blessing of President Mkapa, but it is frequently argued that Tanzania has the ambition to strengthen its political and economic position in the region, and that it does not look kindly upon the increased role played in the peace process by South Africa. In this context it should be borne in mind that there is a long history of close political interaction between Burundi and Tanzania. During the early 1960s the issue of a political union between the countries was on the table in top-level discussions. Through much of the post-colonial period Tanzania has been known to side with the Hutu majority in Burundi. This has been seen as an expression of Tanzania's socialist tradition and support of marginalised groups. In this tradition, support to FDD or similar Hutu groups could be seen as an extension of the liberation movement in Africa.

FDD troops use DRC for remobilisation. Although the reports are more scant than in the case of FNL, it seems evident that FDD receives support from other "Hutu" movements in DRC incl. Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe, and Ex-Far.

The connection between Hutu-based groups in Burundi and DRC creates a direct link between DRC's peace process and the relative power position of the alliances tied to the Burundi conflict configuration. The nature of this implication is, however, not clear. Peace in eastern DRC could imply the cutting off of support and hence the weakening of FNL and FDD. However, if a peace settlement in DRC is not inclusive, excluded groups, most likely various Hutu groups, could try to join up with FNL and/or FDD and found a lebensraum in Burundi.

Burundi and Rwandan Armed Forces, directly or via their proxies, have on several occasions joined forces in the fight against the common enemy of Hutu based groups in the boarder areas of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda.

AMIB (African Mission in Burundi) represents an international, military commitment in Burundi. The mission was agreed upon on February 3rd 2003 at the AU Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa. The mission comprising troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, with the mandate to monitor the transition to democracy and provide protection for politicians returning to the country from exile. Central to the mandate is assistance in the DDR process. Recent arrivals by Mozambican troops (Oct 19th 2003) have brought the mission to its full strength at 3,128 peacekeepers. Out of the AMIB troops, Ethiopia is contributing 1,297 soldiers, Mozambique 202 and the remainder are from South Africa. The mission represents the AU's first military engagement, and is executed in close cooperation with the UN. Deployment of the peacekeepers has been beset by funding difficulties and logistics problems within the DDR process. The United States has financed the deployment of the Ethiopian contingent and Britain has paid for the Mozambicans. The Mozambican Ministry of Defence announced on October 15th that the government in Maputo would spend at least US $14 million to support its contingent over the next 12 months, with some of this money coming from donors such as Britain, France and the United States. In December 2003, South African Deputy President and facilitator of the Burundi peace process, Jacob Zuma, called on the UN and the international community to increase its commitment and financial support to the peace process.

Child soldiers

The horrendous situation for the future generation in Burundi is complicated by the culture of recruiting children to armed groups. These children become highly traumatised, often lack proper education and thus are a highly destabilising element in a post-conflict transformation process.

Arms trade

The almost unlimited access to weapons in the area is an important source and amplifier of conflicts. Control of the trade and distribution of arms is a prerequisite for stability in Burundi and the region. The difficulties in addressing the arms trade stems from the strong economic and political interests involved, and the fact that the trade is typically conducted in the nexus of (in)formal/(il)legal economy. Add to that the global increase in availability of arms and the regional interconnectedness of distribution. Small arms, as opposed to conventional weapons, are easy and inexpensive to manufacture and transport, and several factories in the region produce weapons. As a consequence, their production is highly decentralised which adds to the problem of control. In addition, the recycling of weapons from different conflicts in the region has increased access to weapons. FDD's heritage of weapons from Zimbabwe's DRC adventure stands out as a tragic example.

Security sector reform

The perhaps single most important issue in containment of direct and structural violence in Burundi and the Great Lakes region is a holistic and long-term commitment to a security sector reforms. On a technical level, the issue of security sector reform is much about how to integrate former rebels into national army and at the same time down size the army to make it reasonably large and diversified. The security sector reform was part of the negotiations in Arusha but sorts under Protocol III that was not signed. Nevertheless, the process of security sector reform is at the top of the political agenda.

However, the technical aspects of security sector reforms are at best the first step in a solution to the fundamental problem of security. In Burundi, control of the army has equalled not only control of the state, its resources and positions, but more importantly security against the perceived threat of extinction through genocide. Whereas many Tutsis today literally think that they will not live if they give up control of the army, many Hutus believe that they need to control the army or be killed by it. For the Hutus no sustainable solution to the security sector reform can be reached without a substantial reform of the army, but any attempt to reform of the army without including a solution to the Tutsi's security situation is not likely to be successful.[34]

[34] In a deal aimed at providing the Tutsis with the necessary security guarantee, certain reform – including the reform of the army – requires the counter signature of vice President Alphonse Kadege to validate the signature of President Ndayizeye. This leaves UPRONA with the power to block decisions by the government, which was not given to Frodebu during the presidency of Buyoya.

Moreover, the network of formal and informal military alliances between governments and rebels in the region calls for a regional approach to "domestic" security problems. For example, the willingness of the incumbent Tutsi elite to reform the army hinges on a comprehensive solution including the FNL and FDD whose strategic agendas, and mobilisation patterns are highly regional.

8.5 Structural violence in Burundi

A structural violence is at the centre of conflicts in Burundi as in most of the societies in the Great Lake's area. This includes extreme – and increasing – poverty, exclusion or marginalisation of the majority from economic, social, human and cultural rights, inequality in all respects, not the least of women, youths and children. This is a situation that creates widening frustration gaps both in the marginalised poor sections of the societies as among various elites.

Since its inauguration on Nov 1st 2001, and the successful turnover of power on May 1st 2003, the National Transitional Government has made some progress. However, the combined depredation of continued fighting and economic stagnation continues to sap morale and erode vital support for much of the population. Even in the case of a cease-fire leading to the end of direct violence in much of the country, the structural constraints for successful structural violence alleviation in Burundi are staggering. The economic growth during the SAP period (1986–92) was almost 4% per year, but this barely managed to topple the population growth. The SAP did not manage to set off structural reform in the agricultural or secondary sectors, and since 1993 the per capita GDP has halved while poverty incidence is reckoned to have doubled to 80% of the population. Commercial agriculture accounts for less than 5% of the GDP but still agricultural export, mainly coffee and tea, generate 90% of the official export earnings. This cerates a high vulnerability to fluctuations in international markets. Burundi's external debt is in the area of 200% of its annual GDP. Add to that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the generations of children traumatised by war and deprived of their right to education. Finally, and perhaps most worrying, given what we know about political mobilisation under increasing structural strains, population density in the country is 240 per sq Km, but with 90% of the population living in rural areas and dependent on subsistence farming, the more relevant figure is that the density is close to 770 inhabitants per sq Km in what is classified as arable land.

A high degree of structural violence in combination with incomplete nation building processes, lack of inclusive legitimate political processes, power sharing and institutions for the maintenance of a certain rule of law create a situation where structural violence turns to acute violence, both at macro- and micro-level. Structural violence hollows out cohesion in local communities, fuelling communal conflicts and within families resulting in domestic violence, splintered families and the collapse of social structures and values. Making the vulnerable even more vulnerable and frustrated, and potentially easier to mobilise by various elites.

Scarce resources and demographic stress

The rapid growth of populations and population density in Burundi as well as in different areas in the region (in particular in parts of Uganda, Rwanda, and East DRC) creates increased demands on land, water, firewood, economic resources and social services. FNL and FDD are known to recruit from social groups under stress, and if not managed properly, increased stress can become a breeding ground for widespread social frustration and mobilisation to ragtag armies.

Regional demographic fluidity

With the porosity of its national boarders in the Great Lakes region, conflicts create a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Burundi is the largest net contributor to the refugee in the Great Lakes Region. Adding to the magnitude of demographic fluidity are the vast numbers of IDPs in the country. Some of the people currently classified as refugees know no other home than the refugee or IDP camps, which calls into question these categorisations. A second methodological issue pertains to the elusive accuracy in the reports on refugees and IDPs. A report on the situation may present the odd combination of very accurate numbers of IDPs and refugees subdivided along different social strata, while at the same time include caveats like "the IDP figures exclude a possible further 100 000 IDPs, and possibly more." (UN OCHA July 31st 2002 pp 5–6). These "margins of error" reveal some of the problematics related to the demographic fluidity in the region. Camps are often located in areas with a very low level of infrastructure. This adds to the general problem of the control of their inhabitants and the high level of militarisation. IDPs and refugees are "hard currency" in the cynical market for attention and aid from the international donor community, which calls for the systematic inflation of the figures. Taking this into account table 1, on page 47, provides an overview of the main population flows in the region.

These displaced populations often live in squalid conditions marked by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services. As will be elaborated on in the second on HIV/Aids, displaced populations tend to be at a greater risk of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

The displaced populations typically constitute a security risk both for the revising communities and the country of origin. The influx of large groups of people increases the strain on the local communities and their ability to provide for their own food security. Increases in demand for food, land, water, sanitation provides structural conditions conducive to political mobilisation against the displaced populations. Systematic and collective stigmatisation of the displaced groups, for example as *genocidaires* hiding for justice, further hampers the integration into the revising communities.

The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, if necessary by force. FDD use refugee camps in Tanzania, and to some extent in DRC, as safe havens to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members. Burundi

refugees in DRC are also known to have mingled with Ex-FAR and Interhamwe and their conflict with Rwanda.

Tanzania is by far the largest receiver of Burundi refugees, which has generated both incomes and conflicts over scarce resources and insecurity for the population in the areas where camps are located. In addition, the future of the refugee camps constitutes a concrete reason for Tanzania's involvement in the Burundi conflict.

Demobilisation, repatriation and – above all – the reintegration of refugees and IDPs is a key question, both for reducing human suffering and stabilising the security situation. At the same time this is a politically sensitive process. Among the issues that need to be addressed are: How shall returning refugees be integrated, in particular if there is a shortage of land? Have the possessions of the refugees been appropriated by another returning refugee or a former neighbour? How shall repatriation and reintegration be carried out without tilting a precarious political balance? How shall crimes and violence committed by various groups be reconciled? The National Commission on Refugees and IDPs (CNRS) is the institutional arrangement set out in the Arusha Agreement with the mandate to lead the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in Burundi. According to the Arusha Agreement, CNRS was to have an independent status in relation to the government. This independence has been called into question by a recent law passed in Parliament placing it under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction.

Infrastructure

Insufficient, deficient or destroyed infrastructure is a source of conflict; it creates a foundation for isolated rebel groups as it undermines the development of formal economies and integration in national and international economy as well as societies. Denying remote areas access to markets, social service, information etc., provide a hotbed for rebel groups to mobilise frustrated marginalised populations. Economic and social development in urban/central areas but not in the periphery create uneven development and increasing frustration gaps in the periphery, as clearly illustrated by current tensions between Bujumbura and the rest of Burundi. In addition, it is costly and difficult to control areas with incomplete infrastructure.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS is reported as the most frequently cause of death in Burundi. In 2001, 40 000 people died from Aids, and with an average infection rate of 8.3 percent, the prognosis is bleak. Add to that the quarter of a million Aids-related orphans in Burundi and the horrors of the pandemic defy description.

Many Burundians are known to subscribe to sexual habits conducive to the spread of the virus. In addition, the conflict in Burundi and the region increase the speed by which the virus spreads. Among the processes by which the HIV/AIDS problematics is accentuated by the regional conflict dynamic are (i) social and demographic disruption increasing the general level of vulnerability and risk, and placing highly marginalised people, in particular women and children, in a position where security can only be obtained in exchange for sexual services; (ii)

the use of rape as a weapon to inflict long term psychological traumas; (iii) men under arms trade their social military prestigious positions for high levels of sexual interactions and partners.

Among the projects set out to counter the pandemic are the World Bank programme Great Lakes Initiative on Aids, and the Society for women against Aids in Africa, stand out in their support for women. A recent review commission by USAID and UNICEF, "HIV/AIDS and Conflict: Research in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern-DRC, argues that the major problem with the current approach of the international donor community is not the level of engagement but rather that their work is "slow and uncoordinated". The countries in the region are reported to have launched multisectorial national Aids strategies backed by international, national, and an impressive number of local initiatives and actors. The call is however made for an increase in the evaluation of efforts, coordination in programmes and funding, and transparency in the distribution of funds.

8.6 The construction of knowledge and identities

The third, and to our minds, a very significant source of conflict is the cognitive process where the histories, identities and interpretations of today's situation is constructed. A key process is the systematic manipulation by elite's of uneducated and marginalised masses, setting off self-sustaining processes of the construction of identities built on fear and stereotypes of the other.

Perhaps the most complex knowledge construction in Burundi is "ethnicity" which of course is also a major source of mobilisation and violence. The challenge is to understand the complexity, and ambiguous fluidity of identity as a social (re-)construction.

A prime conflict generator in the region is the interpretations of historical atrocities by constructed collectives, legitimising retaliation on individuals at best loosely connected to the actual event. Constructing history so that blame can be attributed to a certain group constitutes a "legitimate" cause for retribution. Reports about "reality" are never neutral. Whether or not it is the intention of the reporter to report on conflicts containing a message of who is to blame and what the "legitimate" response is. For example, a recurrent pattern in conflict reports is that the Hutu militia, which called on the response of the government's armed forces, started them. Such reports rationalise the intervention of the government by stating, "They started it". No mention is made of circumstances that would place the actions of the so called Hutu militia in an historical context (Where were these "militia" men from? What is their rationalisation for their action? What historical atrocities have they been subjected to?). The role of history as a conflict generator calls for information pluralism and processes of critical evaluation and contextualisation of "facts".

Regional conflict psychology

The historical and cultural proximity between Burundi and the regional conflict configuration creates what we would call a "regional conflict psychology". This regional conflict psychology is fed by, and feeds,

conflicts through the region. Events anywhere in the region are interpreted in light of this psychology and add to the narrations in which different groups are stigmatised or portrayed as martyrs. The region's cycle of violence has also served to legitimate violence through the establishment of a culture of impunity for politically sanctioned violence. To give an example, the current level of ethnic violence in Burundi cannot be understood without factoring in the 1972 events in Burundi which in turn must be seen in light of the psychological factors stemming from Rwanda in 1959. A more recent example is the interpretation of recent events in Ituri as a conflict between Hutu (Lendu) and Tutsi (Hima) which adds to the pattern of ethnic strife in Burundi and Rwanda. Similarly, FNL's recent shelling of Bujumbura stands as a reminder to the inhabitants of Kigali of what damage can be inflicted by a small group of "violent Hutus".

Competing" reversed mirror" models for legitimate management of societies

The state-based elites in Bujumbura and Kigali have chosen contradictory strategies to address the dilemma of ethnicity in their two countries. The relative success of either regime has implications for the legitimacy of the other's strategy. This constitutes the basis for mutual interests between the two state-elites. If the Burundian strategy, with an explicit and very outspoken approach to ethnical differences and a system of ethnic quotations, proves relatively more successful, the Rwandan strategy, characterised by a "de-ethnification" of the society, will be called into question. The reverse is also true.

Reconciliation, rehabilitation and trauma

The history of violence in Burundi has created generations of traumatised people; this presents one of the absolute biggest challenges in the reconciliation and rehabilitation of those deeply psychologically affected by the violence and social stress. The enormous numbers of severely traumatised people, not least women and children, is a source of immense suffering, but also a time bomb if not properly managed, which the situation in former Yugoslavia so clearly demonstrates. Unfortunately, the available capacity and expertise is far too low.

8.7 Deficient democracy, governance, and rule of law

Burundi faces a situation of lack of democracy, good governance and a legitimate political order based on a "social contract" between the ruler and the ruled providing a foundation for citizenship. The structures, institutions, regulatory frameworks and the culture of democracy and good governance are weak. A number of more or less elaborated democratic institutions existed in the traditional society, but most of these have been destroyed or hollowed out during the postcolonial period. Consequently there is a lack of arenas for voicing political dissent and a lack of culture, and national and local power sharing.

The logic of state power in Burundi

The state in Burundi functions in agreement with the familiar pattern of patrons seeking to gain personal interests through exclusive relations with

selective clients rather than seeking the good of the nation. The state-based patron – client relations comprise all spheres of life leaving little room for an independent private sector or civil society. As this pattern of exchange is epiphenomenal to a complex and historically entrenched system of political, economic and social life, any expectations for quick changes face very high odds. The extent to which reform is currently taking place in Burundi will mostly be in terms of changing the player, not the name of the game.

The institutional capacity within the government is exceptionally low following the long conflict period, and the economic free fall, experienced in the aftermath of falling coffee prices, the regional embargo, and the massive cutbacks in international aid. The fieldwork in Bujumbura confirmed the assessment by ICG that "The government lacks the information and analysis necessary for accurate planning, along with the staff capacity to actually monitor programmes or assess situations on the ground. In addition, once information is available and plans are developed, there is uncertainty as to who can effectively implement the programmes."[35]

No quantitative figures exist on the level of corruption in Burundi. But different assessments seems to compete in finding the most derogatory, and hence most fitting, wording to describe this pandemic. In addition, the administrative structure is characterised by a high level of centralisation. All administrators are appointed by the central government. Taxes collected from the commune level are centralised in Bujumbura, and there are basically no institutionalised mechanisms for public accountability.

This calls for a close partnership with the Burundian government as well as any other collaborating partner in Burundi. Capacity building has been undertaken by some bilateral donors, the UN and the IFIs, most notably within the fiscal, education, and health sectors. Nevertheless, the needs remain staggering.

Democratisation

The lack of a legitimate social contract and efficient political institutions makes the current process of democratisation a veritable powder keg. According to democracy theory, democracy is the most efficient way to manage societal conflicts, both within and between countries. It provides framework for negations and brokering between different interest, solving disputes by peaceful means. However, it might be that this form of democracy theory is based on specific western experience. Having being hailed as a democratic success story, the 1993 experiences from Burundi of rapid introduction of a "multiparty system" now stands out as a deterring example of the risks of failed democratisation processes. The lesson learnt is that it is more important to focus on the content than on the form. Elections too early in a democratisation process might generate conflicts, in particular in a context with ethnicity as a dominating line of social stratification. Without proper institutions and establishment of a political culture, an early election might lead to continued polarisation of

[35] A Framework For Responsible Aid To Burundi ICG Africa Report No 57. p. 13–14

ethnicity, openly or candidly, or territorial belonging and xenophobia.

The democratisation process in Burundi is in a dilemma. In short, the dilemma is this: Elections in November 2004 are likely to offset a new wave of violence, while postponing them will undermine the legitimacy of the process out of the current conflict.

The Arusha Agreement stipulates that democratic elections be held in November 2004. However, a very frequent assessment in Bujumbura is that this goal will be very difficult to achieve. Not withstanding practical constraints, such as the lack of a cease-fire, lack of an election law, the need to update the electoral register, the need for infrastructure arrangements to conduct elections, the main objection towards the elections is the eminent risk that the election campaign will be turned into a rally on ethnic grounds which would most likely ignite a new wave of violence throughout the country. However, considering the weight given to the elections in the Arusha Agreement, any attempt to postpone the election date risks setting off the current momentum for the Arusha process. Such attempts would most certainly be used by FNL (and possibly FDD) to boost its raison d'etre. In the eyes of the international donor community, postponing the elections could be seen as a severe break with the Arusha process that certainly would not increase the likelihood of the reimbursements to Burundi.

Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources via the regional conflict

The structural violence is fuelled by inter- and intra-elite struggle of the resources. The foci of the struggles take different shapes depending on the type of resources that are available. In Burundi, with little available natural resources, the control over the state is in focus while in eastern DRC the struggle is more directly linked to control over various resources outside the state apparatus. This means that, in DRC, different actors could gain from keeping the state weak in DRC to be able to maintain their relative position. However, through the high degree of regional interconnection, it also means that elites in DRC may have an interest in keeping the struggles running in Burundi in order to bring out resources from DRC more easily.

Inter- and intra-elite rivalry for resources in Burundi

Given the Arusha signatures the following question can be asked about Burundi: Does the co-habitation of UPRONA and FRODEBU in the current government imply a tendency towards a fusion between the parties' elites? The likelihood of such a scenario would be increased by the fact that urbanised elites in Bujumbura – representing both Hutu and Tutsi – are increasingly subjected to a common enemy in the rural based guerrilla movements occupying the areas around the city. If this would be the case it could be seen as a sign of a new elite formation based on an urban class interests cutting across ethnic lines.

However intriguing, this scenarios did not find any support during the fieldwork in Bujumbura. On the contrary, ethnicity was the absolutely dominating filter through which actors interpreted the conflict.

Nevertheless, the conflict in Burundi should not be seen as a struggle between Hutu and Tutsi. The above section *History as a pretext* stressed the different between Tutsi groups, and even now there is nothing like a joint

Tutsi front in Burundi. Among the groups frequently mentioned are AC-Genocide, PA-Amasekania, Accord Cadre, former President Bagaza joins some "extreme" Tutsis under PARENA (Partie pour le Redressement National), and his successor Pierre Buyoya is frequently cited as the leader of some ready-to-talk-Tutsis in UPRONA. Another increasing power struggle is that between different Hutu-based actors. With Mugabarabona, Ndayikengurukiye, and Karumba part of the Transition Government the main self-proclaimed representatives of the Hutus are Rwasa (FNL) and Nkurunziza (FDD). While Rwasa's FNL might be the most vocal actor claiming to represent the "true" Hutu cause, FDD is the more serious candidate for increased power. In this context it should be borne in mind that FDD has a history of close relations with FRODUBU and increased cooperation is likely. It is however not evident that FDD will remain as an actor under the current leadership of Nkurunziza. Signs of a split within FDD have already been visible, and if FDD moves closer to FRODEBU it might very will have to pay, by once again being divided.

The most prominent Hutu leader in Burundi is perhaps not President Ndayizeye but the Speaker of the House, Minani. With the Arusha Agreement disqualifying Ndayizeye as a candidate in the upcoming elections Minani is FRODEBU's likely candidate. What is more, Minani is known to have exceptionally good connection with Tanzania and FDD. Some observers even argue that some of the FDD troops are under Minani's command. In the history of alliances and acronyms in Burundi, this "unholy" alliance might constitute the foundation for a new Hutu platform in Burundi (maybe known as "Frodebu-FDD"?).

Legal justice and the culture of impunity

It is commonly assessed that the prisoners in Burundi are too few and that the 10,000 imprisoned to a large extent are the "wrong" people. They are the "small" criminals in comparison with the big criminals still enjoying freedom and affluence as part of Burundi's elite. The capacity and will of the justice system to enforce law and order is highly questionable and for decades, impunity has become part of the lifestyle endorsed by Burundi's elite.

Nevertheless, impunity receives centre stage in the current conflict, and the incumbent elites engage in trying to set the agenda for Burundi, based on how to handle the past rather than build a future. Lack of security mechanisms for these actors and their current control of armed forces has put Burundi in a dilemma: While many argue that no peace can be built without addressing historical atrocities, actors who stand the risk of being brought to justice have the capacity of perpetuating the fighting.

Human Rights

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch concur in their reports on the systematic violation of human rights in Burundi. The atrocities have been carried out by the national army and the rebel movements alike and include torture, violence against non-combatant parties, and sexual violence. FNL as well as FDD, despite having signed the Arusha Agreement, use of child soldiers, and more or less explicit kidnapping to

recruit troops. Despite the Burundi's commitment to human rights agreements, the Burundi national army is frequently reported to have killed civilians and government forces have barred access by humanitarian agencies to displaced persons leaving them without adequate food, water and medical assistance.

In a report covering January to May 2003, the Burundian human rights group, Iteka, says that despite the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the government and FDD/Nkurunziza, the human rights situation has not improved in the country. Murder, torture, sexual assault and other violations continued during the period covered by the report. Iteka also points to the systematic exploitation of civilians by belligerents, including the transport of ammunition and looted goods.

Iteka further points to the role of the government to cater for recently repatriated people. As an indication of the need for action, Iteka reports that of the 57 000 people repatriated during the reporting period, 46 percent had no access to housing, 22 percent had no land, and 34 percent had no access to medical care.

The history of human rights violations in Burundi evokes the question of impunity. The question of impunity applies to the national army and the rebel forces alike. Neither of the rebel forces has announced any form of accountability for combatants guilty of violating international humanitarian law. Even though the government forces stand under national laws, the de facto implementation of international commitments to human rights is deplorable.

Nevertheless, some progress can be seen in the recent passing of a law by the Assembly and the Senate against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Human Rights Watch argues that the law "marks a major step" in Burundi, but point to the tremendous problems with implementation. The new law includes a call for an international judicial commission of inquiry under the UN to investigate crimes in the whole post-colonial period, i.e. a period of more than forty years. It also asks for an international criminal tribunal to be created. Without further details on the division of labour, the assembly further proposed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to cover the same period.

Civil society is reported to have played a critical role in these recent changes, and managed to force the government to back down from its claim to have a seven-year respite on certain clauses in the new law that would have restricted the sphere of investigations.

Civil society

Burundi is enriched by a vibrant web of formal and informal organisations for material exchange and social and political interaction. There is need for additional documentation of the dynamics of Burundi's civil society. Informants testify to an increasing bifurcation between a rural and urban civil society. Whereas the rural civil society is typically informally organised and concerned with issues of physical security, food production, and civic training, associative life in Bujumbura reflects the interests of the elites. Coordination between the rural and urban civil society remains weak, and the close connection between the ruling elite and the urban civil is reflected in the low level of critical engagement

with the government. This limits the degree to which support to (urban) civil society will contribute to the development of the country.

In relation to human rights, the less active role taken by civic organisations should also be seen against reports on intimidation by the government. Without the ambition to provide a comprehensive list of civil organisations that stand up for civic rights, the human rights group Iteka deserves to be mentioned for its continued outspokenness. In addition, Search for Common Ground champions universal rights through activities within a number of sectors, including media and women groups. In addition, representatives of Pentecostal as well as Catholic churches are known for their broad engagements and have frequently voiced criticism against the abuse of force and the need for democratic and human rights reforms.

Media

The government record in relation to the media includes repeated violations of national and international proclamations on the freedom of expression. As an example of the harassment, it can be mentioned that the web-based information service, Net Press, was shut down for two months in 2002 on accusations of undermining national unity. The policy is known to have beaten a journalist from Studio Ijambo in March 2002 after he had covered a meeting of a radical Tutsi group. Harassment has also followed reports from military attacks on civilians. In March 2003 President Buyoya summoned journalist to inform them that they must not allow rebels to speak on the radio. Adding to the bleak picture are reports of recent setbacks in the efforts to establish a stronger guarantee for the freedom of expression as a proposed press law was tabled by the Assembly and sent back to the Council of Ministers.

Nevertheless, comparing their situation with colleagues in Rwanda, journalists in Burundi underline that the restrictions they face still leave quite some room for critical and nuance reporting. It is also commonly held that for some years, Burundi has experienced a positive trend for freedom of expression. Today there are a number of private newspapers published, and even though the government monopolises national TV, there are about 6–9 private radio channels with a wide outreach. Association Burundi de Journalist (ABJ) has 300 registered members, and the Maisson de la Press also gathers a fair number of journalists in Bujumbura.

8.8 Strategic considerations for working in and on the Burundi conflict

The existing conflict, as well as, an increase in the level of conflict in Burundi is not an insurmountable obstacle to expand on engagements in Burundi. The conflict configuration should determine *how, not how much*, to engage in Burundi. Working in and on the conflict in Burundi thus calls for strategic considerations in terms of Sida's engagement in Burundi. Among the strategic considerations to consider are:

– The geographic variations in the level of conflict in Burundi calls into question any decision based on an analysis of Burundi as being either pre-conflict, conflict, or post-conflict. Burundi's history is marked by

all three phases being present at the same time, but in different regions of the country. Awaiting a cease-fire in Burundi is thus a futile exercise. At any particular time, different geographical areas will be hit by violence while others are relatively peaceful. Even if the developments on some issues and in some geographic regions progress towards a Best Case Scenario, developments in others may well be in the realm of the Worst Case Scenario. This calls for a high degree of professionalism and local knowledge on behalf of Sida.

- The variability and complexity of the conflict in Burundi calls for clear exit strategies.
- The need for geographic and sector area flexibility should discourage Sida from high input programmes until a more stable progress can be assured.
- The need for humanitarian aid to Burundi is likely to be eminent for a substantial future. All efforts should be future looking and provide for a long-term sustainable livelihood for the inflicted individuals.
- The complexity of the conflict and Sida's current level of engagement calls for a high degree of focus in terms of (i) policy areas and (ii) cooperative partners. This recommendation will be valid even in the case of quite substantial increase in the support level. Existing partners within the international community and civil society seems like the natural entry point for focused support. Concrete suggestions on how to achieve a focused approach in relation to key conflict areas are outlined in section
- Sida may consider an intensified policy dialogue with existing partners to assure a satisfying level of coherence and sophistication in the problem analysis and approach.
- The conflict in Burundi has regional solutions why regional considerations and coordination are called for in relation to policy development and programme assessments.
- The approach to many conflict areas in Burundi is mapped out in the Arusha Agreement. In consideration of the controversial context in which the Agreement was reached, and the complexities of implementation, Sida should seek to strike a constructive balance between respect for the Agreement and Constitution, and need for pragmatism.
- Peace *process* dividends: The peace process could paradoxically generate widening frustration gaps. The peace process increases expectations and hopes. At the same time it takes a long time to reconstruct economic, political and social structures that are in shambles, even longer before an improvement from the prerequisites-conflict situation could be achieved. Withheld international support could in a delicate transition phase widen the frustration gap through increased frustration, and through not rewarding the political leadership trying to broker peace. In that way a too careful approach might risk delegitimating both the peace process, and the donors.

This is an argument for the international community to give substantial support in the transition period, even if it is very difficult, and carries

high transaction costs. The value added of a firm commitment to the peace *process* must be manifested in the everyday lives of Burundians. Without peace *process* dividends, the return to violence is eminent.

As we have argued throughout this report, the question is how to achieve this, with what means, which channels to use, where to enter and with what sequencing – with a minimum requirement not to cause any harm. The needs are enormous, the challenges gigantic, the complexity immense and the interplay of forces makes any prediction of likely future development uncertain. Nevertheless, it is our conclusion that the conflicts determine *how, not how much*, to work in the Burundi. That is to say that the conflicts call on specific strategic considerations on how to work in and on the conflicts. But the conflicts do not constitute insurmountable obstacles for engagements. Sida should thus support the peace process by *not* conditioning further engagement on a nation wide ceasefire.

9. Conflict Analysis Democratic Republic of Congo

After seven years of armed conflicts, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is now benefiting from a general cease-fire. It has gradually been implemented after the long negotiation process in the 'intercongolese dialogue' (ICD), with a substantial influence from external diplomatic efforts. The main steps were taken with the withdrawal of all external military forces, first those who supported the Kabila government, 'the invited forces', and later the Rwandan and Ugandan forces. With few exceptions, the cease-fire is still accepted by the most important actors in the conflict setting (December 2003).

Politically, this gradually implemented cease-fire has been accompanied by the formation of a transitional government and the installation of Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, from different parts of the political spectrum. Two of the vice-presidents come from the rebel movements (the RCD-Goma, and the MLC), one from the political opposition, and the fourth from the former government.

The transitional, coalition government is composed by representatives from the RCD-Goma (7), the former Government (7), the political opposition (7), the MLC (7), the civil society (2), the Mayi-Mayi (2), the RCD-N (2), and the RCD-ML (2). There are also 25 vice-ministers, and the transitional Parliament (500 members), and the Senate (120 members) also attend.

All ministers and the other politicians in these new institutions are nominated and negotiated within the 'intercongolese dialogue'. It will take until the future elections before a government can claim any popular legitimacy. There are also two main political parties (Union por la démocratie et les progress social, and Parti Lumumbiste unifié), which do not participate since they did not agree with the other political opposition on the nomination process to the transitional government.

Although all these steps should be considered extremely positively, they cannot be a justification for triumphalist claims that the DRC is now a country in peace. Our judgement is that there are good possibilities for the future, though there are a number of challenges ahead.

This analysis of the conflict in the DRC is divided into five parts. It will start with a short historical overview of the most enduring structures, which form the conflict environment. The second part will deal with the triggers of the armed violence, the most important being external rather

than internal. In the third part we will discuss conflicts dynamics and the main actors. The forth part deals with the external response to the conflict, and the intervention of the international community in the peace process. Lastly, we will discuss the challenges that lie ahead of all actors participating in the peace process.

9.1 The conflict environment

Historical setting

Although references to colonialism, as a background factor to the current crisis in Africa, are somewhat out of bounds these days, it must be said in relation to the DRC that this much-decried colonial rule had a very special ugly face in Congo. There is enough published material about this in order for us just to leave the issue with a short reminder of King Leopold and the later Belgian colonial rule. What perhaps is the most important heritage for a conflict analysis of today is the kind of pattern for social and political change that emerged out of the colonial system, reinforced itself in the transition period to independence, and became consolidated in the years of Mobutu rule.

Although the soil and climate in Congo offer a huge potential for agricultural production, the mineral assets had shaped the colonial system for years. While Leopold's exploitation was the most ruthless in the collection of rubber, the Belgian rule came to be structured around the mineral resources. Most of these resources are allocated in the eastern parts of the country, along the Rift Valley, and the border areas to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zambia in the southeast.

The structure of the exploitation was built on state concessions to Belgian and other foreign companies, obtaining extensive administrative, judicial and political power in their respective areas. Not until 1933, had the colonial state taken over local administration matters. Gradually, the colonial state incorporated the local structures of the pre-colonial chiefdoms into its governance system. Compulsory agricultural work and forced recruitment were basic features of the colonial state's penetration into the local communities of the huge territory.

This had a strong polarising effect on both politics and economy. On the one hand, it created a crude and violent relation between the colonial power (state and concession companies) and the mass of the Congolese people. Repression and arbitrary killings were, at least seemingly, worse in 'Belgian Congo', than in other colonies. The population in Congo is said to have diminished by around two thirds between the colonial conquest and 1924. Thus, there was a very small elite of Europeans, and a Congolese population, who was not even allowed to reproduce themselves as inhabitants of the territory. The degree of deprivation of the Congolese population was such that all people could feel that that their proper existence as an identity group was threatened.

On the other hand, there were efforts to create a stable labour force in the mines, which implied the growth of an important urban working class. But this process not only impacted on life of the peasantry in a 'normal' colonial way, i.e. that people temporarily moved into a modernising agricultural sector, or into an emerging industrial sector as labour, but maintained a main reproductive base in the original rural areas. The

move into mining activities seems to have cut off the urban-rural linkages more definitely than in other colonies in Africa. From this situation, a *lumpenproletariat* of substantial dimensions emerged. Thus, the effects on the traditional peasantry were not only that much of its labour was transferred to exportable production (both agriculture and minerals), but also that large numbers of people were removed from the peasantry reproductive sphere, without being permanently incorporated in the mineral/industrial production system. Hence, millions of people have for generations constituted a class of errant labour, both in overpopulated cities and in rural areas.

From this situation, the struggle for independence emerged, and a small group of so-called *évolués* arose, with a strong social base among the population; these were Congolese individuals, who had been able to gain access to education, and who often had been employed within the local administrations. This was the main recruitment base for the independence movement. However, very few of the parties and organisations in the movement for independence had an established national programme. Most of these groups were regionally or ethnically based. The main exception was Patrice Lumumba's *Mouvement Nacional Congolais*.

To what extent this can be directly attributed to a fragmentation based on mineral concession areas is outside the scope of this study though it is obvious that the attention the province of Katanga caught in the process of independence is an indication in this direction. In the Katanga issue, we saw an early expression of the strong motivation for violent intervention in political issues, both from the emerging Congolese elites, and the foreign forces linked to mineral interests, passively monitoring the situation, or supporting the party of their choice.

9.2 Post independence

Following different violent efforts to seize political power after the UN intervention in ending the Katanga rebellion, the Mobutu regime was in power from November 1965 to May 1997. This period consolidated, more than anything else, the previous structural patterns of the economy and politics, though the beneficiaries changed. In different parts of country, some armed resistance against the Mobutu regime continued for a number of years, as for example the Mulele rebellion. However, this gradually faded away.

Politically, Mobutu was for many years of his reign forced to try to strike a balance between two different political and economic forces.

On the one hand, he had come to power mainly because of his potential as a broker, for a change of control of the mineral resources. The Belgian monopoly was to be broken by a broader alliance of Western mineral interests. At the same time, Congo became a Western bastion in the Cold War bi-polarisation of Africa. Thus, in terms of the large investments and its international role, Congo became a client state. A lot of Mobutu's legitimacy as a ruler was, thus, based on his capacity to uphold friendly external relations.

On the other hand, this consolidation of Congo as an important mineral provider in the world economy, based on foreign investment and control, had to be based on certain legitimacy among domestic economic

and political elite groups. One instrument for this was a 'zairianisation' of the economy. Zairianisation meant a confiscation of small and medium enterprises from their foreign owners and the handout of these assets to domestic actors, in order to create a Congolese entrepreneurial class. However, the implementation of this policy was deficient in the sense that many of the beneficiaries among the politicians and civil servants were not able to run their businesses with the necessary long-term sustainability.

Thus, this re-structuration of the business sector did not create the necessary dynamics for a change in the general economic development. Rather it reinforced earlier existing fragmentation of group interests, since distribution was mainly made on a divide-and-rule strategy. At the same time, the mismanagement of the state administration, and the decay of the military forces, contributed to the dissolution of societal bonding. Military officers used their positions for local enrichments, engaging in alliances with local merchants for the smuggling of diamonds, gold and other goods. The state gradually lost its monopoly on violence. When defence and security forces were confronted by different insurgencies, they mostly failed to resist. At local level, the distinction between business, state administration, and security forces was increasingly blurred.

Economic and social decay

In economic terms the decay of the then Zaïre started in the middle of the eighties. Incomes from the mineral sector were not reinvested in the economy at large. No trickle-down effects were seen and the economy remained a dual economy with increasing gaps between rural and urban areas, though urbanisation also contributed to a growing mass of urban poor.

One of the most important export products was copper. The mineral dependence became visible when world market demand for copper decreased and the economy stagnated. The shrinking inflow of resources also influenced the regime's possibility to pursue its divide and rule strategy, based on patron-client relations with different elite groups. The ruling elite closed itself in relation to competitors and possible challengers. If there had been some efforts during the mineral heydays to develop some rural infrastructure and public service in education and health, such efforts also ceased along with the economic decline.

Civil society resistance

In the middle of this deteriorating situation, the regime governance grew increasingly despotic, and civil and political rights were constantly suppressed. As in many other third world countries at that time, this state of affairs was seldom questioned in international fora, since it was generally subordinated the cold war pattern of political alliances and support. Thus, the question of governance legitimacy was mainly seen in relation to the external backers, rather than in relation to the citizens. Any real internal political opposition was suppressed.

Gradually, a new resistance movement emerged. It took its shape in a long-term civil society organisational growth. This growth was nurtured both from religious environments, and from the political challengers of the Mobutu regime.

The National Sovereign Conference 1991–92 was a main effort from oppositional forces to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy. The conference gathered 204 political parties and 2,850 delegates in, effectively, eight months of work and discussions. The conference reached an agreement and a transitional government was installed. However, it lasted only three months before Mobutu succeeded in December 1992 to oust this transitional government from office. Although the efforts to implement a peaceful democratic transition did not succeed, the internal anti-Mobutu forces had gained increased legitimacy and political change was no longer seen as impossible. One common reading of the failure of the CNS is that Mobutu's external backers were still not prepared to abandon him in favour of democracy. However, this failure is often mentioned as a turning point for marginalised elites, who tried to position themselves for an approaching post-Mobutu era.

Overdue social change

Hence, in the middle of the nineties four features dominated the societal situation.

1) A long-term downhill for the economy, at both macro- and micro-levels. The vulnerable economic structure had collapsed, and the economy had been increasingly informalised.

2) A fictitious system for political decision-making, in which there were few, if any, channels of legitimisation for any kind of governance. The state had been transformed into a cleptocracy and seemingly lived its own life with few relations to the citizens.

3) A strong fragmentation among the elites, in which everybody was seeking to position himself for a post-Mobutu era.

4) The end of the cold war, as well as the abolition of the apartheid system in South Africa, had reoriented the political situation in southern Africa. However, Mobutu's western backers did in fact not know how to handle Zaïre. On the one hand, there is a diplomatic 'rule' not to abandon long-term friends, thus creating uncertainty among other friends. On the other hand, no obvious political solution seemed to be within easy reach.

This situation of the state meant that there was no buffer capacity whatsoever when the AFDL rebellion was launched in 1996. Most of the state administration broke down, and the society as such had no resistance capacity. This led to a total societal collapse, in which most people are still living.

Thus, when the dominating post-independence Mobutu regime fell, it was not only the regime as such that was overdue, it was the entire societal construction, which had for a long time fragmented. It affected people from the highest level of the central political administration, as well as the economic actors, down to the local communities through a process of dissolution of social trust and norms. This situation has then worsened during the latter years of war.

External triggers of war

In this situation, the acute consequences of the genocide in Rwanda came to be an integrated part of the Congolese situation. From that moment in July 1994, the developments in Congo can no longer be seen

as Congolese problems, but must be analysed in a regional framework.

The first obvious sign that the DRC was on the road to an armed conflict was that the Mobutu government agreed to grant both physical and political space to the *genocidaire* forces fleeing from Rwanda in 1994. As soon as these forces displayed their intention to mount continuous military incursions back into Rwanda from Congolese soil, the war was there. Independently of how the debate about the security threat against Rwanda has developed, and been treated in the years since then, it should have been seen as obvious right from the outset that the new Rwandan government would do whatever necessary to remove this security threat.

Furthermore, the number of refugees from Rwanda entering the Congo exceeded one million. The huge majority were not military or militia personnel, but civilian refugees. Evidently, the mass of these people was defined as *hutus*. Their entry into the Kivu and Maniema areas had direct implications for the fragile social balance between different identity groups in the area. This had both military and local political consequences.

9.3 Revival of old tensions and the two wars

One political consequence was that the existing contradictions between parts of the Congolese population and the *Banyamulenge*, and parts of the *Banyarwanda*, acquired other dynamics and new patterns of local alliances emerged, leading to a reinforced offensive against the *Kinyarwanda*-speaking population in the Kivus.[36] The *Banyamulenge* were suddenly surrounded by a million of *Hutus*, coming directly from the interrupted genocide efforts in Rwanda. This situation also served the interests of the Congolese elite groups in Kinshasa, since the competing *Banyamulenge* elite layers within the politico-administrative system of the DRC could be weakened in their social and territorial base.

Another consequence was that the *Hutu* refugees started pouring into the rural areas in search of a livelihood outside the refugee camps and though they sometimes managed to integrate with other *Hutus* in the *Banyarwanda* population, the result was increased pressure on the land. This contributed to a hardening of anti-*Banyarwanda* feelings among the rural Congolese population.

Militarily, the new local dynamics meant that the ex-FAR/*interahamwe* gained a huge source of recruitment in Congo, both in the refugee camps, and among errant youngsters in the Kivus. In addition, the relative weakness of the FAC offered a space, which the ex-FAR/*interhamwe* could fill up. This was growing into what the Rwandan government interpreted as a strategic alliance between *Hutu* forces and the Congolese government and army, similar to the one that the young *Tutsi* exiles had established through their integration into the Ugandan army and security apparatus during the eighties.

[36] We use the denominations banyamulenge, banyarwanda and kinyarwanda in a very general meaning. Banyamulenge is used for the population in eastern DRC with a Rwandan origin (and a perceived *tutsi* identity), who have been living in the area since pre-colonial times. Banyarwanda is understood as all the groups of the population in eastern DRC with Rwandan origin. Kinyarwanda is the name of the language.

During these circumstances, in which the political changes in Congo did seem remote, there were three social forces developing a need for profound change of the situation: the T*utsi*-dominated government in Rwanda, the government in Uganda, and some layers among the *Banyamulenge* elite in Congo. They joined with other anti-Mobutu forces in Congo, and created the AFDL, in order to expel Mobutu. Laurent Kabila, a former rebel from the middle of the sixties, linked to the Mulelist rebellion, who had spent the last 15 years as a cross-border trader in the Lake Tanganyika area, was brought in as a front figure of the alliance.

As Kabila had experienced already, during the Mulele rebellion in 1964, the government troops did not offer any resistance, and within a couple of months of marching from the eastern border to Kinshasa, the rebellion established itself as a new government, with Laurent Kabila as president. His power base was initially limited to his foreign backers, not least the Rwanda and Uganda military forces and commanders, who assumed important positions in the new governmental structures. This change of regime also created heavy turbulence among the Kinshasa elites, which is still not settled.

Furthermore, the continuous weakness of governmental structures permitted a break-up of whatever control there had been of mineral and other natural resources. New social forces in control opened up for the renegotiation of mineral concession areas, and a number of new players, both national and international, entered the scene, together with those, who intended to reconfirm old contracts. At local level, a certain vacuum emerged, in which the already ongoing informal production and trade in gold, diamonds and other valuables was opened up for more actors, in both production and trade activities. Thus, the balance between different livelihood strategies for many rural households changed. Hence, local contradictions over the control of assets increased, at the same time as more people for livelihood reasons went into the digging and gold-panning activities.

However, the alliance between Kabila and the alliance of forces, which brought him to power, did not last long. We can see, at least, three reasons for this break-up.

Firstly, his governance did not manage to calm the situation in the eastern parts of the country. On the contrary, violence against *Banyamulenge,* and *Kinyarwanda*-speaking people in general, increased, and the economic potential of the Kivus and Ituri could not be explored.

Secondly, he did not contain the ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, which continued to be a security threat for Rwanda. On the contrary, if anything, he started using these forces and the *Hutu* refugees strategically against Rwandan, and *Banymulenge* interests.

Thirdly, at the heart of this situation lay the perception that Kabila could not rely on the Rwandan-Ugandan military for any governmental stability. He had to acquire also a domestic political and social base for his governance. Such new bases could not contain any dominant position for 'foreigners', in the meaning of any person who could be attributed a Rwanda connotation, including people with *Banyamulenge* origin.

Thus, Uganda did not have the economic interests behind its AFDL engagement satisfied, and Rwanda was still left with its main security

problem, ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, which rather increased than decreased. The joint decision was to get rid of Laurent Kabila.

The second war

This second phase of the armed conflict in DRC rapidly exposed the three most important *domestic* roots of the conflict. Firstly, the long term decay of state legitimacy and capacity, secondly, the generalised pauperisation of the population and a gradual dissolution of social trust, and thirdly, the fragmentation of elite groups, through a consequent divide and rule strategy that had occurred under the Mobutu regime. One of the most notable issues within the third root of conflict was the east-west tensions, and the long term quarrels about the role of the *banyamulenge* and other *tutsi* groups in Congolese politics and economic life. Sometimes this contradiction is boiled down to the so called 'citizenship question'.

Hence, the roots of the conflict can be summarised in a description of the process in which the internal problems of Rwanda, 1994 spilled over into the fragmented and delegitimised state of Zaïre. The state had no buffer capacity to deal with the problem it encountered, and the deprived and destitute population was highly vulnerable for mobilisation into violence. Local violence in an environment of dissolved social trust could easily be mobilised into somewhat more organised forms. A culture of violence was there, for both external and internal interests to take 'advantage' of.

The second war started in August 1998. The joint Rwandan-Ugandan military operation was complemented with the emergence of a new rebel movement, the RCD – *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* – based in Goma.

The much polarised discussion about the role of the Rwandan government in the creation and operation of the RCD and its military forces is largely superfluous. Their relation have for long been evident to any observer. For conflict-resolution purposes, it is more rewarding to discuss the possible strength of the Congolese social forces that were prepared to rally behind the military strength of the combined Rwandan-Ugandan military operation to topple Kabila. What is still lacking in the reporting around the DRC, and what is beyond the scope of this study, is a thorough analysis of the effects on the Congolese political and economic elites of the turbulence of the last ten years. It would be no less important to understand to a greater degree, the linkages between these elites, their bases of reproduction and accumulation, and the global mineral and petroleum enterprises.

Thus, our point is that the polarised debate about whether the RCD was backed, or even run, by Rwandan security forces did, and does, not help in identifying the Congolese issues behind the present lack of a sufficiently broad social force, able to take the lead in the political, economic and social spheres for the badly needed reconstruction of Congo as a viable state.

However, the second war came to have completely devastating consequences in the DRC, especially in terms of the humanitarian and human rights situation, and the final dissolution of both political trust among Congolese elites, and social cohesion at the local level.

Important actors

The Mayi-Mayi is today a very loosely knit together assembly of local militias. There may be as many as 20–25 different groups. Its history goes drawn back to the struggle for political power in the vacuum situation between the death of Patrice Lumumba, and the start of the Mobutu presidential period in 1965. With a vague Maoist orientation, it was part of the Mulelist rebellion, and survived in a lesser form until the beginning of the eighties. These traditions of local resistance and struggle came to be called upon when Mayi-Mayi groups were re-emerging as locally, and even community, based defence forces, against a variety of threats. This could range from local struggles over land or influence on mineral sites to the later situation in which the Mayi-Mayi gained a position as local defenders against foreign dominance in the form of Rwandan troops and the RCD. At times different groups have, at the local level, allied themselves with Ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, and played an important role as a complement to the Congolese army.

The most important feature of the Mayi-Mayi is its local base, decentralised structure and social base among the marginalised rural and semi-urban youths, also carrying the image of reflecting deep grievances and frustration among the poor rural population. In one sense, the Mayi-Mayi of today is a reincarnation of the mobilisation of the rural poor in the Mulelist rebellion of the sixties. The ideological Lumumba heritage was blended with a Maoist approach, which attracted many poor people. During the last fifteen years, with continuously growing hardships for the rural population, the movement could be described as displaying both grievances linked to alienation from the modern political economy, and a defence of the *'gemeinschaft'* society that the same modernisation destroys. The scapegoats for Mayi-Mayi rhetoric have often been the *kinyarwanda*-speaking population in eastern Congo. Thus, though being almost parochial in its self-perception, it nevertheless displays a variety of Congolese nationalism.

Another category of armed groups is what is usually called ex-FAR/*interahamwe*. Soon after its move into eastern Congo, it reorganised in order to be able to carry out military attacks on Rwanda. Its major source of recruitment was in the refugee camps. However, it gradually became an ally of the Kabila regime, reinforcing the governmental capacity to defend itself against the Rwandan and Ugandan forces, as well the RCD. In this process, it is said that major reorganisations have taken place, and that this armed group today is a unitary military force, under the name of the 'Force Especial'. However, in a certain sense, still described as ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, its real force has been questioned by those doubting the Rwandan claims that its presence in the DRC is due to an ex-FAR/*interahamwe* security threat. Independently of what is plausible today, in terms of real security threats against Rwanda from ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, the present Rwanda government may have a point in arguing that their own experience from Uganda, can serve as an example of the militant *hutu* forces seeking an integration in the FAC to maintain and develop skills, and guarantee long-term reproduction of its strength for future action against Rwanda. This could be one reason behind the strong emphasis on the control of the FAC that the RCD has developed in the recent negotiations on ministerial posts.

Much more difficult to identify and understand is the phenomena that in the media goes under the name of ethnic militias. The seemingly indiscriminate violence and massacres on civilians, and the connotations of ethnic divisions are often described as completely alien to any human behaviour. The province of Ituri and the town of Bunia have been the main public scenes for these groups. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this study to give a detailed account of these groups. However, there are some observations to be made.

The point we would like to make is that the dominating primordial view on the identity of these groups, and their underlying possible motivations, is an obstacle to efforts to come to grips with the deeper meaning that the actors themselves may attribute to this violence. At best, most analysis point at old land tensions as a base for contradictions though linked to the same pattern of primordial simplification as the *hutu-tutsi* stereotypes in Rwanda. At worst, mysticism and human irrationality are intermixed with exoticism, and an 'otherness' constructed beyond modernist explanatory logic.

These images are of no use, but there are possible reasons for the persistence these images do have. One is a possible military view of the problem, which can be seen, for example, within the MONUC. Movements, logistics and armament are obviously at the centre of attention. Another possible obstacle is the lack of knowledge of the local livelihood structure, and the exact locations of mineral resources, that could explain tactics from a 'chain of production' perspective. This means that different groups could be seen as private 'security enterprises' for the different middlemen in the mineral extraction and trading networks. This does not exclude what many observers report, namely that these groups seem to be ethnically homogenous. However, the material base for this pattern of recruitment should be understood in terms of livelihood deprivation in a wide sense.

As for the excessive violence and the forms of mutilations and humiliation reported from eastern DRC our search of understanding directs its attention to the long-term structural violence, under which the mass of all these young men have been growing up. On the one hand, there seem to be a void in their vision of the future. Even if they happened to attend school for some years, the forecasts for their future survival and reproduction are not very bright. On the other hand, these small-scale, and locally limited, violent activities can also be described in terms similar to what Franz Fanon has observed in Algeria, namely an outrage of horizontal violence, directed at groups or individuals in the immediate surroundings.[37] Lack of organised political space, as well as societal channels for the articulation of grievances and frustration, together with a lack of social and political leadership which could direct demands, and even violence towards vertical hierarchical oppressive structures, are understood as dominating features in the situations of massive local violence, directed against individuals or groups at the same societal level, and with the same kind of identity indicators.

Fanon considers this a self-destructive process, releasing long-term oppression and frustration, directed against 'the brother', as long as no

[37] Fanon, Franz, 1961, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York

political alternatives are available for directing the anger in ways that are more constructive. We believe this is a potentially rewarding approach to local conflict resolution and a future development working towards increased social cohesion, based on a sustainable livelihood approach.

It should also be said, that this reasoning does not only apply to the militias in Bunia, but is partly valid also for a discussion about somewhat more organised actors as the Mayi-Mayi, the former Congolese *hutu* militia called the 'combatants', parts of the *hutu* ALIR forces, and, to certain extent, the recruitment of child soldiers of any group in eastern Congo.

Obviously, the Congolese army should also be added to these different actors. In disarray for many, many years, it has not been very forceful or even present in the main conflict areas in the eastern parts of the country. Most of the 'national' Congolese interests seem to have been handled through 'Kinshasa-proxies'. In the first war, AFDL marched from South Kivu to Kinshasa without serious harassments from the army, and in the second war, the Kabila government survived only due to the intervention of Angola and Zimbabwe. The task of defending the eastern border, and resisting the Rwanda and Uganda occupational forces, has, thus, been delegated to those social forces with a direct stake in that area. It has been a kind of Machiavellian alliance between the FAC, ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, the Mayi-Mayi, and some offspring from the original RCD. Consequently, this is a mere illustration to the long-term extreme weakness of the Congolese state, and the fragmented nature of all public activities. Another way of expressing this state of decay is the obvious discrepancy between the government's willingness to negotiate and renegotiate mineral and petroleum concessions, at the same time as it has no capacity whatsoever to keep these areas safe and secure. This situation may be advantageous to both parties: immediate, but small, signatory bonuses for the government, and cheap long-term concessions for the enterprises.

Conclusion on the wars

Hence, the course of conflict in DRC since 1996 could be described in four observations:

1. Most national, regional and international actors accepted in 1996 that the Mobutu regime was overdue. Two international dimensions of guilty consciences underlined this acceptance. The Rwanda genocide in 1994 was the more important, and the continuous tensions surrounding this issue, were destined to create disturbances. The second guilty conscience regarded the passivity shown by the international community in front of the 'Sovereign Conference' 1991–92. This passivity is still today interpreted as a signal that broad peaceful transitions had less possibility of attracting international political and diplomatic support, than more violent efforts for regime change.
2. Soon it became clear that Laurent Kabila was not the solution. His pseudo-radicalism and unreliability as regards relations with international investors, and the inability to strike a new balance among domestic interests were dysfunctional. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Congolese society and its administration continued, and accelerated. However, the speed with which the second war emerged

made it largely an African affair. Very soon, it became clear that the war would not only, potentially, install another new president, but it would also lead to a re-structuring of control and ownership of important mineral assets in the DRC. Already during the period of the AFDL march towards Kinshasa the would-be president Kabila started a process of renegotiating mineral concessions. This restructuring continued as an integrated part of his defence strategy, in which the 'invited forces' to a great extent financed themselves through mining operations. The same goes for the Rwandan and Ugandan forces, as well as all other armed groups in need of financing arms deliveries and other expenses. Some of these enterprises have later been condemned by the UN reports on illegal exploitation of the DRC's mineral resources. However, if we look at this process with Paul Collier's economic rationality model, it should also be noted that this re-structuration of mineral export from the DRC for the first time in history benefited mainly African interests.

3. By international standards, the Lusaka agreement was negotiated quite quickly. However, its implementation was very slow. It was not until after the murder of Laurent Kabila 2001, and the transfer of presidential powers to his son Joseph, that the implementation process took off. The unconstitutional new president Joseph Kabila, substituting his likewise unconstitutional father, was legitimised internationally, also with a remarkable speed, in order not to create a new vacuum situation that would hamper the process. The agreement changed substantially the tone in WB and IMF reporting on the DRC, though the situation on the ground continued to worsen. However, with the benefit of the hindsight it could be argued that from then and onwards, the international community was convinced that the peace in the DRC was a matter of when, not if. Time would be given for different actors to position themselves to confront the continuous negotiations on the forms of implementation.
4. However, the holocaustian human sufferings that emerged on top of the second war, in terms of social collapse, and the emergence of the extreme forms of violence attached to all actors, created a public dilemma for the donor community and for the international financial institutions. The basic feature of this dilemma was, on the one hand, the brutal violations of human rights in the DRC, and the UN denounced the illegal exploitation of mineral resources had to be publicly condemned, in order not to break with the dominant human rights discourse. On the other hand, the incentives needed as rewards for the signatories of the Lusaka agreement included a (re)opening of the IFI credit facilities and budget/balance of payment support to the signing governments. Thus, the much-praised efficiency in the economic reform programmes, and the efforts by the same governments to attain a first-class achievement, co-existed with the knowledge that the approval of budget deficit benchmarks was conditioned by the need to finance war efforts (i.e. the gross violations of human rights) by extra-budgetary means. These extra-budgetary means were created through the same, internationally condemned illegal exploitation of the DRC's mineral wealth.

Nevertheless, the negotiating process emerging from the Lusaka agreement has continued, leading to a slow implantation. All regular foreign military forces have been withdrawn from the DRC, and during fall 2003 most of the transitional institutions envisaged in the agreement and the following process are now in place.

9.4The international donors and the quest for peace

The main external issue linked to the armed conflicts has been the continuous presence in the DRC of military forces hostile to the governments of Rwanda and Burundi. There has been a tendency within the international community, and among many DRC politicians, as well as among civil society activists, to downplay the importance of the issue of ex-FAR/*interahamwe*, and its reorganised successors in the eastern DRC. Along with improved relations between DRC and Rwanda, and some progress in the negotiations with some personalities among the *hutu* forces this situation has become more publicly visible. Thus, serious intelligence information has continuously stated that there are still relatively well-organised and well-equipped *hutu* forces in the DRC, which constitute a potential security threat to Rwanda. The same applies to Burundian *hutu* forces, which have been carrying out attacks inside Burundi from remote bases in the DRC.

This particular issue has been at the heart of the arguments from various parts in the conflict resolution process. Rwandan argument for its intervention in the DRC, as well as for its hesitation to withdraw, has mostly been justified with this security threat. Within the international community, and certainly among many Congolese social forces, this Rwandan argument has not been recognised. A common counter-argument has been that the Rwandan military forces during the intervention in DRC coexisted with, rather than fought, the ex-FAR/*interahamwe*. Thus, the Rwandan security argument was seen as a justification for the dirty business of exploiting the DRC's mineral resources.

However, the recent repatriation of around a hundred *hutu* forces, including the FDLR commander Paul Rwarakabije, is a first sign that this highly contentious issue could moving towards a solution. Nevertheless, many of the *hutu* hardliners within ALIR are still to be convinced to accept demobilisation and repatriation. Furthermore, Ugandan claims that it will not intervene again in the DRC constitute a further indication that the inter-state dimension of this war is approaching a resolution.

Hence, the *external conflict situation* is today reasonably contained. Both Rwanda and Uganda have withdrawn their regular armed forces from Congolese territory. However, in the internal Congolese political debate, the RCD-Goma is frequently accused of being a Rwandan proxy, both in military and political terms. In military terms, this means that the RCD-Goma and its military forces have been accused of maintaining Rwandan soldiers in its military ranks.

However, important steps to improve relations between the DRC and Rwanda have recently been taken with mutual visits by governmental ministers. The needed reciprocity in this diplomatic development is still not achieved, since the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs has still not made any visit to Rwanda. Although not on state visit level, the two

presidents Kabila and Kagame have met in South Africa. A consolidation of this situation requires that any concrete base for Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan claims that security threats issuing from DRC territory must be removed.

As for the *internal conflict situation*, some disturbances have been noted during the past few months. From time to time, there have been skirmishes and some local massacres on civilians in the Ituri province. However, most military observers, both within and outside MONUC, seem to agree that Bunia violence has had its own historical dynamics, and has not been linked directly to the main conflict pattern in the eastern provinces, also recent skirmishes in Sud-Kivu are considered to be on the decline.

Consequently, there are reasons to believe that the war is over in terms of organised military violence. However, as will be discussed below, most of the root sources of conflict are still present.

9.5 Challenges for peace building

Since the entry of Joseph Kabila as president, the international community has responded favourably to the political and economical changes in the DRC. Firstly, the major international financial institutions have returned to the DRC, after having interrupted cooperation in the early nineties. Other major donors have also developed the cooperation, and already at the donors' conference in 2002, 12 bilateral and 13 multilateral donors pledged US$ 2.5 billion in support of the post-war reconstruction.

A broad image of ongoing activities shows that it is primarily directed at humanitarian assistance (73%), health (19%), education (3%), social (3%) and management (2%). Of the total flow, 84% is channelled through multilateral agencies.

In general, the broad donor commitment is a response to the good prospects of a successful transitional period in DRC. After the installation of Joseph Kabila as President the implementation of the Lusaka agreement, and the following agreements within the Intercongolese dialogue (ICD), was accelerated. All the agreed upon political institutions are now in place. The central government is working, and its composition seems to be based on a, at least temporary, consensus about the real strength of the included different parties and movements. Thus, the present government has a good possibility to lead the country through the transition period until a new and elected Parliament, and a new President can shape a new Government.

However, the proper electoral process, the electoral day(s), the counting process and its immediate aftermath, are moments of high risk. The outcome of this process is very difficult to predict, since no one of the parties in the present government has ever been tested in free and fair elections. Their inclusion in the government has been more based on military and political strength, as well as the specific strength they acquired during the ICD through their respective international linkages. Evaluating the social, political and regional base of these parties is today close to impossible. In case of an unexpected electoral outcome, or a clear fraudulent situation, it cannot be ruled out that local or regional

violent reaction may appear. In a worst, worst scenario, such an outcome could contribute to the (re)emergence of separatist or irredentist organisations.

Hence, from a basically positive point of departure as regards the present situation and the prospects for the short and medium term future, it is, nevertheless, necessary to identify sectors, issues and activities, which should be closely monitored and possibly supported during the transitional period, in order for the international development co-operation to work in and on the conflict.

Risks in the political system

There is a general risk linked to peace agreements, which mainly deals with a reshaping of balance of power and influence in the military and political realm of the conflict-ridden society. Although it sometimes manages to establish a 'working order' among the included parties, not all relevant parties are included, and mostly no attention is given to what is sometimes called root causes of the conflict. Root causes are normally left to any new government to consider. Lack of political maturity, in combination with persistent patterns of regional, ethnic or other identity group discrimination, may easily leave root causes behind, contributing to a seething discontent.

One possible risk is the construction of the government and the four vice presidents. It opens up for a vertical separation of the government, and since each party group of ministers has its own vice president the possible tensions are the same both in the government and within the presidency. This construction may turn out to be unfortunate if the government parties start to see their ordinary work as an electoral campaign. The experiences of the new government has, hitherto, been that MLC has been the most systematic and purposeful in its efforts to create separate friendly relations with the donor community in Kinshasa. The huge differences as regards political experience between different governmental parties should therefore be taken into account when donors are evaluating proposals and taking decisions on sectoral choices of activities to be supported.

It is obvious that the three dominating political forces, the former government, MLC and RCD-Goma should have most of the ministerial positions. But it should be noted that the distribution of portfolios also is biased in the sense that these main parties completely dominate all ministries linked to security and the economy. In the somewhat unusual division of the economic ministries of Planning, Budget, Finance, Economy, Industry, and Mines, these ministries are all controlled by ministers from MLC, RCD-Goma and the former government. On the other hand, one the ministries that from a post-conflict reconstruction point of view should be considered important, Ministry of Rural Development, is led by a less experienced minister from the Mayi-Mayi, and reportedly run in a situation gravely affected by both material and staff scarcity. Internal governmental grievances may easily grow out of such a situation. A further risk is that the government, in fact, is only transitional, and will address structural problems rather than formulating and implementing economic and political measures that will affect the population positively. There are still no signs of how the underlying roots of

the conflict will be handled and transformed. Different parties in the government do still have very different views on the root causes of the conflict.

Governance and Civil and Political Rights

Today, there is very little organised public service. However, and surprisingly enough, both the idea of a local administration and its function, and the individuals who were last in to be appointed to the different posts, are often still at hand. The different rebel movements have, in principle, followed both the pattern and nomenclature of the administrative division when organising administrative structures in the areas they have held. Thus, apart from leading posts, such as governors at province level, many of the same civil servants are still performing some duties. Above all, they consider themselves part of the civil administration of the country. These individuals are still functioning at the most local administrative level. Although no salaries have been paid for years, many teachers continue teaching the pupils, whose parents can afford a contribution to the survival of the teacher. Some rudimentary structures of the health system still exist. France, Belgium, the UNDP, and the World Bank are currently conducting a nationwide inventory study of the situation within the administration.

Political parties and the civil society

Only when the preparation for the forthcoming elections has been completed will it be possible to say something about the scope to manoeuvre for political parties and other social forces. Not one of the groups in the new government is a political party in any real sense of the word, though some individual ministers represent established political parties. However, the main governmental parties hatched as rebel organisations, of which the organisational forms and mode of internal action have emerged out of an armed conflict. Other individuals in the political institutions may have a deep experience of civil society work, but are less experienced in party politics, which sometimes dissolves the traditional distinction between the civil society and political parties.

This is a legacy from the Mobutu period, as the traditional civil society organisations, such as the churches and other religious communities, as well as Human Rights organisations, have come to harbour most of the political opposition. This has politicised the civil society. Sometimes relations among civil society organisations have more resemblance to relations between political parties. It is still unclear as to what extent these organisations will have the capacity to create nationwide networks and organisational structures. It is even less clear where and how they will find their electoral bases, i.e. what will be their message to a potential electorate.

Specific problems with support to civil society and political parties

Supporting the civil society can thus be hazardous since the boundaries between political parties cannot always be clearly distinguished. This should not necessarily be a problem in itself; as long as we are aware that the future politicians emerge from within the civil society organisations.

As regards the political parties emerging in a post conflict situation, and preparing themselves for the first democratic elections ever, donors

should be attentive as to what kind of arguments is arising in electoral mobilisation. Many politicians have a territorial and/or 'ethnic' (tribal) affiliation, contrary to the conventional western multi-party system, in which most affiliations to political parties are based on socio-economic interests or ideology. High-profile political parties with a clear 'ethnic' and/or 'territorial' discourse would be signs of a special vulnerability, possibly based on emerging grievances from politicised territorial identity groups. Thus, it is up to international donors to attentive in relation to possible regional/territorial discriminations as regards support to political parties.

Risks emerging from politico-military situation

A possible division within the governmental structure could as well affect the military apparatus. The same party division has dominated the talks around the new military structure. RCD-Goma has gained an upper hand in the negotiations, providing both the Minister of defence and the Chief of Staff. Recently, three former RCD-Goma officers have taken office as commanders of the military regions of Goma, Bukavo, and Bandundu. Although allegiance is sworn to the President, the RCD-Goma has, in practise, military control of its core regions. With this RCD-Goma has gained one more victory in the military negotiations, since the earlier principle, that no one should be in command in his party's core regions, has been abolished.

However, this military solution also has its international implications, and could even be praised for its political sensitivity in relation to Rwanda's claims about continuing security threats from *hutu* forces in eastern DRC. Until a complete dissolution and repatriation of *hutu* forces in DRC has been implemented, the Government of DRC seems to have showed the necessary sensitivity as regards expressed Rwandan security needs. This is another kind of illustration to the positive trend in the international community's commitment to the peace work in the region. However, the military issue still depends on how the basis for the Rwandan claims on security threats from DRC territory is handled. It is plausible that both Rwandan and the RCD-Goma military attention will continue to be on high alert as long as the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe*/FDLR issue is not finally removed from the agenda.

Nevertheless, the military reorganisation process has only started and there is still no national demobilisation program ready for implementation.

A concentrated evaluation of the military sector is that the military structure as such will be taken care of, mostly by the countries with bilateral agreements for the military sector (US and Belgium) and within a broad approach of Security Sector Reform. Future conflicts are not likely to emerge directly from the military system. But the military personnel, both those continuing in service and those demobilised, will for a long period keep an implicit allegiance to their respective political leaders. Thus political tensions may spill over to the military, rather than the other way around.

The Ituri issue

The situation in the Ituri province, and the provincial capital Bunia has attracted a lot of attention during the last year. Horrendous massacres and violation of human rights have occurred, disguised as ethnic conflicts.

However, it seems as if most observers over time have come to the conclusion that the events in Ituri have had its dynamics more in parallel with than as a part of the main conflicts dynamics. The Ituri province is very rich in minerals and the proximity to the oil assets in and around the Lake Albert makes the province an interesting catch for economic interests, both directly linked to the external warring parties, as Uganda and Rwanda, as well as Congolese, not least local, interest in being in control of land when a new wave of prospecting activities will start as stability increases with peace. In this context, it should also be noted that control of land may become a valuable asset, also in relation to future activities in the oil sector.

Thus, a growing stability in the country will also increase security in Ituri. However, the total breakdown of societal structure in the province temporarily created a situation of complete lawlessness. This has, however, been minimally restored, and it seems as if during the last months a fragile but relative stability would have emerged. The government is in Ituri facing a huge task, first to establish a governmental presence in the area, then to enter a process legitimacy building through measures for increased social stability and normalisation. The key to stability in Bunia is the completion of the ongoing negotiations on new, and renewed, mineral concessions in the area – followed by the concessionaries' control of their respective mining sites.

Demobilisation

To a great extent, the outcome of the demobilisation is depending on how the reintegration of rank and file from all armed groups will turn out.

The complex web of different actors, who have participated in the armed conflict, makes the demobilisation process complicated. On the one hand, there are soldiers coming from reasonably well organised units. They will be 'delivered' to the restructuring process, and demobilised if are considered unfit for future military service, or if their numbers exceed the size of the new army. On the other hand, there are soldiers (or perhaps the recently introduced word "combatants" could be used in this context) who have been active in loosely connected groups, with a low degree of internal cohesion. They may even have been a kind of part-time combatants, moving both in and out of violent activities, and between different groups.

Although the DRC national DDR programme is still in preparation, the structures and strategies for the handling of ordinary soldiers will surely be addressed. It seems as if the re-structuring of the Congolese Armed Forces are proceeding relatively smoothly. The first new deployment of united forces is under way in Kisangani, and the bilateral international cooperation in the field seems to be stable.

However, there is still a great uncertainty about what should be done with all the irregular forces and the 'homemade' combatants with hidden

caches of weapons. Here there is need for closer coordination between the DDR programme and the efforts to transform humanitarian assistance into development activities. There is still a need for a discussion of the coordination of peace building strategies directed towards the recruitment base of irregular forces, i.e. the destitute population of the rural areas.

This is not only an issue linked to those suffering from the effects of the latest war, but the long-term structural violence problem, which have been ongoing for many decades. It should also be remembered that this issue is above all a socio-economic and social cohesion issue, including the entire rural population in eastern DRC, and especially the marginalised layers of the rural and semi-urban population, and the *lumpenproletariat*. It is from these extremely vulnerable groups that the bulk of the rank and file of the most violent 'militias' are recruited.

9.6 Current political risk issues

The citizenship question

Obviously, the transitional government will have to deal with a lot of issues related to its proper role a transitional solution. Some of these are linked to the very first steps in a Herculean process of post-conflict reconstruction. It regards both the proper infrastructure all over the huge country, as well as the organisational and administrative challenge get public and private activities going a process of normalisations. The rehabilitation of basic public infra-structure is not limited, as in many other post-conflict countries, to repair or rebuild war causalities. An even more demanding task is to construct what was never constructed, neither during colonial time, nor during the Mobutu reign. This is a challenge in itself. Nevertheless, these huge tasks are not *that* political sensitive. There may be disagreements as regards regional and sectoral priorities, but in general it seems as if there is a common conviction that these societal needs have to be met.

However, and related to the risk of backsliding in the conflict, there are two political issues in the Congolese society, which seem to be highly contentious. The first is, as mentioned earlier in this report, often called the 'citizenship' question. In its most simple form it is a question of citizenship for a number of people in DRC with ancient or more recent Rwandan origin. At another level it is a question of land rights for millions of people in the eastern parts of the country. A deep land reform seems to be a prerequisite for a solution of this issue. The land issue intimately linked to the political needs of the RCD-Goma for future elections. It is also a crucial issue in the Rwandan equation to stabilise the Kivus and if solved, Rwanda, as well as the RCD-Goma, can probably count on a certain political support in the region; if unresolved, local Kivu skirmishes can develop, potentially creating an influx of refugees into Rwanda. Perceived threats against the *Kinyarwanda*-speaking population in the Kivus (as well as in other parts of the DRC) could easily become a justification for increased Rwandan pressure against the DRC government.

At an even deeper political level this issue is crucial for future relations to Rwanda and Burundi. At the end of a sliding scale of seriousness we

will find the issue of the proper future for the eastern parts of DRC, and a fear that it will, for all practical purposes, become an integrated part of eastern Africa.

These issues are highly contentious at all levels of the society. Local violent struggles in eastern Congo have for many years, even before the genocide and the refugee flows of 1994, been focused on the land issues, involving the identity groups of Rwandan origin. At the national level, there is still a palpable hostility against the *'banymulenge'* group and later immigrated *'tutsi'* people from Rwanda. This is partly a consequence of the Belgian policies to favour and educate *'tutsi'* people from Rwanda, and then positioning them in the colonial administrative system also in Congo.

These issues are, also obviously, linked to the role and position of the RCD-Goma in the current government and political administration. RCD-Goma is the pivotal political force in a process of normalising the relations to Rwanda. Any break-up between the RCD-Goma and the rest of the government is likely to upset the situation in the east – and the relation to Rwanda, possibly also Uganda.

Political reconciliation

Reconciliation is mostly understood as the process of healing relations between perpetrators and victims, and their relatives, in post-conflicts environments. During the later years this process has often taken the form of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or similar institutions. This is also the case in DRC, and the Commission is about to initiate its work. The idea behind the Commission in DRC is somewhat unique in the contemporary history, since it will not only deal with the fading armed conflict, but with the entire period since Independence 1960. This would obviously be a good thing for a country, which has suffered so much from various forms of political and human rights abuse. However, from a practical point of view, this may seem to be a too wide and demanding task to be carried out with sufficient accuracy and transparency, especially if its mandate will be only two years.

However, the situation in DRC, and the perceived necessity to include more than forty years of repressive governance, is an illustration to the deep cleavages dividing the Congolese society, not least among the political and economic elites, those who for the first time are now assembled in a new and more inclusive political arena. Discussions about these historical injuries have consequently been suppressed over the years, and have left many scars and obstacles for elite consolidation in the DRC. Therefore reconciliation should be seen both in relation to local abuse and its contribution to reinforced social trust, and its role to foster a new relationship among elites. The image, that political and social change only can only come about through violent means, has to be destroyed. Thus, the Commission is aimed not only at treating and reconciling in relation to last eight years of atrocities and gross violations of human rights. But it will also, hopefully, contribute to the reconciliation between the political, economic, social and cultural forces, which have been victimised and pitched against each other during the entire period since Independence.

Hence, the forty-years mandate is thus the necessary extension for getting the assassination of Congo's first President Patrice Lumumba into

the Commission's mandate. With this, the reconciliation process in DRC will have a more important and direct politically unifying function, than what is common in similar situations in other countries. Furthermore, many voices in DRC do still see the assassination of Lumumba more in a nationalist, rather than strictly political ideological, perspective. This implies that the reconciliation process in its dealing with the human rights violation during the period 1960–1997 will also have a point against the international community, which along the dictatorship of Mobutu supported, or kept the eyes closed, as regards the autocratic repression. This would also cover the UN passivity in the relation to the Lumumba murder, as described for example in the autobiography of Carl von Horn, the Swedish commander of the UN forces at the time of the assassination.

Economic reconciliation

Another dimension of reconciliation has to do with how the economic spoils after Mobutu will be handled. This is no longer a process that can be orchestrated from within the autocratic circles, but it will be strictly guided from the internal community, through the international financial institutions. But principles and mechanisms behind the forthcoming privatisation processes are not neutral, in the sense that they do not influence the possibilities for different Congolese elite groups to play a future role in the management of the country's economic assets. Basically, this is a political question, since it is linked to the forthcoming patterns of economic policy, credit availability and new patterns elite alliances. The intricate question is about what internal social forces will benefit from this redistribution: Those, who earlier have been loyal to the Mobutu system and its international backers, or those who lately have made their way to power violently? Since it seems as if this process will take place before there is an elected government in place, all these issues are highly political and contentious. Failure in these proceedings may very well create and detach both 'greedy' and 'discontented' elites from the peace process.

Economic reform is too often seen as a mere instrument. This may enhance economic growth, which is a prerequisite for resolving social and political problems that may affect the conflict-ridden society. However, from a conflict perspective, it is crucial to understand how different elites, as well as the broader segments of the population, are affected by different economic reform strategies. Thus, any analysis of economic reform programmes in the DRC should seek to take into account how different interventions affect different economic elites, both those who have been intimately linked to the pre-war regime and those who are now seeking to position themselves foremost, both politically and economically, for the new era. Although there is too little information, close to nothing, in public documents or contemporary analysis, this issue will be referred to, now and then, as a remainder of the threat that increased intra-elite struggles on economic assets could pose for the fragile peace process.

In a broader sense, and in a conflict perspective, the economic restructuring of the DRC would have to be implemented slowly and carefully. It should take into account that we are witnessing a sharing of

the heritage of 40 years of dictatorial distribution of assets, based on a tradition that social change must always be based on violence. This reasoning has a bearing on the restructuring of the mineral sector, as well as on the entire privatisation process, which will occur in an economic reform programme. Special credit is needed in order to guarantee broad Congolese participation in a reformed Congolese economy.

The mechanisms for these kinds of considerations should be integrated in the World Bank and IMF transactions with the government. One important argument in this context is that there should be no wholesale privatisation of state-owned property until *after* an elected government is in place.

Possibilities and obstacles for growth.

Mining, export agriculture and forestry are the three sectors expected to lead the economic recovery. The mining sector is especially seen as a huge potential for economic recovery. From 1985, the production of copper, for example, has declined to some 5% of its earlier maximum of around 500,000 tons. The formal production of gold, zinc, and tin in practice has disappeared. From these almost non-existent levels of production, and exports, the economy is expected to grow by some 6% over the coming three years. An assessment of this projection would be that it is quite modest, taken into account the low initial levels. Furthermore, the fact that direct violence will cease, the security situation will improve, and the IDPs will be resettled, will imply a substantial growth in family agriculture. Hence, there should be enormous possibilities for rapid growth, as long as the peace process keeps its promises.

There are two main direct threats to the envisaged growth strategy and one indirect one.

The first will emerge if the government does not succeed in implementing the economic reforms, which are assumed to be engines for growth. This regards, for example, how the surplus labour of workers from privatised state companies are treated. A certain trade union militancy has been displayed, especially within the mining sector. Linked to this process is also the risk that marginalised/alienated economic and political elites may be tempted to obstruct, if they are not considered in the privatisation process.

The second threat will emerge if living conditions in the mega-city of Kinshasa become more oppressive than the suburb dwellers can support. Salaries for public employees are already illusory. Unemployment would remove any possibility they now have of gaining something out of the petty corruption of their positions.

A third, indirect, obstacle is that the strategy as such does not take into account sufficiently well the need for increased internal purchasing power. If the proper programme is not seen as also providing for rural areas, the political legitimacy may be threatened, and indirectly threaten the economic reform program as such.

An obstacle of another kind lies in the risk that international donors will not contribute the resources necessary to implement the programme in a long-term perspective.

Natural resources

Illegal exploitation of the mineral resources of DRC has been a constant feature in the discussion about the war in DRC in general, and especially in the eastern part of the country. A main dividing line in different analysis has been between those highlighting the exploitation of mineral resources as a main aim for the foreign armed forces, and others seeing their use of existing resources mainly as a way of financing the war efforts. Our position is that what we have seen hitherto in this context has mainly part of financing efforts, though individual enrichment has also been a substantial part of the process. Here most observers do also point at a difference between Uganda and Rwanda. Ugandan interests would have been more inclined to individual enrichment, while the Rwandan intervention and organisation of extraction and export would have been more directed at financing of the military engagement. This 'wild west' mineral exploitation period has now come to an end.

However, besides the short term interests displayed during the war there is obviously a long-term interest in DRC's mineral resources. This has been so since colonial time, and the economic policies to be pursued during to coming years emphasise the mineral sector as the main engine of growth.

The challenge in the mineral sector is to strike a balance between all the different interests engaged in the sector. Besides the dominating transnational corporation with long-term engagement in Congo, also new regional players are very interested in entering this arena. Here we can envisage growing claims from Ugandan and Rwandan interests, wanting to be included. There will also be claims from various Congolese capitals groups, not only those formerly linked to the parastatals in the sector. However, a main engagement is coming from South Africa. South Africa has since the fall of the apartheid system worked arduously to expand its mineral sector activities in Africa. This has gone hand in hand with the Government's increasing engagement in the continent's political affairs. South Africa's deep commitment to the peace process in Central Africa could well be seen in this light. The recent US$ 10 billion accord between South Africa and DRC is the public confirmation of this long term commitment. The agreement covers co-operation in various areas such as defence and security, the economy and infrastructure. A main contribution will be that the South African Chamber of Commerce will rehabilitate the giant Gecamines mining concern, as well as one concession of the Kilomoto Gold Mines.

The risks involved in the mineral sector today are not of the same local and violent kind, as during the war period. But different parties in a sensible negotiation process on contracts and concessions may, at times, use political, or even military threats, to reinforce their bargaining power. The main risk would be to leave Rwandan and Ugandan interests completely out this business. The politically and long-term most sensible issue here is how to balance between, on the one hand, the economic and political forces emphasising the historical commercial and economical links that eastern Congo has had eastwards, and the need of reinforcing this eastward orientation, and, on the other hand, the legitimate and obvious interest of a new Congolese government to keep control of all Congolese resources that can contribute to the construction of a legiti-

mate Congolese political system. Any move eastwards would be seen as potential threat against such an endeavour.

Elites as conflict generators

It may seem as if too much attention is given to the elite aspects of the ongoing peace process. However, if we are looking back to the years of the latest conflict, and to years of Mobutu, it is easy to see that fragmented elite groups have been in the forefront of the most destructive forces. Seldom do broader sectors of the population at grass root level move into protracted armed action without active mobilisation efforts from engaged leaderships at elite level. Thus, the reasons behind a backsliding of conflict resolution processes could be described as a combination of perceived continuing marginalisation of certain elites, and a lack of success in restoring 'normal' conditions in the environments from which the rank and file of violent movements are recruited. Hence, it is within the bilateral and multilateral political dialogue between the donor community and the ambitious political and economic elites that much of the peace building work is actually done.

The importance of the elites as conflict generators should also be seen in relation to our discussion in the introduction about gaps of frustration. Political elites, business people and the civil society leadership have during the Intercongolese dialogue built up huge expectation and aspirations about their roles in a future post-Mobutu DRC. At the same time, it is obvious that not all of these groups, political parties and outstanding personalities will be allowed the needed capacities for achieving their expectation. The internal struggle is already ongoing, and the new arena is constituted through the political institutions. Who will loose, and who will win is still too early to predict, but it is of utmost importance to monitor the movements in this arena. It is especially important in a country as DRC, because the earlier political regime was very tight and very much closed. This meant that many political aspirations found their organisational expressions within the civil society. Thus, we can foresee an emergence of political parties out of civil society organisations, which are aspiring for political power. Also as regards economic activities, there is in DRC a palpable experience among business people that the road to successful business goes through politics. Hence, the changing environment for politicians, for business people, as well as for the civil society leadership will shake up their internal relations, and the could be a risk that the marginalised ones may detach themselves from the process – returning to armed resources for positioning themselves in this struggle.

Development as reconciliation

The actual process of reconciliation should not be limited to the fragmented elites, nor should it be too narrowly directed towards the conventional violations of human rights. In our work, the concept of structural violence has been highlighted as an important condition behind the war. Structural violence and long-term deprivation of basic human needs are seen as strong determinants behind the social and psychological vulnerability in rural local communities. This vulnerability diminishes the capacity to resist various kinds of mobilisation efforts carried out by leaderships and elites of any social force in need of armed young men.

It is in the rural local communities we find the most disturbing expressions of structural violence. As mentioned above, the situation had deteriorated continuously until the first war broke out. Already during the easy march of the AFDL from Kivu to Kinshasa, recruitment along the road was largely based on these destitute layers of the local communities. Enrolment offered both excitement and possible survival.

It was easy to find an armed group into which to be integrated. For a number of years before 1994, the eastern provinces had seen increasing local tension, involving local identity groups, as well as *tutsi* and *hutu*, of Rwandan origin. From time to time, some of this tension for land struggles had turned into violence, which mobilised young men. With a total breakdown of societal structures after 1996, small, armed groups with local loyalties became the only security on which people with some assets could rely. The situation worsened further as the armed conflict developed into a social chaos. Numerous armed groups, often with few, if any, links to the general pattern of conflict, grew as a response to the parallel dissolution of the political system, the public service, and social trust in local communities.

Reconciliation has also a political meaning in that it regards the recreation of legitimacy for a political system, with its administrative institutions, which has not succeeded in its classical task in protecting its population and guaranteeing its long-term survival. On the contrary, the state itself has been a main promoter and perpetrator of human rights' abuses. Thus whatever will happen at the central level in the political transition, if the broader layers of the population will still be detached from the process, they will continue to constitute a mobilisation and recruitment base for the losers in the intra elite struggles, who would like to create new violent havocs. Such a re-linking between rural destitute people and marginalised elites is probably the main threat against the peace process and social stability. Hence, the failed political system must reconcile itself with its own population, in order to gain legitimacy and engagement in the coming electoral process.

Human Development

The economic and social legacy of this war, as well as of long-term neglect, is appalling. The I-PRSP (2002) concludes that about 80% of the population live on less than US$ 0.20 a day. This means that the resources available for a person considered to be outright poor by the UN Millennium standards, has to be shared by five Congolese poor. For many years, the DRC has been established among the countries in the world with the lowest Human Development Index.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the available social indicators are very uneven, if compared across the country. Kinshasa in particular, and provinces as Bas-Congo, Katanga and Nord-Kivu, are relatively better off. Bandundu, Equateur, and Orientale are, in economic terms the worst affected areas. In terms of more structural social indicators, such as literacy, school enrolment and life expectancy, Sud-Kivu is clearly the worst province. Although everybody is poor, the continuously increasing gap between urban and rural areas should also be mentioned in this context.

Even if the I-PRSP is evidently underdeveloped in terms of its poverty reduction strategy formulation, it highlights the need to develop such

a strategy. Although the figures are unreliable, the sector descriptions of the poverty situation indicate an appalling situation. What is especially problematic is that the I-PRSP itself states clearly that there is no possibility in the DRC to achieve the Millennium targets of reducing poverty by half by 2015. Hence, it is a worrying sign that also the World Bank and the IMF are criticising the government for its lack of priority on poverty alleviation. In their assessment of the I-PRSP, they note that there are no implementation plans for a poverty-reduction strategy, neither are there any targets, nor poverty indicators, to guide planning and the implementation of any pro-poor growth strategy.

HIV/Aids

The HIV/Aids pandemic has first and foremost very traumatic consequences for affected people, and their relatives. Health sector resources are limited, and the disease is increasingly crowding out most other activities in hospital wards. The public health institutions gradually transformed into Aids wards, with decreasing possibilities to treat other, curable, sicknesses. In this process, poor and sick people may turn into competitors for a decreasing caring capacity.

In a broader perspective, the disease has an indirect bearing on conflict risks in at least two directions.

The first is the societal consequences of o process in which a large part of the economically active population is affected and bound to pass away too early. It has serious consequences within both public institutions and private companies, as the disease starts to diminish the amount of trained staff. In the long run, this will affect both economic growth, and the possibility for the political system to provide and adequate public service.

The second is the special consequences that this process will have in a rural setting. The loss of one (even worse two) adult will rapidly decrease the livelihood stability for hundreds of thousands of families. The number of orphans is steadily increasing. An increasing number of 'child-headed' households is reported.

The HIV/Aids situation has its main risk influence in the emergence of new vulnerable groups among children and youth. In the rural areas youngster orphans may have few alternative for survival than engagement in 'doubtful' activities. In a worst scenario they are easy recruits for armed brigandage or local warlordism. In urban areas, a criminal career is often the only alternative for survival.

9.7 Risk evaluation

Above we have pointed at some the sectors and activities within which we deem that the main risks and threats against a peaceful development in today's DRC are located. The above table will list some different factors and activities from different sectors and clarify the risk evaluation that we do. It will follow a scale of low, medium and high risks (x-xx-xxx). This evaluation should be understood as an indicator on the degree of attention that should be given to each activity. The likelihood of different outcomes is presented in the scenario analysis in section II of this report.

Sector	Risk evaluation
The political system	
– Internal divisionism in Government	xxx
– Premature electoral campaigning	xxx
The politico-military situation	
– Military fragmentation due to political divisionism	xx
– Military fragmentation due to demobilisation shortcomings	x
– Military fragmentation due to shortcoming in repatriation of foreign forces	xx
– New intervention of foreign forces	x
Ituri	
– New large scale massacres and human rights violation	x
– Local skirmishes linked to competition on land and mineral sites	xx
Political issues	
– The 'citizenship' question	xxx
– Political reconciliation	xx
– Economic reconciliation	x
– Marginalisation of ethnic and/or regional elite identities	xx
Development issues	
– Continuing structural violence	xxx
– Land tension in the Kivus	xxx
– Food security	xxx
Demobilisation	
- Restructuring of the armed forces	x
- Reintegration of rank and file	xx
- Reintegration of middle range officers and local commanders	xx
Natural resources	
- 'Wild West' exploitation of mineral resources	x
- Foreign policy tensions as part of negotiation on concessions	xx
- Local tension on control of sites and middleman activities	xx
- Pattern of privatisation and new renewed concessions	xx
HIV/Aids	
- Effects on growth and skilled labour – short term	x
- Effects on rural livelihood – short and long term	xxx
– Effects on urban social stability	xx

9.8 Mechanisms for conflict management and resolution

How we look at conflict resolution mechanisms is mainly a question of how we define the conflict, its root causes and its dynamics. Through this report, not least visible in the chapter on scenarios, we have tried to keep a distinction between direct violence and structural violence, in line with Galtung's famous concepts. One basic assumption is that a high degree of structural violence constitutes a risk for a re-emergence of direct violence. Conflict resolution mechanisms are measures aiming to control and diminish direct violence, as well as measures aiming to reduce structural violence.

Our general conclusion as regards the political and military situation development in DRC is positive. The new political structures are put in place and are functional. The military process has moved on without substantial backsliding as regards the main armed groups and their political representatives. There is a palpable desire among the actors in Kinshasa to consolidate a situation without direct violence. Furthermore, the main actors within then international community, as well as the financial institutions, do display a firm commitment to peace in DRC. The situation was during the second war period on its way to move out of control, with possible disastrous consequences for the entire central Africa. Today, such a risk is non-existing for the foreseeable future, and new large-scale outbreaks of direct violence in DRC would probably only come about as consequences of a complete breakdown in the political process.

In a such a situation (note: if our analysis is correct) conflicts mechanisms directed towards structural violence reduction are relatively more important than those directed at direct violence. If a new war would break out around the forthcoming elections and the creation of a new government, it would (also according to our risk analysis) depend more on political mistakes from both international and internal actors in the consolidation process, and too little attention given to structural violence reduction, than on the actuation of the military conflict resolution mechanisms. Hence, the main problems in the current situation are political, social and economic.

The role of MONUC

The UN mission in DRC has constantly been criticised from many quarters in the region. Initially, the main criticism regards the decline to send a sufficient number of troops (5.500 was the initial number) in order to fulfil its mandate. It took until 2003 before the number has risen to almost 11.000, which today is considered sufficient number. But when this increase is completed, the war is over and the main task is another. Thus, the military role of the MONUC in ending this war has not been very prominent. However, neither the lack of troops and financing, nor the weak mandate, is a MONUC issue as such. Rather it is a question of the commitment to central Africa of the international community.

One interpretation of this situation in the region has been that it reflected a continuation of the UN position in relation to the genocide in Rwanda: passivity (at best) or a pro-*hutu* position (at worst). When MONUC during 2003 started to overcome such a suspicion in relation to

Rwanda, observers in DRC have noted a growing suspicion from Congolese social and political forces, drawing their reluctance from experiences of the UN mission in Congo during the sixties.

One of the most important tasks for MONUC should have been to disarm and repatriate the ex-FAR/*interahamwe* forces in eastern DRC to Rwanda. Very few combatants have in practise been repatriated, until very recently. The return to Rwanda of the FDLR Commander Paul Rwarakabije in November was at the time seen a turning point, though there has been no continuation of the process. This slow pace of repatriation is also a consequence of the mandate MONUC was given. Since disarmament was voluntary, few *hutu* combatants have felt it secure to return to Rwanda.

Another debacle of MONUC was the inability to intervene effectively against the growing violence and gross violations of human rights in the Ituri province, as well as in the Kivu provinces. A badly co-ordinated and equipped mission in Bunia during spring 2003 was overrun by events, and only with the intervention of a EU force, led by France, and with Swedish participation, it was possible to restore some calmness in the area. However, this intervention also had a complex political context, since France, by the present government in Rwanda, is held as the main internationally responsible for the genocide and its consequences. The situation did not get less preoccupying since, reportedly, a number of French officers, who had organised Operation Turquoise 1994, reappeared in commanding positions of the French forces in Bunia. Their impartiality was questioned.

However, although MONUC has been criticised for military shortcomings, and to some extent for a certain political insensitivity, it managed to fill up the space behind Rwandan and Ugandan forces withdrawing from the central parts of DRC. Also, a lot of negotiational work has been done through MONUC, when local skirmishes have broken out in eastern DRC. MONUC has also been instrumental in the negotiations, which have established the relations between the local armed groups in Ituri and the central government.

On balance, MONUC has been hampered by a lack of commitment of the international community, and a general distrust, based on historical experiences, against the UN in the region. The efforts of MONUC to handle DRC-Rwanda relations have obviously been complicated. On the one hand, the process of repatriation of ex-FAR/*interahamwe* has by Rwanda been considered to be too passive and slow. On the other hand, any more active efforts to intervene would have hurt the Kabila government's alliance with the same forces, in order to keep a pressure on the Rwandans. It should be noted that it is reported that the Kabila government as late as August 2003 supported ex-FAR/*interahamwe* with weapons and logistics. Hence, MONUC's military role has been overshadowed by its relatively successful diplomatic efforts. Nevertheless, the reinforced mandate through resolution 1493 has increased its capacity, and SRSG has got a more influential role as responsible for the co-ordination of all UN organisations in the country.

In this context, it should also be noted that the work of the Swedish military contribution to MONUC, the airport company in Kindu, is highly appreciated for its air traffic control activities.

MONUC's future role

Hence, MONUC's role in the peace process hitherto has been mixed. To a certain extent this is a consequence of the heavy political role the more forceful international actors are playing in the whole region. Since MONUC's major role was linked to the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, it active military role in DRC may come to diminish, as internal processes will stabilise and the bilateral actors will increase their activities. This is a natural process.

However, since MONUC is presently forced to deploy substantial parts of its forces to the Ituri province, as well as the Kivus, its capacity to maintain its monitoring capacity in the rest of country has been hampered. Resolving the Ituri disturbances is increasingly emerging as a crucial issue for MONUC.

There is still no sign of a strategy for establishing a broad observation mission, with a sufficiently broad presence for playing a crucial role in the planning of the nationwide elections, as well as for the monitoring of the proper electoral process. Recent criticisms voiced against the government for delaying necessary decision on electoral legislation illustrates the need for a co-ordinating body as MONUC to increase its capacity to contribute to the process.

Thus, is could be said that MONUC will have three main tasks for forthcoming years.

The first would be to establish a broad presence in the country, in order to constitute a logistic network, which is able to plan and monitor the process, as well as being a focal point for civil political and human rights observers, who should be deployed all over the country in parallel with an expansion of the MONUC presence.

The second would be to continue and reinforce the DDR process of external forces. This is demanding task, since it involves a lot a sensitive diplomacy. This task is a key to stability in the eastern part of DRC.

The third task would be to continue the lead co-ordinating responsibility for the elections.

A fourth task could, possibly, also be envisaged. That would be to assist in a more planned and active fashion in the future demobilisation process within DRC. Although this is generally perceived as a national responsibility, to be planned and carried by governmental institutions, and financed through the World Bank administered MDRP, a third party intervention could play an important role. Many of the armed small groups will have few people fit for the new integrated army, and MONUC could possibly play a role in mediating both between these groups, and between them and the government. The main task would be to assist the government demobilisation program to ensure that small groups do not try to hibernate with their arms caches intact, as did the Mulele rebellion during the sixties and the seventies.

The main constraint in such a mandate for MONUC would be a lack of commitment from the international community. Such a lack of commitment, hindering the UN to follow this process to its, hopefully, positive end, would again jeopardize the reputation of the UN in the region.

Other international mechanisms

Chapter three of this report gives an overview of the different international and regional initiatives and conflict management mechanisms in the region. It seems as if most of them (AU, SADC, TPVM, Heads of State initiatives, EAC, IGAD, etc) made their most active intervention in the diplomacy around the negotiation of the Lusaka Agreement and its continuation in Pretoria and Sun City. Since few of them possess any substantial military capacity (with exception of South Africa), they have mostly been limited to diplomacy, and sometimes observation. Furthermore, the present state of affairs of the regional conflict has put other processes in the forefront. However, as we have argued in other parts of the report, several of these institutions and mechanisms deserve a continuous support in order to reach the degree of institutional stability, which is necessary for the long-term fulfilment of their regional conflict prevention and management objectives.

The process diplomatic engagements and negotiations of international politics in which DRC is presently involved will be determinant for how it will take its new place in the international community. The main questions at stake are its regional relations, its political position taking in the current global issues and its long-term relations to the world market of its main resources – minerals. Thus, as military, political and social stability are increasing, the process will gradually move towards bilateral relations, and the active role of international conflict resolution mechanisms will diminish. As noted above, MONUC will still have to play a role for sometime. The UN involvement will then be reduced to the normal representation of it different organs. This analysis is consistent with our most likely scenario, in which the threats of continuing direct violence are gradually diminishing. However, at lot of new efforts will be necessary to reduce the structural violence.

9.9 Domestic conflict resolution

Again, it should be emphasised that our judgement of the situation in DRC is that the direct violence is fading, and that the military and diplomatic actions to curb that will be less important for the foreseeable future. Instead the mechanisms linked to reduction of structural violence should immediately be given priority in planning of future international development co-operation activities.

The main responsibility for these processes is with the new government, and the political priorities it develops together with the donor community. Taken into account the specific historical background of the political system in Congo, the main issues for the central political system is to gain legitimacy. In the present situation the question of legitimacy in not immediately linked to the present government, or even the first elected government, which will come out of the coming elections. Mainly, it regards the political system as such. There is a generational understanding that the political system and the state administration are corrupt bodies, which are demanding much more in taxes and tributes than it ever has delivered. Thus, the broader layers of the population must be able to see that the new political system will differ substantially from the former ones in terms of provisions for physical security, state of

law, and conditions for production, local and regional trade, and long-term stability.

Therefore it is somewhat worrying the transitional Assembly and the Senate have still not succeeded to create the necessary legislation for new and free political activity, nor the legal base for the elections. Neither are the 'support' institutions for the democratisation process fully operational. This means, for example, that the democratic influence that civil society organisations had hoped to exert through institutions like the truth and reconciliation commission is held back.

For the general economic policy of DRC the I-PRSP is the basic document. Although the economic policy decisions taken since the Bretton Woods institutions resumed it activities in DRC have been praised, it should be noted that the Joint WB/IMF evaluation of the I-PRSP criticises the document for being to soft on the poverty alleviation issue. Neither goals for poverty alleviation, nor the lack implementation capacity are properly dealt with in the document. Thus, there is a risk that the broad local level reconstruction and reconciliation approach, needed for a deeper conflict resolution process is not looked upon with sufficient seriousness among the members of Assembly and the Senate.

9.10 The Congolese civil society

The above mentioned situation, in which there seem to be a slow pace in the legislative bodies as regards democratisation and human rights issues, not least the freedom of the press, puts a lot of pressure on the civil society organisations. The same goes for the obvious lack of administrative and financial capacity at provincial and local level, when it comes to the reconstruction of a normal life situation for the population. Our experience from field visits and interviews indicates that both politicians with experience, and the "wannabe" politicians have too vague ideas of how legitimate relations to the population in general can be developed. This means that for the foreseeable future a lot of local activities will have to be carried by local civil society organisations, not least the churches. Thus, also substantial parts of international development cooperation resources will have to be channelled through the civil society. Here we will probably find the most important mechanisms for the local conflict resolution and management activities, which have to accompany the developments at the central political level.

Churches

The most institutionalised complex of civil society organisations in DRC, is constituted by the churches. Besides being an important social force, the churches and their complex web of organisations also represent a substantial political force in the society. Important personalities from religious organisations are centrally placed within the new political institutions.

But the churches also represent the most advanced network at grass-root level of the society. Many informal local co-operative activities among ordinary people grow out of the membership in religious organisation. This has been visible during the war, not least in relation to different kinds of self-help 'communities' trying to deal with emergency

situations. These groups have, reportedly, played an immensely important role for raped and violated women. Women's groups have also been instrumental in negotiations around local disputes on land and other issues, that otherwise could have developed and linked themselves into the broader framework of the war.

The churches have since long in the Congolese history been a point of reference in people's everyday life. Not least in the sense that many schools, hospitals and health clinics have been run but churches and missionary organisations. The only institution more or less intact body in the Congolese society of today, with linkages from the central level and into local communities, are churches.

Hence, churches are a natural choice for many organisations and institutions within the donor community for channelling resources to local communities. However, there are also voices at local level complaining about sectarianism, in the sense that available resources are used only for members. In such cases their role as co-operation partners for aid agencies should be questioned.

The most important social and reconciliation activities carried out by churches and church organisations today are related to education and hospitals. Both the Catholic Church and the variety of protestant churches have their respective reconciliation programs, with seminars and discussion at parochial level all over the country. Thus, to a very high degree, the churches today do constitute the main part of the civil society in DRC.

NGOs and INGOs

A great number of international NGOs are active in DRC. Most of them have their main activity at the local level. They are important actors in all efforts to reduce local structural violence. We have not done any evaluation of individual NGOs, though we appreciate what we have seen of Save the Children's reintegration of child soldiers in Goma, and the local conflict resolution work done by Life and Peace Institute in Sud Kivu. One example of dynamising role that internal NGOs can play in order to bring local communities closer to each other, is the inter and intra community meeting in Uvira, Sud Kivu, in November 2003. Representative from conflict-ridden local communities in the province gathered to make an inventory of the present problems, and together outline and discuss possible solutions.

This kind of activities is badly needed in many parts of eastern DRC. Basically, what come up in these inventories are expressions of structural violence, injustices, land issues, which have underpinned the actuation of different communities along the years of war. These local tensions have played a much more active role for how local communities have behaved and allied with different parties, than what we normally perceive from outside. This is especially important in the Kivus, since the structure of the local armed groups has been highly fragmented.

According to our analysis of the importance of structural violence as an important part of the sources of direct violence and the local configuration of the war, we see in these kind of activities one of the main avenues to re-establish local social trust. Here there is no significant difference between local genuine NGOs, the churches and the international NGOs.

However, there is a risk that international NGOs to 'go native', in the sense that they are placing themselves between, on the one hand, the population and their local counterparts, and, on the other hand, the efforts to rebuild a functional local administration. Thus they could, in effect, block renewed relations between the administration and the population, which are crucial for a legitimate democratic development.

In this context, it also necessary to make a brief comment on mushrooming NGOs. As in most conflict and post-conflict situations many international donors need implementing agencies at local level. Often INGOs are attributed such assignments, and they need national organisations to cooperate with. DRC is no exception from the general reaction among many urban and skilled people to start numerous non-governmental organisations. These organisation are indeed non-governmental organisations, but may often be the creation of some friends looking for funding, i.a. a job. Thus, they have no social base whatsoever, and no local anchoring.

9.11 Summing up on conflict management mechanisms

Of the many conflict management mechanisms that have been influential in the DRC peace process MONUC is the one that can continue to play a substantial role on the ground. Normal procedures within the regional diplomatic world will obviously continue, but none of these have the logistic capacity to be instrumental in the continuous process of installing democratic institutions and give support to the elections.

At the national political level there are some signs that the required priority to local level change is not given. No consequent poverty alleviation policy is presented in the I-PRSP. Hence, it is doubtful if the government will have the capacity to reorganise its administrative structure, and its capacity for local intervention within the foreseeable future.

Thus, the civil society will play a crucial role in local reconstruction and reconciliation, not least the churches. It seems as if the churches are the only existing network with nationwide reach in today's DRC.

International NGOs role should not be underestimated. However, as external actors, often with a deep engagement at grass root level. Besides their support to sufferings populations, and participation in reconciliation processes, they could play a crucial role in supporting weak local administrative institutions to recover.

Hence, at the national political level, institutions are being re-established, and the opportunities for dialogue are still evolving. However, it has to be noted that economic recuperation is still extremely weak. Earlier experiences have indicated that around half of the armed conflicts in Africa return to war soon after a peace agreement. Although there are still no conclusive answers as to why this happens, it seems as if there is a constant lack of long-term perspectives and visions in the peace agreements. Most agreements deal with the mechanisms for the cease-fire, and the immediate constitutional and political changes. However, the political content of these changes is often left to an uncertain future. Thus, too little attention seems to be directed towards future societal participation, beyond what can be indicated by multi-party elections.

Nevertheless, the peace process is in need of the re-establishment of a legitimate political system, not least to supervise the use of the country's immense mineral resources. However, in order to target the traditions of divide and rule politics, and the fragmentation of political and economic elites, such a strategy must carry a conscience about the need to establish a legitimate Congolese leadership. Such a leadership must be given every opportunity of building a *domestic* political and social legitimacy, as a pillar for a deeper democratisation of public life.

At the local level there are considerable needs, which have to be satisfied. In the case of the DRC, this is not only a question of a normalisation back to pre-war levels. In fact, there is an entirely new societal order that has to be developed. Most of the vulnerabilities that forced people into violence and armed conflict are still present, and local social violence could be expected to continue for a long time to come.

Thus, it seems important that donors, with a specific interest in poverty reduction, subsequently make poverty reduction (or structural violence reduction) a prominent part of the ongoing political dialogue, both with the government and the supported civil society organisations.

The total breakdown of the fragile "Congolese house" came with the AFDL rebellion. It triggered a struggle for a restructured relation among Congolese elite groups, which is still very slowly moving towards a possible solution. Thus, the elites of the DRC need scope to establish an arena for governance in the broadest sense of the word, in which the role of all identities should be acknowledged. The international community should take this need into account when identifying and formulating interventions in both the political and economic sphere.

10. Conflict analysis Uganda

10.1 Basic characteristics.

Uganda is a land-locked country, surrounded by Kenya to the east, the Sudan to the north, DRC to the west and Rwanda and Tanzania to the south, covering some 243.000 sq. km. According to preliminary results from a census conducted in 2002, the population was close to 25 million people, with a population growth of 3.4 percent annually. More than 85 percent of the population live in the rural areas, largely dependent on agriculture. A high population density is found in the fertile districts close to Lake Victoria, to the east and in the southwest towards the Rwanda border, with well over 200 inhabitants per sq. km. The population is divided between various ethnic groups, of which Bantus, such as Baganda and Banyankole, are by far the most numerous. Some of these groups also make up the traditional kingdoms, such as Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro. Nilotic groups, such as Langi, Acholi and Alur, live in the north, with Nilo-Hamitics (Teso and Karamojong) to the east and some Sudanic groups to the west. Conflicts in Uganda have since independence often been regarded as a north – south controversy. Uganda ranks just below average among African economies, with a GNI (Gross National Income) per capita of US$ 310 (2000), but during the last decade, economic growth been estimated at among the highest on the continent. Against this impressive trend we have to note the high debt and the dependence on coffee for exports. Various poverty alleviation programmes have been successful on an aggregate level, but the benefits are unequally distributed, not least regionally and ethnically. This, of course is one cause for the conflicts dealt with below.

10.2 Uganda since independence

Uganda was formally granted its independence from Britain on October 9th 1962. Since that time, the situation in Uganda has been marked by frequent conflicts and insecurity. The seeds of this turbulence might have been sown in a compromise in the first regime, with the election of the King of Buganda as Head of State, and with the ambitious Langi from the north as Prime Minister (Milton Obote). In less than five years, Obote had made himself executive President, with the assistance of a newly appointed Army Commander, Idi Amin. What followed was a constant turmoil under the rule of Obote I, Amin, Obote II and the

Okellos. A short-lived attempt to find a peaceful regime after Amin in 1979–80 was crushed by a coup that eventually led the way to the return of Obote. What happened during these twenty years has been devastating to both economic and social life in Uganda – a legacy that is hard to overcome.

In 1986, Yoweri Museveni took over power after a prolonged civil war. Initially, the new regime came to be associated with a radical development strategy. However, this was to be mellowed down into a close association with the western dominated development agenda of the time. Politically, this has been connected to a system characterised as a No-Party democracy. A fundamental component of this has been the concentration of power to the president personally.

Even against this backdrop of relative peace and progress in Uganda since 1986, it is difficult to see a country free from conflicts. Worst hit internally has been the northern parts of the country. At the same time, Uganda is very much an essential part of being located in between two of the most volatile regions in Africa, from the Horn to the DRC.

10.3 Internal Conflict Pattern.

The present conflicts in Uganda can be explained by relative deprivation and suffering from a socio-economic exclusion. This is especially aggravated among some groups by the fact that they once enjoyed being at the helm. In addition, the conflict situation is determined by support from across the borders, as well as a meddling in the affairs of neighbouring countries.

The Acholi region

As mentioned conflicts in Uganda have often been explained as a matter of a north to south divide. However, when Obote first lost power (1971) it went to another northerner, Idi Amin. When he was overthrown the second time in 1985, it was more of an internal Luo affair, as the Acholi military leadership under Tito Okello took over. When Yoweri Museveni took over the reigns of power a resistance emerged, initially led by Alice Lakwena, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), based on Christian religious fundamentalist, coupled with some traditional beliefs. After some early military success, Lakwena fled to Kenya and her army was replaced by the Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA) under her uncle Joseph Kony. Few terrorist organisations have resorted to such extreme cruelties against their enemies, as well as civilians, as the LRA, including the abduction of children in order to use them as soldiers. LRA has been supported by the Sudan Government in order to destabilise the Ugandan side of the common border. This can be seen as an attempt to counter Ugandan support of the SPLM/A in southern Sudan. Another strategy from the Sudan could be that the support of terror, of whatever brand, can be to prepare the way for Islam.

During an attempt to eliminate the guerrilla, the Ugandan army has launched its "Operation Iron Fist". By forcing the Kony group out of the bases in southern Sudan it now seems as if the main activity has been to attack civilians more or less at random in order to secure basic supplies.

Any negotiations with LRA must be seriously questioned, due to the obvious lack of rationality in whatever is done.

Even if there has been talk about negotiations with Kony and LRA the ultimate solution resorted to seems to be nothing short of a military victory. Still it can be noted that LRA recently ventured into new territories in Karamoja and close to Soroti town. Since that time virtually the whole of Soroti district has been more or less deserted, the majority of the population living as IDPs in town. A new factor that has emerged is the Arrow group to fight the LRA. In a few months, some 11,000 soldiers have been recruited among unemployed youth in Soroti and neighbouring districts. This group is sanctioned by the government. A similar military force has also been set up with some 10,000 soldiers in Lira District. These heavily armed groups might now be effective in holding back the LRA menace, but how they will be used in the future is an open (and potentially dangerous) question.

It is difficult to understand if the LRA would receive some kind of support from the local communities that have suffered immensely during the last two decades. On the other hand, election results do indicate at the same time that President Museveni has very little support in this region. Therefore, in a choice between two bad things, the people might even see LRA as a potential liberator. Museveni for his part, has taken a very active military role against the LRA, and occasionally he camps, sometimes with the entire Cabinet, in Gulu (and lately also in Soroti). This can be seen as an attempt to show himself off as a strong and determined leader.

Karamoja.

Karamoja makes up the three districts of Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit. The population of some 450,000 is called Karamojong, but is divided between a number of ethnic groups and subgroups. Most of the people belong to what is known as Karimojong, which are subdivided into Bokora, Matheniko and Pian. These are groups that have been involved in cattle raids and confrontations between themselves and with neighbouring people for the past centuries.

Karamoja has been an area grossly neglected by the authorities since the days of colonial rule. Through the introduction of national and internal boundaries, the annual movements of the nomadic Karamojong have been restricted. During the colonial days, Karamoja was a closed area designed as a game retreat for civil servants and military staff. Trade with ivory from the area was one of the most profitable exports from the British East Africa. Unfortunately, the situation in Karamoja has not greatly improved since independence, with the area being increasingly marginalised. One major difference in the last few decades is the massive build up of arms in Karamoja. Estimates vary at between 50.000 to150,000 small guns in the region, with a widespread trade all over northern Uganda and well beyond the borders. Attempts at disarmament have not been successful, so far. The element of the gun has made the ongoing rivalries between the different Karimojong groups more serious than previously, coupled with the fighting across the border to Kenya, mainly against the Pokot. Further, it is now customary that the losing side in these conflicts take revenge by raiding the more peaceful people in the

region, or cross the border to attack the neighbouring Teso (particularly the Katakwi district) and Kapchorwa. Increasingly, cattle rearing has been commercialised in recent years.

A major task now confronts the government i.e. the building up of a functioning administrative rule to which the Karamojong can feel a sense of belonging. The concerns of Karamoja, and its neighbouring districts, have to be focused on achieving some kind of inclusion in national affairs, but also to reach some external agreement with Kenya and the Sudan.

The West Nile

When Obote was overthrown for the first time, it was by his army commander, Idi Amin, originally from the West Nile. He was notorious for his regime of terror. After eight years in power, Amin fled to his home area and with some of his former officers formed the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF). Since that time sporadic struggles have occurred. Recently, the UNRF II has negotiated a peaceful settlement with the government. Thereby, the West Nile might be part of what can be classified as postconflict. Another group that does not now seem to be active in this region is the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that was also largely formed by ex-Amin soldiers. The main issues confronting the region now are the effects of the war in DRC, i.e. the escalating violence in Ituri.

Other postconflict parts of the north and east.

Initially, the LRA atrocities also affected the Langi region, with the two districts of Lira and Apac. Lately, we have seen how LRA is moving back into this area making the situation more insecure once again. With LRA moving further towards Soroti, we can now see how the Teso are being squeezed by LRA from the west and the Karimojong raids in the east. Even this area was at one time in the late 1980s/early 1990s, the home of an active insurgency, Uganda People´s Army (UPA) led by a former Minister for Defence under Obote II, Peter Otai. Work carried out in the Teso region by local mediators might be used as an example for analysis on peace building.

Among other armed groups that have been active in the north, we could mention Force Obote Back Again (FOBA) and Citizens Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP). In the east various armed groups have emerged, such as Uganda Salvation Army (USA) and the Mount Elgon Vigilantes.

The Ruwensori Mountain borders to RDC.

Since colonial days, there has been sporadic armed rebellion in the Ruwensori Mountains. People in this region have been unable to reap the benefits of the natural resources, thus creating a feeling of being neglected compared with the inhabitants of the kingdom of Toro. Many of their aspirations have been geared towards the establishment of a separate kingdom straying over the border to what is now the RDC. This has been the objective of a guerrilla group calling itself the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has also been defined as a terrorist group. Two years ago, this group carried out numerous attacks on schools and

other public institutions. Since that time, they are said to be regrouping in the Virunga Mountains on the RDC side of the border.

Some general points related to the western and central parts of the country.

What has been referred to above, have been the most significant open spates of insecurity recently. In recent times, there have been a number of bomb explosions aimed at popular targets in Kampala city. According to those accused of being involved in this, they had been sent abroad (Nairobi) to learn the technique of manufacturing bombs. The funding is said to have come from Muslim sources and the culprits are alleged to have been recruited from among unemployed Muslim youth. This links these activities to Muslim fundamentalism and alleged terrorism in the East African region. There have also been allegations of the funding of various destabilising activities in Uganda, linked to the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

After the last presidential elections, a certain tension has existed related to the person of the main challenger against the incumbent, i.e. Besigye. This has mainly been due to some general insecurity in the western part of the country, closely connected to the border insecurity towards Rwanda and RDC.

10.4 The External Conflict Pattern

During its 40 years of independence, the Ugandan people have experienced no less than ten Heads of State (Obote ruling twice). On six occasions, the new ruler has taken over his position after a military coup or at least after some form of violence. With this background in mind, it can be regarded as a new period of stability that President Museveni´s present rule has lasted for 17 years, so far. This is in spite of what has been referred to above. At the same time the situation in neighbouring countries has been exposed to a long sequence of violence. Below, an account will be given on Uganda, as part of a regional security complex.

Uganda-Kenya

Uganda is largely dependent on Kenya for its external trade routes, being a land-locked country. Since the early 1960s, the relationship between the two countries has been cordial, but filled with a mutual suspicion. During the Idi Amin regime, it was difficult to see any coherent policies between the two countries. Many Ugandans were forced to leave their country and settled in Kenya, for fear of losing their lives, as Amin unleashed his brutal terror. In the middle of the 1970s, a statement made by Amin on the colonial boundaries between Kenya and Uganda sparked the onset of serious anti-Ugandan feelings and demonstrations. However, this can also be seen as a way used by Kenyatta to regain confidence after the political murder of a popular politician, J M Kariuki.

One serious incidence was the Israeli Entebbe raid to liberate the hostages held in Uganda after a hijacking. This would not have been possible without the active backing by the Kenyan authorities and the permission to use a Kenyan airport for refuelling.

Ultimately, Kenya did not play any role in the overthrow of Amin, even if many of the returning politicians had been in this country for a

long period of time. Once again the relationship was one of mutual suspicion in the years after the fall of Amin, especially during the time of Obote II.

One event that led to the onset of an uneasy relationship between Moi and the Ugandan president-to- be was a peace agreement signed between Museveni and Okello. This was done under the Moi chairmanship, while the Museveni troops were still advancing on Kampala to take over power by force.

Largely, Kenya has been open for dissidents from Uganda for the last 40 years. Rebel groups have been organised from Nairobi. At presently, the founder of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) that was later replaced by the LRA, Alice Lakwena, lives as a refugee in Kenya. Nairobi is also claimed to be the place to train Muslim terrorist that have been responsible for numerous bomb attacks in Kampala. Even if we have not witnessed any open hostility between Kenya and Uganda, this might be because both countries have allowed armed atrocities against each other.

On another level, Kenyan pastoralists have been involved in open fighting against their Ugandan counterparts since pre-colonial times. Up to the present day, we can follow how Pokot (and to a certain extent Turkana) attacks have seriously disrupted life in Kapchorwa District, and there has been fighting against the Karimojong. There is also the location of an extensive arms trade stretching over the whole Horn of Africa.

With a clandestine opposition growing with an intensive repression on either side of the Kenya/Uganda border, the progressive elements on both sides have often been united in solidarity.

Uganda-the Sudan

The Sudan attained its independence in the middle of the 1950s, as a part of North Africa. Since that time, there has been a constant division between the Muslim north and the southern part of the country. At an early stage, the southern guerrilla war was waged by the Anyanya I and II movements. A definite provocation against the population in the south came, when President Niemeri introduced the Muslim Sharia law to be used all over the Sudan. Since the overthrow of Niemeri, the Sudan has been ruled by proponents of an Islamic fundamentalism. For a period, the Prime Minister was a religious leader, al Madhi and later on, politics were characterised by a struggle for influence between the President, Omer Beshir, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, al Tourabi.

Even if the war in southern Sudan has always had an influence on northern Uganda, the situation is at present at its lowest level. Opposition to the Khartoum regime is through the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under Joseph Garang, who has been close to the Ugandan President Museveni. There has been financial support for the SPLM/A from the Ugandan side, while at the same time, the Sudan Government has been backing up the LRA. In the 21st century, the Ugandan army has been active with its "Iron fist", attacking the LRA camps in southern Sudan after agreements with the Khartoum regime.

The relationship between southern Sudan and Uganda is also similar to the one with Kenya, as certain nomadic groups are engaged in raids over the three borders. All countries are also involved in the arms trades.

In the West Nile region, the population is ethnically close to the southern Sudanese. Often, the Amin regime was seen as more Sudanese than Ugandan. Consequently, at the fall of Amin, rebel groups were started by former soldiers retreating to the neighbourhood of the Sudan and the then Zaire. One such group was the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF) I and II, and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). It is also in that area that the State of Lado was once a separate kingdom during colonial time.

Largely, the future of Uganda and the Great Lakes/Lake Victoria region is closely knitted to events in the Sudan. At the same time, the Sudan has been forced to enter into negotiations with dissident groups in the south and a peace proposal is now being discussed. If this will lead to any substantial result is unclear at this stage, but the outcome is crucial, at least for Uganda. At the same time, we also have to realise the enormous mineral (not least oil) resources found in the south. This is of vital importance, and not the future role of the international financial interest, for the peace process. We have also to account for the fact that the Sudan is involved in civil war in other regions, apart from the south.

Uganda and the great lakes countries

The relation between Uganda and the great lakes countries appear in chapter 2.

10.5 The Uganda State and Civil Society

The Ugandan policy, in relation to the internal conflicts, has been one of military confrontations in most cases. This has been expressed as an assurance from the government that the enemy will be "wiped out" or "destroyed". At the same time, development activities in the north have been instituted, such as the Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme I and II (NURP I and II). This has now been replaced by a social fund that is mainly supposed to rely on the private capital development in the region.

In the region, Uganda has tried to motivate its aggressive policies from the view of internal security, or to blame other actors such as Rwanda. Even if Uganda has been highly praised for its economic progress since the middle of the 1980s, the present regime has not been able to solve basic insecurity and violence. One issue that has to be tackled is the re-introduction of governance in the most volatile regions of the country.

Apart from the issues already raised, there might be a looming crisis facing Uganda as a nation-state, i.e. the role of the traditional kingdoms. It is unlikely that Buganda, would be particularly satisfied at remaining in some form of cultural/traditional unity for the future. Further, with any change it is likely that other kingdoms would eventually bring out similar kinds of demands. In the end, this might become an explosive issue and a challenge not only to the Ugandan, but also to the African Nation State, as moulded by colonialism and determined by the OAU Charter in the early 1960s. In addition, this factor has to be considered together with the numerous internal and external conflicts that are present in Uganda at this stage.

One potential expedient for the conflicts in northern Uganda would be to resort to some form of traditional mediation based on the civil society. Already we can see how a variety of NGOs, CBOs and religious organisations are bringing representatives for the warring factions together for fact-finding and for initiating dialogue. Often this has been done with the support of bilateral or multilateral donors, but the attempts have been rather uncoordinated. It might be an advantage if efforts like this could be more focused and carefully followed up.

The attempts among the Acholi that have become known as the "Bending of Spears", involving both modern and more traditional aspects on conflicts and conflict reconciliation, is one example of these kinds of activities.. Largely, these efforts have been made very complicated because of the very character of the conflicts, which have broken down the traditional social order and norms. This has too often been replaced by the "Power of the Gun". What used to be common practice is not valid any more.

10.6 A thematic analysis

Causes of conflict

In the case of Karamoja we can clearly distinguish the historical roots of the present conflict in the colonial policies, followed up by serious government neglect (exclusion) since independence. The region is characterised by widespread poverty, a low level of literacy and poor health generally. Nothing has really been done to make the Karamojong part of national development. By bringing guns into the region, the conflict has reached very serious proportions. The only way out for the young Karimojong warriors to acquire wealth for marriage and a relatively comfortable life, has been to take part in armed raids. It could be easy to refer to the Karamoja conflict as based on ethnic (tribal) reasons, but this is only part of the truth. Rather we could see the stigmatisation of the "primitive" Karimojong as a deliberate (or unintentional) way of brutalising these people. A sensitive border situation towards the Teso group has created much animosity between the neighbours.

Partly, the conflict in the Acholi region can also be explained by an exclusion from national development. This is particularly so, as a reaction to the advantaged status held nationally during previous regimes, such as Obote I and II. At least it has been an easy task to play on these kinds of feelings for both the HSM and the LRA. Under such conditions, it has been easy for religious fundamentalism to play on the perception of being left out. As in other parts of the north, conditions in the West Nile are greatly lagging behind. The people of the Rewensori Mountains believe they have excluded from mainstream national development since the colonial days. This has made them resort to a claim for a kingdom of their own, which has led to armed guerrilla activities.

From an international perspective, Uganda has been active in DRC, which has also grouped them on the opposite side from former allies such as Zimbabwe and Rwanda. In the case of Rwanda, the animosity created could escalate, in the worst case, into open war between the two countries. This in turn could very well be part of a much more serious re-

gional conflict involving the whole region. In a way, it can here be argued that Uganda has been moving away politically from the East African region to be a more active part of the Great Lakes' region. With the deteriorating relationship between Museveni and Kagame that we have noticed in some instances, this might lead to a dangerous and complex conflict scenario.

The other country that will have a great deal of impact on the Ugandan situation will be the Sudan and its future development

Effects

Raids by the Karimojong have deepened the poverty further among the more peaceful agricultural people of Karamoja, living under a constant threat of attack. During the early parts of the 21st century, this has also been due to LRA presence. Because of the war activities, we can find much disability in the area (both physical and psychological) coupled with a skewed gender balance.

Living under the conditions found in and adjacent to Karamoja has created a feeling of apathy, which results in limited economic activities, not least in farming. Many people resort to relying on donor or NGO handouts for mere survival. In addition, a large number of the population are living as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in camps. In the Katakwi District alone, 76,000 IDPs lived in 53 camps in 2001, out of a total population of 275,000 inhabitants. It has been estimated that the number of IDPs has increased since that time, as the army has been withdrawn for other duties, i.e. to fight the LRA. In addition, virtually the whole population of neighbouring Soroti are now classified as IDPs. In connection to these camps, we can also find a risk of an increased spread of HIV/AIDS, not least from the indiscipline among soldiers, leading to many cases of rape.

Even northern Uganda has lagged further behind due to a constant fear of terror. Many of the fields are hardly cultivated; school children are not attending schools etc. as there is a constant fear of attacks. As in Teso a considerable number of the total population live in camps. A very difficult process can be expected when (or if) the former LRA soldiers are supposed to be re-settled in their former communities.

The situation in the western parts centred at Fort Portal is also that of poverty that has been aggravated due to the war conditions. Socio-economic standards are low particularly in the district of Bundibugyo, especially with a number of IDPs and refugees coming over the border from DRC. Another factor very much related to this is the escalating domestic violence in the conflict areas. To women and children this might be a more visible aspect compared with other related effects.

External connections.

It can be argued that the conflict in Karamoja is an integral part of the troubled Horn of Africa. This entire region has historically been living off nomadic cattle rearing, with raiding against neighbouring communities as a natural activity. The procurement of guns has made this into a dangerous situation. However, a basic consideration must be that the kind of traditional lifestyle prevalent in the Horn of Africa is not compatible with the modernisation taking place in the rest of the continent.

Therefore, national, as well as international policies must be for fundamental change – not merely to treat the symptoms.

From the outset, the insecurity and conflicts in northern Uganda have been closely connected to the situation in the Sudan that has undergone civil war since the 1950s. Partly, this is essential for the expansionist policies of Islam in Africa. Lately, there have even been attempts to link organisations such as LRA to the al Queda. In this, the former Amin soldiers making up the bulk of the UNRF II might also have played a role, especially as the Amin regime was at least formally Muslim.

For the West Nile, there have also been claims put forward that this is part of a colonial formation known as the Lado State. Even if this cannot be taken seriously now, the closeness to DRC makes the border to this country rather insecure. The same is the case further south in Kabarole, Bundibugyo and Kasese, which have been areas with an influx of refugees from DRC. Insecurity can be closely linked to the civil war taking place in DRC.

10.7 What to do?

The complex realities of Karamoja and the neighbouring region need a multidimensional strategy, involving both a military and a developmental component. As the culture of the gun has so deeply affected the whole way of life, some kind of disarmament has to take place. At the same time to do this by force might prove difficult, as this would also mean taking control of the illegal arms trade. Further, for the young warriors, this is the main source of status and wealth, which could not be replaced by only some vague promises of "development". One complication has to be taken into account, the Karimojong are not an army as such, but are mostly attacking for personal gain; they are merely a number of criminal groups.

So far, much of what has been brought into Karamoja has been for mere survival. In all this, the people of the region are very suspicious of government, and to a certain extent also of non-governmental assistance. Therefore, any changes in the region are very sensitive and must be introduced with great care, by leaders accepted by the wider Karamojong population. Coupled to this must be some kind of mediation with the neighbours, primarily the Teso and the Sebei. To complicate matters further, it is of the utmost necessity that a solution to the problem must take an international dimension.

Northern Uganda also needs some kind of international mediation, involving the Sudan. The LRA now seem to resort to pure banditry and are becoming increasingly irrational in their behaviour. For the future, the districts in the north would need some form of integrated approach to rebuild physical and human capital, but as long as the war continues there is little scope for a positive change. The only viable development would now be emergency support, coupled with an attempt to regain government trust.

In the early 21st century, the Langi and Teso regions, plus the West Nile, could be regarded as postconflict. This is a very delicate period, when the roles of donors and NGOs would be to strengthen civil society. There is a great need to consolidate the process towards a lasting peace

and development process. Overall, there is a great need to assist Uganda in the efforts on poverty alleviation, but this must take the regional and ethnic dimensions into serious account. On the international front, it is essential to take an active part in the negotiations with the Sudan, and on the DRC. There would also be some point in initiating a discussion about the way international capital is actually aggravating the situation in both the Sudan and the DRC, not least as there are important Swedish interests involved.

11. Conflict analysis Kenya

11.1 Basic characteristics

Kenya is located in East Africa, surrounded by the Somali Republic to the east, Ethiopia and the Sudan to the north, Uganda to the west and Tanzania to the south. The country also has a coastline to the Indian Ocean. The total area is some 580,000 sq. km, with a population of some 32 millions. Most of the population is concentrated to the slopes of Mount Kenya (the highest Mountain) down to the capital Nairobi, and close to Lake Victoria. This is also the best agricultural land in the country, providing the backbone of the economy. Kenya is a major producer of tea and coffee.

The population is divided into numerous ethnic groups, of which Bantus (Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii etc.) are the most numerous. On the shores of Lake Victoria, we find a Nilotic group, i.e. the Luo. The "original" inhabitants of Kenya are the Nilo-Hamitic population (Masai, Turkana, Pokot, Samburu, and the Somalis). The GNI per capita for Kenya was in the year 2000, US$ 360, placing it slightly ahead of its partners in the new East African Community (EAC), Uganda and Tanzania. Since the last few decades, the economic performance has been rather mediocre. According to estimates, more than half of the population is living under the poverty line. Further, poverty is rather unequally distributed over the country regionally/ethnically, but also by gender.

11.2 Kenya since independence.

Kenya was formally declared independent on December 13th 1963, after years of armed struggle led by the Kenya Land Freedom Army (KLFA), or with an abusive British expression, i.e. the Mau Mau. The first president of Kenya was Jomo Kenyatta, who had spent years in custody for alleged leadership of the rebellion.

To many foreign observers Kenya has appeared to be a haven of peace in a troubled region. However, on careful scrutiny it is obvious that there have been many cracks beneath the surface. Since the time of independence, disagreement with Somalia over territory has been the cause of insecurity in the entire northeastern Province, i.e. the so-called Shifta war. Similarly, the vast region to the north has experienced destabilising cattle rustling and a war-like situation between various

groups, aggravated further by the massive arms proliferation. Intensified competition over land, with an increase in the demand of cash crop production, lies at the very root of these conflicts

Politically, Kenya has exposed a number of undemocratic measures since 1963. The leading opposition party of the time, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) joined the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). Thereafter, these were only some short-lived attempts to form alternative parties that were never able to function properly. So, for example, the Kenya People´s Union (KPU) was banned and its leader, the former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, was put in prison. In the 1980s, Kenya was even turned into a one-party state constitutionally.

Opposition of various kinds have been met with strong repression. The list of political murders consists of many prominent names, of which some are Tom Mboya, J M Kariuki and Robert Ouko. Detention and politically motivated prison terms have been common practice, resulting in the real opposition being forced underground. Vote rigging and denial to stand for certain candidates have occurred at the general elections held. In addition to this, the government has been very generous in the use of the national budget to reward districts voting in the "right" way.

Corruption has become a way of life, dominating Kenyan society. This has also been coupled with the establishment of a state, dominated by tribal considerations. During the time of Kenyatta, the Kikuyu was unduly favoured by the regime, replaced by the Kalenjin when Moi was in charge.

With increasing poverty, crime has been become the only possible way of securing a living in the country. This is particularly evident in the capital, Nairobi (popularly known as Nairobbery) and the tourist areas on the coast. The issue of street kids of the 1970s was never really addressed and this is now reflected in an increased crime rate. The above is a brief background to the real and potential conflicts in the Kenya of today.

11.3 Present Conflict Pattern.

In the early 1990s, Kenya opened up for multiparty elections, after strong pressure from external forces. Widespread violence was a characteristic feature of the two first elections (1992 and 1997). According to the Akiwumi Report, this violence often took the form of tribal clashes, for example Kalenjin and Masai, against the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo. One effect of this has been the escalating number of Internally Displaced persons (IDPs). Even if the last election (2002) was more peaceful, there are fears of potentially new clashes of a tribal nature. A likely scenario that emerged during the interviews was that of a new strong GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu and Meru) alliance building up.

Since the new government has been installed, there has been common talk of a Mount Kenya "mafia" dominance. With that as a background, it is speculated that the Luo will now suffer and the idea of Luo-Kisii clashes was mentioned as one possibility for the future. This can also be coupled with the increased poverty and exclusion of the people living near Lake Victoria.

In a government survey from 1992, the generally volatile conditions in countries surrounding Kenya was mentioned as a destabilising factor and a cause of tribal clashes. Cattle rustling and a flow of migration from Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia tend to increase the tension in the northern parts of Kenya. Consequently, we can see the future stability of Kenya as closely related to the development at the Horn.

A great deal of hope has been placed in the new government under President Mwai Kibaki who took over from Moi in early 2003. However, as mentioned above, the president has already been accused of tribal considerations in the appointment of his new cabinet. This might also be said of many of the replacements made in the civil service. Of course, it is good if corrupt elements in politics and administration are thrown out, but what about the character of the newly appointed? In addition, too many in the government party (NARC), even in the cabinet, have been very close to President Moi in the previous regime. Ethnic and regional aspects have been the key to forming a new government, but this might also be what makes cooperation fail in the end. One dilemma facing President Kibaki when Vice-President Wamalwa passed away recently was how to play the ethnic and regional cards to gain a balanced solution.

For the future, one of the most acute issues for the new government to face is the escalating poverty. This, in itself, is also a cause for worries when it comes to potential conflicts, especially as expressed in regional and tribal terms. If large sections of the population are excluded from a general development process, this might be a reason for new clashes. This is now closely related to what is happening in the Lake Victoria region. Another aspect of poverty is the crime rate, as mentioned above. Even if some anecdotes were told on how people acted as substitute police officers in the early stages of the new regime, this is a issue that has to be addressed seriously by the new government.

12. Tanzania

Tanzania is a key player in the region. Despite being one of the poorest countries in Africa, its different governments have played an important role as sub regional power. During the Nyerere era Tanzania played a crucial role in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, which gave Tanzania high credit — and moral authority — among fellow African states as well as in the international community. Tanzania has also played an active role with OAU/AU, SADC and EAC as well as in other regional institutions, as well as on the international level, not the least in the Nonalignment movement, the South Commission and within the UN system. Tanzania thus has had a more active foreign policy then for instance Kenya.

12.1 Internal conflicts

Tanzania has achieved to maintain a remarkable stability, in a context where all neighbours, apart from Zambia and Malawi, have been devastated by internal conflicts. The national identity is today firmly rooted and has overtaken the ethnic identity. Not the least through a systematic nation building policy, including the use of *Swahili* as teaching medium in primary school and as national language. The ethnic identities has been strongly depoliticised, and do not play a major importance for political mobilisation. Regional and local affiliation, on the other hand plays a certain role, not the least as side effect of the one-man constituencies and majority election system.

Chama Cha Mapinduzu (CCM) is still the by far strongest political party with few challenges. The opposition is divided in more then six different parties. Civic United Front (CUF) being the most important. Even if it claims to be a non-religious party, its strongest base is on Zanzibar, along the coast and among the Muslim population in the inland. The military has been strong, but have not played any significant political role.

Within Tanzania few seeds to large-scale violent conflicts could be observed, apart from the tense situation on Pemba and Unguja. After two stormy elections in 1995 and 2000, marred by fraud and rigging by the ruling party and ending up in the "massacre" of 20 CUF supporters demonstrating against the irregularities in January 2001, a peace accord, the *Mwafakaa*, has successfully been implemented. Strong feelings, however, still exists. Not the least on Pemba with its larger "Arab" population.

The elections in 2005 will be a test how deep the peace accord is anchored in different segment of the population on Zanzibar. Failure to develop more inclusive and democratic processes might deepen frustration and provide a fundament for political mobilisation.

Persistent and wide spread poverty on the mainland could, as well, provide a hotbed for increasingly frustrated majority in the rural areas, as well as among the rapidly growing population of youth in the larger cities.

The Muslim population are generally perceived, and perceive themselves, as poorer and more marginalised then Christian population. This is a potential source of political mobilisation. There exist strong and missionizing movements with strong international backing both on the Christian and the Muslim side. Religion has to a certain extent been used around a few of the bigger mosques Dar es Salaam, along the coast and on Zanzibar. The government have acted strongly and intervened to curb religious mobilisation. The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam has been taken as strong indicator that radical Muslim networks are active in East Africa and Tanzania and recent alerts by US and UK intelligence has pointed at the likelihood that Bin Laden and related networks could have cells in Tanzania.

The economic elite is constituted of on the one hand families with Indian background, that do not play an active role in the politics in the country; the "indigenous" elite, often with close ties to political elite; and the rapidly growing number of entrepreneurs with South Africa, European or non-African background. The arrival of foreign investor and the integration in the global economy have started to generate intra elite conflicts. Claims have been raised on the need for a policy of "indigenisation" of economic activities. But it is unlikely to generate open violence.

Despite these source of conflict we perceive that it is unlikely that the internal conflict configuration in Tanzania should generate violence or open conflicts that could effect the situation in the Great Lakes region. On the other hand, the conflict in the Great Lakes, in front of all in Burundi and Rwanda, has had negative effects on the situation in Tanzania, which partly explains Tanzania's active role in the region.

12.2 Tanzania's role in the Great Lakes

Tanzania engagement in the region could be understood from two points of departure: On the one hand it was/is a part of a radical pan-African agenda to support the liberation and emancipation of Southern and Central Africa. In that context Tanzania have had a sympathy for the perceived "under dog" the *Hutu* side, in Burundi up to now, but for apparent reasons not in Rwanda after the genocide—while striving to be a mediator, at the same time. On the other, the developments in the great Lakes Region do have large impact on Tanzania's external and internal security, as well economy. The long borders Tanzania share with Rwanda, Burundi and DRC cut across pre-colonial political, cultural and economic units. Western Tanzania was a part of the interlacustrine belt of kingdoms, and has a tradition of cross-border cultural links and economic exchange with today's Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.

Mutually intelligible languages are spoken, facilitating, e.g., trade, and labour migration, intermarriages as well as integration of refugees from the conflicts in the region. A large part of the export and import from Rwanda, Burundi and southern part of Eastern DRC passed and passes via Tanzania. The repercussions of the civil conflicts and war in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC have flooded over into the communities of western Tanzania, as well as other parts of the country, creating insecurity and instability, facilitated HIV-Aids diffusion as well as putting pressure on land, food, wood, infrastructure and other resources, causing environmental degradation. Other negative side effects have been criminality, drugs and circulation of weapons. It had as well, to a lesser extent, created income opportunities. Waves of refugees have come in the early sixties, 1972, 1993–96 and after 1998 from Burundi and DRC. Over the last decade, the refugee inflow, at the almost inconceivable scale of at times more than one million, sought solace in under populated and peripheral border areas while others linked up to friends and relatives in Dar es Salaam and other towns.

During Nyerere's time, the prevailing, humanitarian, view was that: "The refugee is not a foreigner, but a guest in need." Citizenship was made available to refugees through a naturalization process. Land was given. With more then one million refugees in the country after the crisis in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda 1994, the negative consequences of the large number of refugees led to strong popular resentment against the refugees, not seldom developing to xenophobia. Rwandan refugees was gradually expelled, the Burundian as well. But the continued conflicts in Burundi and in DRC after 1998 led to stop of the repatriation and new waves of refugees.

But the Tanzanian government, or at least part of it, has pursued duplicity of policies in the Great Lakes. Tanzania have facilitated a number of peace negations in Arusha and elsewhere both for Rwanda earlier and now for Burundi, however at the same time it allowed, or did not have the capacity to stop, the Burundian *Hutu* rebels to use Western Tanzania as a focal point for key activities of the rebellion including: military mobilisation, recruitment, training, fund-raising, political strategizing, communications, arms trafficking, resource distribution, medical treatment, naval operations and the launching of cross-border attacks, according to for instance ICG. This situation has led to that the *Tutsi* side in the conflict have had doubts on Tanzania's neutrality in terms of peace making.

With 479,770 refugees, in January 2004, Tanzania is still the leading refugee-hosting country in Africa. Around 327,000 are Burundi refugees assisted by the UNHCR in seven refugee camps in Tanzania and around 150000 from DRC. In addition Another 470,000 refugees who left Burundi way back 1972 live outside camps in overlying towns and villages.

Following the signing 2003 of a ceasefire and power-sharing deal between the transitional government in Bujumbura and Burundi's biggest rebel group, the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza, improved security has been opening up opportunities for organised refugee returns to new regions of the country.

Today there appear to be a strong conviction both among the popula-

tion and the government in Tanzania that the country would gain from stable development in Great Lakes, including DRC, and that a stable development includes power sharing in Burundi. It appears that the unofficial support for the *Hutu* side in the Burundian conflict have been reduced, but that it at the same time still are strong forces in Tanzania that support the *Hutu* side, in Burundi. It seems unlikely that the coming election will bring about a change of this policy line.

As part of the facilitation of the peace process Tanzania will host the UN conference for the Great Lakes in November 2004.

The conclusions of the country analyses appear in chapter 2–6.

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Great Lakes Administrative Boundaries



Prepared by OCHA Great Lakes Regional Office, Nairobi.
Map slightly modified by the authors (borders outside the region)

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Halving poverty by 2015 is one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring cooperation and sustainability. The partner countries are responsible for their own development. Sida provides resources and develops knowledge and expertise, making the world a richer place.

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